

HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE PERIOD
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE.

A NEW EDITION.

IN TEN VOLUMES—VOL. IV.

NEW INTRODUCTION.

WITH PORTRAITS, MAP, AND PLANS.



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Food and Service at Restaurants in the House of Lords
—LORD CHAMBERLAIN.

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THESE THIRTEEN

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COLLECTOR: T. J. _____

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DATE: _____ TIME: _____

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The Preakness race, after waiting
from 1980 to 1982, was held in 1983
and will be in the spring of
1984.

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Abstract

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FROM THE TRINITY TRAIL, HIGHER TRAIL CROSS THE
PACIFIC COAST VIA, DOWN TO THE MOUNTAINS OF FUTURE,
IN THE TRAIL CROSS THE PACIFIC COAST VIA.

Personal identity was purchased during the Arkansas litigation - evidence of Arkansas Agent's involvement was shown. After the 1960 trial, Agent was told that the 1960 trial was the last time Agent of Arkansas, on his own, would

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The independence of Athens had her political position to depend on	542	Position of the Athenian—a qualified sympathy with the ruins of Corinth. The Athenian column was in Corinth	546
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Power of Corinth, then being public, became weak	542	The Parthenon was founded before it was destroyed from Athens—the Parthenon had ruins, except of numerous Parthenon pillars	546
Dispute with Athens, Corinth and Athens—ruins of Athens	542	Monument not yet mentioned before Athens and Corinth	546
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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON.

In the preceding chapter I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica; manifested first in the form of a threat by Artaphernes the eunuch, when he exhorted the Athenians to take back Hippias as the only condition of safety, and afterwards converted into a passion in the bosom of Darius in consequence of the burning of Sardis. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being subjoined, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The conquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernes proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of profusion and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Consulting deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment

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disputes

of laws by any one against the others. Moreover he caused the territory of each city to be measured by paces (each paces was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to the measurements; without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt.¹ Unfortunately, Herodotus is extremely brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may however surmise it is certain that both the population and the territory of many among the *lois* cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the conflict with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Mithra, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its surrounding plain, but gave the mountain-portion of the Milesian territory to the Karans of Phoenia.² Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land districts. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of war depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. Yet there can be no doubt that they are partially true, and that the miseries of those days, as stated in the work of Herodotus as well as by contemporary informants with whom Herodotus had probably conversed, must have been extreme. How salutiferous would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and each infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artabanus, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the *lois* cities, and so it must unquestionably have appeared, coming as it did immediately after so much previous suffering. He further adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the *lois* cities after the repulse of Xerxes from Greece Proper.

¹ Herodot. vi. 44.

² Herodot. d. 46.

marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised by the dominion of Aspithes, since that prince had before submitted to Megabates. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land force again at the Gulf of Thessaly, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of preventing the march as far as Athens and Thessaly; so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxes would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of perils to navigation. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the further progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land army, and was himself wounded in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and arrange this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance further. Both the land force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence again to Asia, with so much shame of failure, that Mardonius was never again employed by Darius; though we cannot make out that the fault was impossible to him.¹ We shall hear of him again under Xerxes.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the point of Thracians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolt- ing. At least their conduct provided the suggestion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thracians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The island of Skopel Erythra Thracæ yielded to them an annual tribute

¹ Herodot. vi. 42. 43. *Scopelus* is the island of Skopelos opposite Athens.

² Herodot. vi. 42-44. *Cherson* is the point of Chersonesus, or the point of the Thracian peninsula opposite the Hellespont.

Mount Athos, and the destruction of the fleet of Mardonius (Herodot. vi. 42-44). *Cherson* is the point of the Thracian peninsula opposite the Hellespont.

of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untroubled—was two hundred talents (248,000, if Attic talents; more, if either Eubœan or Æginetan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours, many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable routes of Ægean Myths. As in other cases, so in this: the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revolutions to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thracians were made known, and they were forced to raise their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdera.¹

Though dissatisfied with Hieronius, Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians.² Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transports for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, to order to require from each the formal tokens of submission—such and such; and then to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islands to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thracians and Thespians, though Hieronius does not particularize them. Among the latter Rhodes, Kos, and some of the smaller islands are not included; but Ægina, at that time the last maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.³

Nothing remains so clearly the momentous peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by

Preparation of
Darius the
Great for
conquering
Greece.
He sends
heralds
round the
Grecian
cities to demand
such and
such—
tokens of
their
submission.

¹ Herodot. vi. 48—51. See especially 51, 52.
and of Æginetan sailing from Salamis
before the battle and before the flight.

² Herodot. vi. 52.
³ Herodot. vi. 53, 54, 55, 56.

the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this discontent on the part of the *Ægiptians*, whose commerce with the *Antiochians* and *Antiochians* had been improved, stood strongly with the untimely reconquest of unimpaired resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by sympathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persians even as ally and arbiter in her internal content—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between *Ægina* and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

The war between *Thbes* and *Ægina* on one side, and Athens on the other—began several years before, and growing out of the contention between Athens and *Plataea*—had never yet been terminated. The *Ægiptians* had taken part in that war from genuine feeling, either of friendship for *Thbes* or of enmity to Athens, without any direct ground of quarrel;¹ and they had begun the war even without the formality of notice. Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 465—450 B.C.) had elapsed, the state of hostility still continued, and we may readily conceive that *Ægina*, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the members of Athens the privilege of succelling, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persians to vanquish her in that way. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both *Thbes* and *Ægina* manifested unhesitating disposition towards the heralds of Darius.

Among these heralds, some had gone to Athens and to *Sparta*, for the same purpose of demanding such aid and water

¹ Herodotus, v. 49—50. The story, though true, is a legendary story that grew up in the imagination of *Ægina* in the war in which she was engaged as a real and independent state of war; a state of general peace

all over Greece to be raised up, and some probably to be forwarded. It is like the old legend spread between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, 107—108.

The reception given to them at both places was angry to the extreme. The Athenians sent the herald into the prison called the *Prothronai*,¹ into which they sometimes precipitated public criminals: the Spartans drove the herald who came to them into a well, desiring the unfortunate messenger to take earth and water from thence to the king. The irretrievability of Herakle was so ancient and undisputed in Greece, from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the fiercest excitement could have incited any Greek community to such an outrage. But to the Lacedæmonians, now accustomed to regard themselves as the first of all Greek states, and to be addressed always in the character of superiors, the demand appeared as gross an insult as to breathe from their nostrils for the time all recollection of established obligations. They were subsequently, however, to repent of the act as highly criminal, and to look upon it as the cause of misfortunes which overtook them thirty or forty years afterwards. How they tried at that time to expiate it, I shall hereafter recount.²

But if, on the one hand, the wounded dignity of the Spartans hurried them into the commission of this wrong, it was on the other hand of signal use to the general freedom of Greece, by rousing them out of their apathy as to the coming invader,

[1] It is in this treatment of the herald that the story in Pausanias (lib. ii. Thespiæ) and other writers, of that very incident in 495, for the first time, was not likely to need a second herald, after such treatment of the first. An interpreter accompanied the herald, carrying freely as well as interpreting language. Thespiæ was a Greek and called a wife that he should be sent to death for having betrayed the Greek language as nothing but barbaric dialect. (Pausanias, lib. ii. 45) "We should be glad to have them whom Athens despised betraying."

Pausanias states that it was the herald who proposed the sending to death of the herald of Athens (lib. ii. 45), and that the divine judgment fell upon the treaty in consequence of it. From these fragments upon this statement I do not know precisely and how the story, who does not

mention Herakle in the war, and necessity was made to draw out here in what manner the divine judgment against the envoys for the treaty was made. (Pausanias, lib. ii. 45) "We should be glad to have them whom Athens despised betraying." (Pausanias, lib. ii. 45)

The fact that there must have been a divine judgment of some kind or kind, presented a divine judgment to correct the worst case. Herakle was to be punished with it. Herakle was to be punished for the treaty in regard to the situation and to render the treaty, a circumstance which was, along with others, to strengthen the confidence in the general authority. The divine judgment was the authority, and was not to be the authority of the treaty in regard to the situation which is certainly not a circumstance to be considered.

(Pausanias, lib. ii. 45)

and placing them with regard to him in the same state of unpropitious hostility as Athens and Eretria. The use at once the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the *Agonists* for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Athens conjointly with the Persians.

Thus they represented "as traitors to Hellas," calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenes king of Sparta went over to Argos, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, "for the general benefit of Hellas."¹

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for the idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifested and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an instantaneous deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other state. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the capture of Hippotus) as summoning and exhorting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing

¹ Herodotus, 8. 45. Euripides, *Alcibiades* (1890), vol. 1, p. 100. The Athenians, however, did not regard Sparta as the head of Hellas, but as the head of the Peloponnese. The Athenians, however, did not regard Sparta as the head of Hellas, but as the head of the Peloponnese.

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permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Dionysius) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Plataeans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector-general. She refused the Ionians and the Boeotian Mendeians, as well as the Plataeans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic usage—the expedition which she undertook against Polykrates of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves; moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Aigina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the sister of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the recognition of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Greek neighbour. The complaint of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Aeginetans to her detriment and danger, and with upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first time in Greek history such a call is made; for the first time in Greek history it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, irresponsible, and home-keeping character of the Spartans, with their general inactivity to distant dangers¹—if the adventures of the Persian

She was
Athens of
perpetrated
by which
leadership
was the
extreme
manifestation
of Athens
at this
moment.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persians—or at least something as near to a political union as Greek temper will permit—with Sparta as

¹ Thucyd. ii. 77—118, *passim*; x. 1. 1. Xenophon, vi. 141—145. On these facts, see also *Epistola* p. 145 and *passim* *Epistola* of 145. On the subject of the Spartan character, see *passim* *Epistola* of 145.

the land for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually leading. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which brimmed for the time her ancient and only civil—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of those

ag. 489—
 490. Pelopon. war. Pausan. heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Miltiades was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos¹—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenes, encouraged by a promise of the Greeks that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Krænon, the border river of the Argolian territory. But the marshes, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfordable, that he altered his course, entered some vessels from Sijina and Sikyón,² and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argives having marched their

Pelopon. war of Sparta against Argos.	Crossed down in order of battle at Sijina near Tiryns. Kleomenes, by a piece of duplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argives (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-ruled by strategos, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy, that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonians' herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenes, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately
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¹ That which marks the close of Miltiades, and the defeat of the Argives by Kleomenes, as corresponding, or nearly so, to the common chronological dates referred to, serves to mark in the same position of the Pythia, the last allusion to the sufferings of Miltiades, the story told by Herodotus of Argos (Herodot. vi. 74-75). Kleomenes and Argives in Nauplia were engaged for about six months, Argos being supported by the Spartans. It is not clear, as the Argives were in Argos. I assume this position of

dates to be better than the statement of Pausanias. They rather place the campaign against Argos immediately before—Paus. vi. 4. 1, after the conclusion of the Persian war, as he says that Kleomenes came from Sparta (Herodot. vi. 140), must have come to the Greeks and joined them in 480 B.C. This would perfectly agree with the fact that in 480 B.C. a date much later than the war between Kleomenes and the Argives, as we may see by Herodotus vi. 140.

² Strabo, vi. 46.

stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argive camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—but not within sight from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, as soon as the Argives heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner,¹ they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove connected to their quarters here Argos. Kleomenes, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it wiser to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argives then shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald, pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until some one, climbing to the top of a tree, detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argives from their concealed refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them, Kleomenes set fire to the grove and burnt it to the ground. The process within it appears to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword.² After the conflagration had begun, he inquired for the first time to whom the grove belonged, and learnt that it belonged to the hero Argos. Not less than six thousand witnesses, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this diabolical snare and ruse. He completely won the city pretending, that Kleomenes might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valour of the Argive women; who, in the death of warriors consumed by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by

Exposition
of the
Argives by
Kleomenes
in the grove
of the hero
Argos.

¹ Herodotus, of the Argives, Xenophon, *Hæc. Laced.* c. 2. Others say that there is the field, in the Lacedæmonian military service, were not pronounced

by the herald, but transmitted through the various gradations of officers employed. v. 209.

² Herodotus, ii. 16, 17.

invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but as soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argos (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by taking Argos, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed to the Illyrean. There, though his sacrifice was in vain, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar rushed back from the bosom of the statue of Hera, and not from her head. If the flame had rushed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm;² but the flash from her bosom plainly intimated that the proposed success was out of his reach, and that he had already repaid all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from crediting the story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, warranting to Kleomenes an honourable retreat.³

Though the Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had indicated upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the mastery of Greece.

[illegible][illegible]

one of the studies, they would have indicated that the gene occurs more frequently than it does in other "normal" alleles.

[illegible]

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Table 1 Summary of the study

with Lacedæmonia. I have already mentioned that both in legend and in earliest history Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to leadership, and decidedly above Lacedæmonia, who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence, and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding state over a body of

Argos
usurps the
leadership
from Argos
in the island
of Argos
and in her
pre-eminence
power

states who are bound back to her and to each other.

Her tale to this lesson, however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described gave in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary preclusion of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet assertion of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-mentioned adventure of the Lacedæmonia, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival who would have surrounded Argos in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have hampered immensely the deliverance of Greece. The ships which Kleomenes had obtained from the Argives as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Argives refused to do so.¹ The circumstances of the Kleomenes war had thus the effect not only of weakening Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan pre-eminence.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the treacherous submission of Argos to Persia, we find that king Kleomenes passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Argives, when Erion and some others among them

¹ Herodotus, vi, 95.

appeal to him a menacing resolution, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and without influence of Athenian tribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the *Agonists* ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Democritus, the colleague of Kleomenes in the junior or Prokled line of kings, had suggested to them the step and proposed to carry them through it safely.¹ Disunion between the two co-sovereign

Kleomenes goes to Sparta to settle the dispute between the two kings, as the suggestion of his colleague Democritus.

kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Democritus and Kleomenes, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Athens. Hence Democritus, having his colleague more than even, entered into the present struggle with the *Agonists* with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenes was compelled to return to Sparta; not without unqualified success against Kris and the other *Agonists* who had repelled him,² and not without a thorough determination to depose Democritus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Democritus's birth. His reputed father Ariste, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agtias—a woman of surpassing beauty—and contrived him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agtias asked from Ariste was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agtias, who was afterwards at the request and indignantly complied of having been devoted into a sacrifice of all others the most painful: nevertheless the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Democritus took place as soon after the change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Ariste, as he sat upon a bench along with the sphere, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an

¹ Herodotus, vi. 51. *Agonists*—Kings. ² Herodotus, vi. 51-52, 54. *Agonists*—colours of the robes of the *Agonists*. ³ Cf. *Agonists* and *Agonists* (vi. 52). *Agonists*, vi. 5, 6.

only—"The child cannot be mine." His sons however extracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being put into raised as to his birth, well educated by his father on the throne. But the original words of Acrisio had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.¹

Of these suspicious Kleomenes now resolved to avail himself, making Leotyphids, the next heir in the Frokoid line of Sparta, to engage publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to succeed him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and sending in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Agis. Leotyphids was admitted not merely by justice, but also by private vanity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arranged Demaratus as no true Spartan, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Acrisio. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenes, opposing the pretensions of Leotyphids, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of Kleon, a powerful native of Delphi, he procured from the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Acrisio.² Leotyphids thus became king of the Frokoid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing assembly of the Gymnarchia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Strong with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotyphids ought in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good to Sparta. So saying, he covered his

¹ Herodotus, vi. 61, 62, 63.

² Herodotus, vi. 64, 65. In an assembly soon afterwards, where the question was debated between Agis and Kleomenes, Kleomenes was defeated, and Leotyphids, the illegitimate son, at the demand of Agis, the Lacedæmonians agreed to have Agis, who was supposed to possess Spartan blood, succeed to the throne; but Kleomenes, who was

unable to suppress his spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Strong with this insult, Demaratus replied that he himself had tried them both, and that Leotyphids ought in time come to try them both also: the question (he added) shall bear its fruit—great evil, or great good to Sparta. So saying, he covered his

face and retired home from the theatre—offered a solemn funeral service at the altar of Seme Heracles, and solemnly adjured his mother to declare to him who his real father was—then at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretence of going to consult the Delphic oracle.¹

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Hieronius who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenes and Lertychides became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death. This marks the sentiment of the Lacedæmonians, and Demaratus was not the less likely to give trouble because they had pronounced him illegitimate.²

Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthos. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Dalia, where he presented himself to Doria, and was received with abundant favour and protection.³ We shall hereafter find him the companion of Xerxes, giving to that monarch advice such as, if it had been acted upon, would have proved the ruin of Grecian independence; to which however he would have been even more dangerous, if he had remained at home as king of Sparta.

Meanwhile Kleomenes, having obtained a consistent colleague in Lertychides, went with him over to Argos, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the reputation and presence of the two kings jointly, the Argives did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenes made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence, among whom were Klitos and another person named Karambos, the two most powerful men in the island. Overruling

Demaratus having quitted Sparta and gone to Elis.

Kleomenes and Lertychides go to Argos, seize ten citizens, and carry them to Argos to assist.

¹ Herodotus vi. 46. The account made by the mother in this respect—belonging to Demaratus that he is the son of King Agis, is of the same importance to the story as the story of the birth of Demaratus.

² Herodotus vi. 46. and of the same nature as the story of the birth of Demaratus.

³ Herodotus vi. 46.

there away to Athens, be deposited there as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.¹

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-Hellenic mission, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest either two kings, at this juncture unwarlike, or any other powerful interference in covering Argos, and placing Spartan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Spartans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from assisting Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a vast Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Attic plain of Marathon near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed vessels, together with many transports both for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation: the troops were put on board, and sailed along the coast to Salamis in Ionia. The Ionian and Asiatic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Athens. The generals were Datis, a Median,² and Artabazanes, son of the eunuch of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded

¹ Herodot. vi. 78.

² Herodot. vi. 84. *Aliter* vi. 85, *Alibi* vi. 86. *Major* vi. 87. *Minor* vi. 88. *Continuus* Herodotus (Ed. of Farnesian).

³ Datis with Mardonius & Megabates which cannot be true, since he was Master of Salamis, and at the same time Persian ambassador (Herodot. vi. 87).

and resolved, as I have noticed in a former chapter, by an outbreak of hostile nationality between the Medes and Persians. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his power.¹ These cities were literally meant, and probably neither the generals nor the soldiers of this vast armament doubted that they would be literally executed; and that before the end of the year, the wives, or rather the widows, of men like Themistocles and Aristocles would be seen among a numerous train of Athenian prisoners on the road from Sardis to Susa, thus accomplishing the wish expressed by queen Atossa at the instance of Darius.²

The recent terrible storm near Mount Athos detained the Persians from following the example of Marathon, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thracæ. It was resolved to strike straight across the *Ægean*³ (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistocles most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxes) from Susa to Hæbus, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among these islands was Samos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and gallantly repelled the Persian Megabates with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Darius to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Mælians.⁴ Crossing from Susa to Hæbus, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains; while the Persians, selling as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the unfortified town with its citizens sacred and profane.

Immense indeed was the difference in Greek sentiment towards the Persians created by the terror-striking renege of

the capture
the *Ægean*
crossed
the island
of Samos
without
protection
—
Darius

¹ Herodotus, vi. 35. Herodotus is
inconsistent in representing Darius and
Atossa, after being in the act of
declaring war.

According to the Mælians of
Samos (p. 11, p. 115), Darius ordered
him to land his army at point of the

very land, as such assistance appeared
to Darius.

² Herodotus, i. 62.

³ Herodotus, vi. 35, 36. The Persian
army did not require further
assistance at Samos, as the city was
open.

loins, and by the exhibition of a large Phœnician fleet in the *Ægean*. The strength of *Naxos* was the same now as it had been before the *Ionian* revolt, and the successful resistance then made might have been supposed likely to nerve the courage of its inhabitants. Yet such is the fear now inspired by a Persian armament, that the eight thousand *Naxian* hoplites shudder their wives and their gods without striking a blow,¹ and think of nothing but personal safety for themselves and their families. A sad augury for *Attica* and *Eretria*!

From *Naxos*, *Datis* despatched his fleet round the coast, *Cyclades* islands, requiring from each hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the small island of *Delos*, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The *Epilæans* had fled before his approach to *Thos*, but *Datis* sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which *Apollis* and *Artemis* were born. His acts corresponded with this language; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of *Ionian* Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of *Delos* may probably be ascribed to the desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for, in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, *Datis* at length touched the southernmost portion of *Eubœa*—the town of *Karyæis* and its territory.² The *Karyæians* at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders. This was the first taste of resistance which *Datis* had yet experienced; and the facility with which it was overcome gave him a promising omen as to his success against *Eretria*, whether he soon arrived.

¹ The inhabitants of *Naxos* offered that *Datis* had been repulsed from the island. He had this statement confirmed, the *Atticks*. *Herodot.* i. 94.

p. 89, among his instructions ordered contributions of *Eretrians*.

² *Herodot.* vi. 92.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of this third city, among whose considerations, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily and conveniently afforded to them by means of those four thousand Athenian or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighbouring territory of Chalcis. Notwithstanding such reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unsailable rocks of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Muzians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians.¹ Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of fortitude of heart which could alone avert to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Alcibiades was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice, and passed over to Attica by way of Orizus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight, at Taurum and other places in the territory. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus, with others, betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; the temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery.² It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plutarch, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus to

Herodotus
Plutarch—
says and
applies to
Eretria.

¹ Herodotus vi. 128. Plutarch Alcibiades in the sixth Epistle ad Arrianum, it says Alcibiades was a Spartan, whereas in Alcibiades Vita: it says he was an Athenian. Alcibiades was a Spartan, but he was a Spartan by birth, and he was a Spartan by adoption.

² Alcibiades in the sixth Epistle ad Arrianum, it says Alcibiades was a Spartan, but he was a Spartan by birth, and he was a Spartan by adoption.

The story told by Alcibiades in the sixth Epistle ad Arrianum, it says Alcibiades was a Spartan, whereas in Alcibiades Vita: it says he was an Athenian. Alcibiades was a Spartan, but he was a Spartan by birth, and he was a Spartan by adoption.

³ Herodotus vi. 128, 129.

Athens, with bold opposition from citizens after immediate and devoted. And the march of Hippasus from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which his sleep visions had cast the Athenians whom he found here were radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great reform of the Athenian character, under the democratic institutions which had animated since the dispossession of Hippasus, I have already pointed allusion in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenes in the constitution had not only rights or ancient laws, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. The Ten Tribes, each with its ancestral domain, had become a part of the established habits of the country; the citizens had become accustomed to exercise a genuine and self-determined democracy, in their assemblies political as well as judicial; while even the senate of Areopagus, renovated by the nine annual archons earnestly chosen who passed into it after their year of office, had also become identified in feeling with the constitution of Kleisthenes.

Nothing
remains
but to
point out
the
Athenian.

Individual citizens doubtless remained, partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippasus. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but terror and aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratic Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history during the decade preceding 490 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the government. The new form however which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stood prominent at this important epoch—Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after six or seven years' absence in the Chersonese of Thracæ, whether he had been originally sent by Hippasus about the year 515—516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle the exiled Miltiades. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the leaders who accompanied

Darius, in the Danube, in his boyish expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Themistocles and the other despots did not think it then interest to follow,—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed, but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionian revolt.¹ That part he took in that revolt, we do not know. He resided himself, however, of the period while the Persian attempts were employed in suppressing it, and deprived of the mastery of the sea, to expedite in conjunction with forces from Athens, both the Persian garrison and the Ptoleagæ inhabitants from the islands of Læronæ and Imbros. But the reflection of the Ionian revolt threatened him with ruin. When the Phœnician fleet, in the summer following the capture of Miletus, made its conquering appearance in the Hellespont, he was forced to escape rapidly to Athens with his immediate friends and property, and with a small squadron of five ships. One of these ships, commanded by his son Metrochus, was actually captured between the Chersonese and Imbros; and the Phœnicians were most eager to capture Mithridates himself, inasmuch as he was personally accused by Darius from his enormous recommendation to destroy the bridge over the Danube. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phœnician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls "his despotism" there exercised.² Probably the Athenian citizens called in that position may have had good reason to complain of him,—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries. However, the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, probably in part from the reputation which he had obtained as conqueror of Imbros,³ and

¹ The chapter of Herodotus (ii. 10) relating to the introduction of Mithridates is extremely perplexing, as I have already remarked in a former note: and I would recommend those readers desirous of clearing up this difficulty, which are not pressed for time, to consult the

op. *Deinde subvertendum, ut the observation stated in Bunsen's note, is satisfactory.*

² Herodotus, ii. 48-50.

³ Herodotus, ii. 48-50.

⁴ Herodotus, vi. 35. Mithridates, not a proper philosopher.—Cf. Bunsen's

he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the republic, during the year of this Persian expedition—chosen at the beginning of the Athen year, shortly after the summer solstice, at a time when Datis and Hippias had actually sailed, and were known to be approaching.

The character of Miltiades is one of great bravery and domestic—qualities pre-eminently useful to his country on the present crisis, and the more useful as he was under the strongest motive to put them forth, from the personal hostility of Darius towards him. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy—of Cleisthenes's, like his younger contemporaries Themistokles and Aristides. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting feebly with Pericles, Lycurgus, and Megacles, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistokles and Aristides, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by will through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people—exercising those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly circles, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing. Instead of Athens divided and torn into armed factions, as it had been forty years before—the Dorian under one man, and the Paria and Pedieia under others—we have now Athens one and indivisible; regimented into a body of orderly hearers in the Pnyx, appointing and holding its accountable magistrates, and open to be addressed by Themistokles, Aristides, or any other citizen who can engage their attention.

Neither Themistokles nor Aristides could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the *Alkibiades Miltiades*.¹ Both were of solidifying station and circumstances. *Aristides*, son of *Lysimachos*, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of *Neokles*, father of *Themistokles*, was a foreign woman of Thessaly

¹ *Alkibiades Miltiades*. Her mother's name—grandfather of *Alkibiades*, son of *Pericles*, cf. 120. father had been long'served by the state. — *Herodotus*, cf. 58.

as of Kato¹—and such an officer is the less surprising, since Themistokles must have been born during the dynasty of the Perakleids, when the status of an Athenian officer had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most ^{marked} conspicuous in the one being comparatively deficient ^{marked} in the other. In the description of Themistokles, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thucydides, the circumstances most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual position. The right of untaught nature² was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present circumstance, and defined the elements of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind at once, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for deliberation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action: when engaged in any point of duty, his superior comprehension marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no hindrance, however large to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly unlooked for. Such is the remarkable picture which Thucydides draws of a statesman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistokles probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—and Perikles especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistokles had received no teaching from philosophers, orators, and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thucydides, and whom Aristophanes, the contemporary of the latter, so humorously depicts—

¹ Thucyd. l. i. 102. He says that Kato was a person of great power and influence in the state, and that he was a great friend of Themistokles. He also says that Kato was a great friend of Perikles, and that he was a great friend of the people.

Thucyd. l. i. 102. He says that Kato was a person of great power and influence in the state, and that he was a great friend of Themistokles. He also says that Kato was a great friend of Perikles, and that he was a great friend of the people.

Of Aristide's we possess unfortunately no description from the hand of Theophrastus. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unequalled notices of Herodotus¹ Plutarch, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornutus Nepos;² however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristide was inferior to Themistocle in resources, quickness, his policy, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenes, the first founder of the democracy³—as pursuing a straight and a single-hearted course in political life, with no solicitude for party-view, and with little care either to attract friends or to offend enemies—in refusing in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as saving for himself the lofty estimate of the Jews, not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his conduct in political disputes—and as maintaining, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his litter contemporary the great Themistocle⁴ and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assumed the tribune. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Theophrastus ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many excellent qualities possessed⁵ by Pericles; while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The

¹ Herodotus, viii. 76. Plutarch, *Corinthia*, c. 12, p. 164; *Pericles*, c. 12. Cornutus Nepos, de *Thucydide*, c. 2, p. 185.

² Plutarch, *Aristide*, c. 1-4; *Themistocle*, c. 11. *Themistocle*, c. 2, in *de* *Themistocle*, c. 2.

³ *Themistocle*, c. 11.

⁴ *Themistocle*, c. 11.

⁵ *Themistocle*, c. 11.

abilities of Aristotile—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Theanotile—were put in the shade by this inextinguishable probity; which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, an inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his outrageous vote and expressed his dislike against Aristotile,¹ on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called the Just. Now the purity of the most honorable man will not bear to be so honestly talked of as if he were the only honorable man in the country. The law is violated, the more deeply and cordially will it be felt, and the story just alluded to, whether true or false, illustrates that natural reaction of feeling produced by almost unexampled, or perhaps by unexampled exalted, under the mask of enviousness, who transported both Aristotile as The Just man of Athens, so as to wound the legitimate dignity of every one else. Neither indiscreet blunders nor wilful mistakes, however, could rob him of the loving esteem of his countrymen; which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracized during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Theanotile was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxes brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His return, originally very modest, was still further diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the state was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such was the character of Theanotile and Aristotile, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Theanotile would have been an active partizan in the faction of the Fandi or the Pechas, while Aristotile would probably have remained an unactive citizen. At the present period of Athenian history, the character of

¹ Plutarch, *Aristotile*, c. 2.

soldiers, magistrates, and sailors were intimately blended together in a nation who stood forward for unison, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristide's and Miltiade's were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the *Ægean*, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover, we

are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch that Themistocle also was general of his tribe on the same occasion,¹ though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition

to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachos of Aphidna.²

Such was the state of the military force, and to a great degree the administration of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian *klérouchoi* or soldiers planted in Eretria—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. Not doubtless the alarm was hardly inferior to that which had been felt at Eretria. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippide the athlete was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance, and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed the journey of 150 miles, on foot, in 45 hours! Revealing to the Spartans that Eretria was already captured, he entreated their assistance to avert the more fatal doom from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartans authorities readily

The Athenians
did not
doubt
of the
Spartans.

¹ Plutarch, Aristide's, c. 2.

² Plutarch, c. 120, 121.

³ Mr. Kinnear remarks that the Persian Council, or *Sanhedrim*, was

well found to attend upon accordingly at the rate of about 1000 men a day (Geographical Memoir of Persia, p. 142).

promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in the month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reasons assigned seem to have been no pretences on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abide, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history.¹ Indeed, their delay in marching to rescue Athens from Marathon, eleven years afterwards, at the instant hazard of shattering Athens and retreating the Peloponnesian cause, marks the same selfish delusion. But the waters now given certainly looked very like a pretence, so that the Athenians could indulge no certain assurance that the Spartan troops would start even when the full moon arrived.

In this respect the answer brought by Philippias was unshelving, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Farther, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians; while Miltiades with the remaining five strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for procuring all wanted aid on the part of the allies. Thus most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question, whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to content the defence to the city and the moral rock. Thucydides as little leaves either generally in his statement some more probable

influence of ancient custom among the ten generals—¹that at this juncture, as in the Peloponnesian war, the older men were averse to it.

best men that of Heraclea. For the two generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight; moreover, the question between fighting in the field or waiting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the two influential generals would take their stand. And probably indeed Miledade himself, if deterred from immediate action, would have preferred to hold possession of Athens, and prevent any treacherous movement from breaking out there, rather than to remain inactive on the hills, watching the Persians at Marathon, with the chance of a detachment from their numerous host sailing round to Phaliron, and thus distracting by a double attack both the city, and the camp.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the two generals, whether manifested at Marathon, or at Athens, is certain. Miledade had to avail the casting vote of the polemarch Kallimachos. To him he represented emphatically

Depict the
division of
Miledade in
favor of the
polemarch
Kallimachos
casting vote
of the polemarch
Kallimachos.

the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite dissension and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrible consequences of embroilment to the Persians and to Hippas, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the action of which he (Miledade) was prepared to

guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miledade; while the seditions movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristarchos and Theorastides are both recorded to have attended Miledade warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miledade their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army. It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle.¹ Yet, considering the eagerness which he displayed in being on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a point.

While the army was mustered on the ground sacred to Marathon near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plata, consisting of about 1000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithairon, and passing through Delphoi. We are not told that they had ever been invited. Very probably the Athenians had never thought of summoning aid from this important neighbour, in whose behalf they had taken upon themselves a leading fight with Thebes and the Boeotian league.¹ Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be too much commended because their interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plata from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet every a Greek town would have disregarded both generous impulses and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrible enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generation, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this voluntary march of the whole Platæan force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Greek history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian household,² and repaid by a grant to the Platæans of the full civil rights (nominally without the political rights) of Athenian citizens. Upon the Athenians then marshalled at Marathon the effect must have been irresistibly powerful and encouraging, as a proof that they were not altogether isolated from Greece, and as an unexpected countervailing stimulus under circumstances so full of hazard.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites either including, or besides, the 1000 who came from Plata.³ This statement is so very imprecise

¹ Herodotus, vi. 124-125.

² Thucyd. iii. 55.

³ Herodotus states 10,000 Athenians besides 1000 Platæans. Connected

extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both however have a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted nature of the plain is hardly altered by a single tree: and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which were steep and difficult paths communicating with the districts of the interior.¹

The position occupied by Miltiades before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Ilivakia near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above the plain. Ctesias Hecateus tells us that he protected it from the attacks of the Persian cavalry by felled trees obstructing the approach. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hyppias himself marshalled them for the battle.² The native Persians and Saka, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour,³ and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was as regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachos had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plataeans. It was necessary for Miltiades to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Lemnians and Eretrians, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while

¹ Herodotus, vi. 129.

² Miltiades, *Epitaphia*, l. 1, p. 109; Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 2, § 10; *Attica*, l. 2, § 12/13, ll. 19.

³ We may compare, with this arrangement, that of the Persian army, placed and remarkably followed out with the Phoenician tribes of Marathon in 480, noticed by Anagrat. i. near the Marathonians. The Egyptian troops for Miltiades' flank occupy the left wing; the Eretrian troops for those of Aristides the right wing; the Athenians are in

the centre. The Saka, or the Grand Tribe, surrounded by the selected cavalry or Hoplites, is in the central point of Miltiades' Phoenician disposition for Marathon; *Attica*, book v. vol. 2, p. 103.

As to the manner of occupying the right wing in a Persian battle, see in particular the celebrated passage between the Athenians and the Spartans before the battle of Plataea, *Herodotus*, l. 8, § 10. It is the post assigned to Miltiades' phalanx of hoplites under Clearchus, *Herodotus*, vii.

each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack effective on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some shovs or unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry. How could the Persians have been very strong in this latter line, seeing that their horses had to be transported across the *Agien*? But the devoted position of Miltiades enabled them to take some measure of the numbers under his command, and the entire absence of cavalry in his army could not but confirm the confidence with which a long career of uninterrupted victory had impressed their generals.

As long as the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favourable for battle. Miltiades, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies. This rapid forward movement, accompanied by the war-cry or shout which always animated the charge of the Greek soldier, startled the Persian camp. They construed it as an act of desperate courage little short of insanity, in a body not only small but destitute of cavalry or archers—but they at the same time felt their conscious superiority sink within them. It seems to have been long remembered also among the Greeks as the peculiar characteristic of the battle of Marathia, and Herodotus tells us that the Athenians were the first Greeks who ever charged at a run.¹ It doubtless operated beneficially in

State of Marathia—rapid charge of Miltiades—nature of the Persian attack.

¹ Herodotus, vi. 113. *ὅπως αὖτε πλεῖστον χρόνον ἐπὶ ταῖς ἡμέραις ταύταις ἐπὶ μάχῃ ἐπὶ ἀντιπαύσει.*

The running pace of the charge was obviously one of the most peculiar circumstances connected with this battle. Colonel Leake and Mr. Fisher were disposed to believe the run to be a wild march; possibly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and cut off head by running a mile. The probability is that they really were so, and that such was the great cause of the defeat of the Greeks. It is very probable that a part of the mile ran four hundred of hoplites. I accept the account of Miltiades himself, though whether the distance be exactly equal, we cannot certainly say. It does the best is, that it required some

steadiness of discipline to prevent the loss of position, then charging with the wing companies into a run. But the narrative of the battle of Marathia in Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 2. 37, states, *οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες ὅπως ἔβησαν, οὐδὲν ἔκρινον*—they were not shaken by the advance with the disadvantage of this running charge.

Both Colonel Leake and Mr. Fisher try to point out the most general advantage to the two armies; they offer to his eyes chance, and I cannot think that there is sufficient evidence to be had in favour of any point. Leake thinks that the Persian contingents were engaged in the plain of *Platanos*, separated from that of Marathia by the great marsh, and communicating with it only by means

rendering the Persian cavalry and archers comparatively unimportant, but we may reasonably suppose that it also decimated the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of pointed spears and shields which constituted their form. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a serious resistance, were overthrown and driven back. But in the centre, where the file was shallow, and where, moreover, the native Persians and other select troops of the army were posted, the headstrong and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Locmide and Antioche, with Themistocleide and Aristocleide among them, were actually defeated broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Saka.¹ Miltiade seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Saka put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impossible march and there perished.² The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only some ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed.³ This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the sea-shore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation; leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been distributed and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6400 men. The number of Athenians dead is accurately known, since 192 of them all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they

of a cemetery (Lodge, *Thucyd.* II. p. 100).

¹ *Herodot.* vi. 118. *Thucyd.* viii. 94-96. *Arrian* at Marathon, and *Strabo*, *Geogr.* ix. c. 1.

² *Herodotus* here tells us the whole truth about the ships: "Persians

(*Herodot.* vi. 119) only says that the Persian vessels made a large number of men, and gives the reason in the Persian words: "they were to be burnt."

³ *Thucyd.* i. 10, 1.

⁴ *Herodot.* vi. 118-119.

of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiades saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens.

On the very day of battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Herakleia at Marathon to the precinct of the state god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet.¹

News soon came off the part of Phalaron; but the partisans of Hippias had been so damaged by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find them able and bristling with the force he had anticipated, for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Though too late, however, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less guidance on the part of Miltiades in deciphering the treacherous signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian officers in superadding a lightning march to a no less halting combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalaron no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon, made no attempt again to disembark at Athens, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than invasion. Nothing could have rescued her except that desperate and instantaneous attack which Miltiades so emphatically urged. The missing step on the field of Marathon might have been disorder in the ranks of the heliotes; but extreme haste in bringing on the combat was the only means

¹ Herodotus, vi. 118. Others give the expedition before Marathon, April 20, 491 before the crisis, e.g. *Journal des Savants*, 1817, p. 109. See also the *Journal des Savants*, 1817, p. 109. See also the *Journal des Savants*, 1817, p. 109. See also the *Journal des Savants*, 1817, p. 109.

notion.

Plutarch, *Life of Miltiades*, c. 1. See also *Plutarch, Life of Miltiades*, c. 1. See also *Plutarch, Life of Miltiades*, c. 1. See also *Plutarch, Life of Miltiades*, c. 1.

of preventing disaster, and destruction in the minds of the citizens. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the perfumers of Hippies had actually organised a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield spotted on Mount Pentelike, appearing the Persian that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathón, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his feet round to Phaléron, detaching the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phaléron—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phaléron wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Archilochus by the Thebanian cavalry, in 440 B.C.—that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders. Generals as well as soldiers would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrusted of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, importunate, unquitting character which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fickle, excited, or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers about and unseen than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unquestionable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiades, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxes impressed upon him the profusion of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments

to send separate Greek states—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Greek host, and leaving no central or co-ordinating force for the defence of Greece generally. Fortunately for the Greeks, the selfish passions of Xerxes led him to despise all such advice, as implying conscious weakness. Not so Datis and Hippias. Sensible of the probability of detecting the situation of the Athenians by a double attack, they laid a scheme, while the main army was at Marathon, for relieving the partisans of Hippias, with a force to assist them in the neighbourhood of Athens, and the signal was upheld by these partisans as soon as their measures were taken. But the caprice of Miltiades so precipitated the battle, that this signal came too late, and was only given "when the Persians were already in their ships,"¹ after the Marathonian defeat. Even then it might have proved dangerous, had not the movements of Miltiades been so rapid after the victory as before it. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous catastrophe. To Miltiades belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the dissipation of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy. The chance all turned out in his favour—for the unexpected junction of the Plataeans in the very moment of Marathon must have wrought up the courage of his army to the highest pitch. Not only did he thus escape all the depressing and demoralising accidents, but he was fortunate enough to find the extraordinary encouragement immediately preceding the battle, from a source on which he would not have calculated.

I have already observed that the phase of Greek history best known to us, and amidst which the great actions from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even *Æschylus* the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the Perses to celebrate the disastrous flight of the monster Xerxes, may have forgotten the

¹ Herodotus, vi. 118. *Taken Europe's double walls, before the eyes appear.*

nations with which he and his brother Eugene
 marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on
 the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, there-
 fore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to
 the time when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon,
 the tide of Persian success had never yet been
 interrupted, and that especially during the ten years
 immediately preceding, the high-headed and cruel
 extraction of the Ionian Greeks had aggravated to the
 highest pitch the animosity of the Greeks. To this must be
 added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of
 Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent
 continuance of *Archaia to Athens*. The extreme effort of courage
 required in the Athenians, to encounter such invaders, is attested
 by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all
 the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian
 history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylae, as will
 appear when I come to describe that memorable event. And
 the admirable conduct of the few dissentient generals, when
 overruled by the decision of the polemarch against them, in
 co-operating heartily for the success of a policy which they
 deprecated—proves how much the feelings of a constitutional
 democracy, and that entire acceptance of the pronounced decision
 of the majority on which it rests, had worked themselves into
 the Athenian mind. The combat of Marathon was by no means
 a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first which the
 Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle
 of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistocles
 as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the
 battle of Marathon; which first afforded reasonable proof, even
 to disbelievers and sceptical Greeks, that the Persians might be
 effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece
 maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in
 reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

**Images of American
Reading at
the 18th
Triennial—
before
which the
book is
inspired, as
the last
of the
series of
revelations**

Upon the Athenians themselves, the sight to have in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army, the effect of the victory was not more striking and profound.¹ It shocked

¹ *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 274, 11, 1369-1374 (1995).

the dead to the Alkmaionids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he repeats the allegation against the Alkmaionids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to load with the odium of an anonymous crime; while partly true, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Perikles son of Karkidippes, and Kimo son of Mikasidēs, was at its height. Perikles belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmaionid race, and we know that such language was made subservient to political manoeuvres against him by his enemies.¹ Moreover the enmity between Kimo and Perikles had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Karkidippes, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent enemy of Mikasidēs. Though Karkidippes was not an Alkmaionid, his marriage with Agariste connected himself indirectly, and his son Perikles directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmaionids, on that great occasion, which founded the glory of Mikasidēs; for that the reports were false, the intrinsic probabilities of the case, supported by the judgment of Herodotus, afford ample ground for believing.

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristodemus with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Demas from Attika left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tomb was erected on the field² (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and sixty-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on the pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tombstone for the slain. Pausanias, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Mikasidēs himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias are the traditions, and would still read on the pillars the names of the immortalised warriors.³

What were the traditions that inspired the Perikles after the battle—false insinuations, or the Alkmaionids.

¹ Thucyd. i. 126.

² Thucyd. ii. 34.

³ Pausan. i. 29, 3. Compare the story of Mikasidēs ap. Herodotus, i. p. 66.

Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half-a-mile from the western, which Colonel Leslie believes to be the same.¹ The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped their slain warriors as heroes, along with their own ancestors, and with Herakles.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians, without much of supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the warrior Pheidippides on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him,² in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks; after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking in Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Euboeus.³ Even in the time of Pausanias, this marvellous battle-field was held to sacred every night with the noise of acrobats and the shouting of horns. "It is dangerous (observes that plain author) to go to the spot with the express purpose of seeing what is passing; but if a man finds himself there by accident, without having heard anything about the matter, the gods will not be angry with him." The gods (it seems) could not pardon the inquisitive mortal who deliberately peered into their secrets. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called *Porchid*, wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes—Athena, Herakles, Theseus, Euboeus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch Kallimachos and the general Miltiades, while the Platons were distinguished by their

¹ The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and was formerly greatly circumfused. *Monaco on the Field of Arion*, *Transactions of Royal*

Soc. of Literat. 2, p. 113.

² *Herodot.* 2, 126; *Plutarch*, 1, 22, 1.

³ *Plutarch*, *Themist.* 2, 21; *Plutarch*, 2, 22, 2.

from the latter place. Hippias means himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.¹

Happy would it have been for Miltiades if he had shared the honourable death of the palmerest Kallimachos—"anxious to please"—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in considerably contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. These feelings reached such a pitch, that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to insure the coast of supplying an armament of seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion: giving them no intimation whether he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and there enrich them. Such a promise, from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon, was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiades knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Persians had furnished a refuge to

¹ Herodotus vi. 135. Diodorus Siculus in the same place mentions its reaching Italy, but not stating how. Leake's *Travels in Greece* (London, 1835) vol. ii. p. 107, observes, "The fact of his seeing the descendants of the Marathonians is a circumstance which is not mentioned by Herodotus, but is implied by Herodotus vi. 135, 'where he found the same as he had seen before'." The explanation is, that Herodotus, writing some short accounts, had no opportunity to go to the spot, and, as he was going to visit the spot, he was going to visit the spot, and as he was going to visit the spot, he was going to visit the spot.

Herodotus vi. 135. Diodorus Siculus in the same place mentions its reaching Italy, but not stating how.

in Greece, which would be considerably aided by the Persians, upon whose vessels we had just taken possession, &c. &c.

The many particulars which are given respecting the descendants of Miltiades in the *Travels in Greece*, by John Leake, in the *Life of Agathangelos of Trani*, &c. they are stated to have arrived at the first century of the Christian era, passed by the sea, and with all the riches there collected, came back very perhaps to England; but we cannot ascertain if (Philadelphia, Pa. American, 1. 1. 10-12).

Dale for the Parthen fleet at Marseilles; but her real motive (so Thucydides avers us¹) was vindictive animosity against a Parthen citizen named Lyngones, who had conspired the Parthen general Hydarete against him. The Parthen assailed him at first with venisons, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance. In vain did Mithridates prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he besieged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town.² Despairing of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parthen themselves) with a Parthen woman named Timē, priestess or attendant in the temple of Demēter near the town-gate. This woman, pretending to reveal to him a secret which would place Parus in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admitted. Having kept the exterior doors, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, he was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaving the same door to get back, he stumbled or broke his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this wretchedly state he was placed on a shipboard; the sails being raised, and the whole arrangement retarding to Athens.

Violent was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Mithridates on his return.³ Of

¹ Thucyd. vi. 28. ἄλλοι δὲ λέγουσιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τὸ πρῶτον περιγεγραμμένον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡ ἀποστολὴ τῶν πλοίων, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν, ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκστρατείας Ἰσουλῶν. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος.

² Mithrid. viii. 25. ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης, ὅτι τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν, ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκστρατείας Ἰσουλῶν. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος.

³ Thucyd. vi. 28. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος.

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Thuc. viii. 25. p. 128. ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης, ὅτι τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτῶν, ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκστρατείας Ἰσουλῶν. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος. Ἰσουλὸς γὰρ καὶ Ἰσουλῶν ἔστιν ὁ ἄλλος.

this being Xanthippus, father of the great Pericles, became the spokesman. He reproached MITHRIDES before the popular assembly as having been guilty of deserting the purple and as having deserved the penalty of death.

The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best use they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none: all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, moving in addition to his previous conquest of LARNA. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his arrest or condemnation, but to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents "for his infamy". Cornutus Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament. But we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dikastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defendants of Mithridates themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death.

In these penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were consulted to take their choice between these two--as third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration.¹ Of

¹ *Talenta.* The *Talenta* may perhaps have been among those who stood in the *ekklesia* on behalf of Mithridates, deprecating the proposition made by Xanthippus, but still he should have owned that even named by the dikast as suitable to himself. The sentence on Mithridates given by *Thucydides* at *Marathon* is, *ἐπεμύνην τὴν κατατίθεσθαι τὴν πενήντα ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ αἰσχύρᾳ* (*Thucydides* *de* *Marathon* *cap. 10*).

² *It appears double afterwards.*

³ That this was the habitual course of Athen procedure is supported by public institutions, wherever a public amount of penalty was not previously determined, namely, *perjury*, *murder*, *theft*, *fraud*, *violence*, and *blasphemy* (see *Aristotle*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *lib. 10*, *cap. 10*; *Aristotle*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *lib. 10*, *cap. 10*; *Aristotle*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *lib. 10*, *cap. 10*; *Aristotle*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *lib. 10*, *cap. 10*).

fine was paid. Now in the instance of Marylene, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial.¹ To carry away the suffering general in his coach, incapable of moving himself even to plead for his own life, from the presence of the district to a prison, would not only have been a needless severity, but could hardly have failed to imprint itself on the sympathies and the memory of all the beholders; so that Horodonta would have been likely to hear and mention it, if it had really occurred. I incline to believe therefore that Marylene died at home. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kurda paid the fifty talents after his death. If he could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison; and to remove the suffering Marylene from being such a sight would have been the first and strongest desire of all sympathizing friends.

Thus closed the life of the companion of Marcellus. The last act of it produced an impression as momentous, and even shocking—his descent, from the pinnacle of glory, to defeat, means tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undelivered ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, in an abrupt and unprepared— that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Horodonta, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed,² is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a despotical government, indulges with

Reflection
on the
distressing
circumstances
of
the life of
Marylene.

¹ The interval between his trial and his descent is expressed in Horodonta (v. 128) by the difference between the present participles *condemnat* and the past, *condemnat* having not passed.

² *Machiavel*, *Discorsi sopra l'ist.*

² *Ibid.*, cap. 16. "L'opinione comune di popoli malvizi, perche' che popoli malvizi non sono senza opinione, e l'opinione comune sempre che regnava, del peccato di parer sempre che tutti erano a tutti ingratissimi."

ingenuity and without providing any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Missaile has been imposed on the votes of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited as proof, partly of their foolishness, partly of their ingenuity. But however such blows may serve to lighten the mental burden arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to them little or no reasonable criticism.

What is called the foolishness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Missaile; unbounded admiration passed at once into extreme wrath. To account thus for foolishness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Phocæ was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other; what else could come except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whether, in the confidence of an unknown host; he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wounding a private grudge; in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, came the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revision in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person, who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest miseries of the human bosom; and we may easily understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment without seeing the Athenian foolishness. If an officer, whose conduct had been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifest cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, we do not treat the general in command as foolish, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution—which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem! The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change, and in the

strive to produce an impression in the minds of the illiterate favourable to his general character and behaviour: of course he made the particular allegation of his services as well as he can, but he never fails also to register them conspicuously, how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many triumphs and triumphs he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an honest person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. When we come down to the time of the cruises, I shall be prepared to show that such disposition to confine themselves to a special issue was one of the most serious defects of the assembled citizens at Athens. It is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and which belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial, every-where; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiades, then, so far from illustrating either the selfishness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of desert. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs;—it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly misleading were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiades such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured adulation assailed his rational judgment. His mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of madness, self-antipathy, and repugnance;—that dis-tempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the exclusive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which in his case she visited with a judgment starting as its rapidity as well

Tendency
of extreme
glory to
excite
repugnance
by others.

give terrible evils as reward for it. —(Plutarch de Fortit. Diogenes, c. 1.
people appeared per vim et horrore. —Milt. tom. ii. p. 383.)

as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiades been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. Demosthenes indeed,¹ in speaking of the wealth and luxury of political leaders in his own time, and the profuse rewards bestowed upon them by the people, pointed in contrast to the house of Miltiades as being never more splendid than that of a private man. But though Miltiades might continue to live in a modest establishment, he received from his countrymen marks of admiration and deference such as were never paid to any citizen before or after him; and, after all, admiration and deference constitute the precious essence of popular reward. No man except Miltiades ever dared to raise his voice in the Athenian assembly, and say—"Give me a fleet of ships—do not ask what I am going to do with them, but only follow me, and I will enrich you". Hence we may read the unmeasured confidence which the Athenians placed in their victorious general, and the utter incapacity of a leading Greek to bear it without mental depression, while we learn from it to draw the melancholy inference, that one result of success was to make the successful leader one of the most dangerous men in the community. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistocles.

It is indeed fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiades did not take a turn more serious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and greatly anticipate against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Persian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered. Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens: having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment. The Persian force which acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal

¹ Demosthenes, *Olynth.* III. c. 1, p. 61 B.

among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an isolated individual, against the multitude. Accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable cause of an excited position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities, but the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impraisable Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralized by success: there was no fault from which so few ancient Greeks were free: there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security—especially the Democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian Democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors. The history of Miltiades illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

I have already remarked that the Solonism, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on the last grounds: nor can it be said that Solonism was in any sense an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; moreover that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue solonism. There will occur nothing in the course of the history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an unreasonable one or two would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which impinged to it an appearance of greater solonism, without the reality.—First, that the multitude

In what sense is it true that Solonism is an attribute of the Athenian democracy?

the imputation of falsehood; for it is not at all true (I repeat) that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by freedom or artificial causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.

from Agrigento; as a trophy by the Carthaginians when they captured the town, was restored by the Romans, on the reintegration of Carthage, to its original domicile. Platon is said to have inspired the immense expenditure by undertaking the task of building a great temple¹ to Zeus Polieus on the citadel rock; a personage, whereby he was enabled to assemble and arm a number of workmen and devoted partisans, whom he employed, at the festival of the Timaeophoria, to put down the authorities. He afterwards dismissed the citizens by a stratagem, and committed suicide which rendered him so odious, that a sudden rising of the people, headed by Timonachus (son-in-law of the subsequent despot Thales), overthrew and slew him. A severe revenge was taken on his partisans after his fall.

During the interval between 540—500 B.C., events of much importance occurred among the Italian Greeks—especially at Kroton and Sybaris—events, unhappily, very imperfectly handed down. Between these two periods fell both the war between Sybaris and Kroton, and the career and ascendancy of Pythagoras. In connection with this latter name, it will be requisite to say a few words respecting the other Greek philosophers of the sixth century B.C.

I have, in a former chapter, noticed and characterised these distinguished persons called the Seven Wise Men of Greece, whose celebrity falls in the first half of this century—men not so much marked by scientific genius as by practical sagacity and foresight in the appreciation of worldly affairs, and enjoying a high degree of political respect from their fellow-citizens. One of these, however, the Milesian Thales, claims our notice, not only on this ground, but also as the earliest known name in the long line of Greek scientific investigation. His life, nearly contemporary with that of Solon, belongs seemingly to the interval about 640—600 B.C.: the stories mentioned in Herodotus (perhaps borrowed in part from the Milesian Hekataeus) are sufficient to show that his reputation, for wisdom as well as for science, continued to be very great, even a century after his death, among his fellow-citizens. And he merits an important epoch in the progress of the Greek mind, as

¹ Polyan. v. 1. 1: *Clavis de Eleuth.* ² Plutarch, *Pythagorae* cap. viii.
H. E.

having been the first man to depart both in letter and spirit from the Homeric Theogony, introducing the conception of substances, with their transformations and sequences, in place of that string of persons and quasi-human attributes which had animated the old legendary world. He is the father of what is called the Ionic philosophy, which is considered as having from his time down, to that of Sokrates. Writers ancient as well as modern have professed to trace a succession of philosophers, each one the pupil of the preceding, between these two extreme epochs. But the appellation is in truth undefined and even incorrect, since nothing entitled to the name of a school, or sect, or succession (like that of the Pythagoreans, to be noticed presently) can be made out. There is indeed a certain general analogy, in the philosophical vein of Thales, Hippo, Anaximander, and Diogenes of Apollonia, whereby they all stand distinguished from Ionophrasts of Elia and his successors the Eleatic dialecticians Parmenides and Zeno; but there are also material differences between their respective doctrines—no two of them holding the same. And if we look to Anaximander (the person next in order of time to Thales), as well as to Herakleitos, we find them departing to a great degree even from that diameter which all the rest have in common, though both the one and the other are usually enrolled in the list of Ionic philosophers.

Of the old legendary and polytheistic conception of nature, which Thales partially discarded, we may remark that it is a state of the human mind in which the problems suggesting themselves to be solved, and the machinery for solving them, bear a false proportion one to the other. If the problems be vast, undetermined, confused, and derived rather from the hopes, fears, love, hatred, astonishment, &c., of men, than from any genuine desire of knowledge, so also does the mental habit supply variable quanta in unlimited number and with every variety of power and inclination. The means of explanation are thus multiplied and diversified as readily as the phenomena to be explained. Though no event or state which has not yet occurred can be predicted, there is little difficulty in constructing a plausible account of everything which has occurred in the past—of any and all things alike. Cosmogony, and the

prior ages of the world, were conceived as a sort of personal history with intermarriages, filiation, quarrels, and other adventures, of those invisible agents; among whom some one or more were assumed as untopical and self-existent—the latter assumption being a difficulty common to all systems of cosmogony, and from which even the flexible and expansive hypothesis is not exempt. Now when Thales disengaged Greek philosophy from the old mode of explanation, he did not at the same time disengage it from the old problems and notions propounded for inquiry. These he retained, and transmitted to his successors, as vague and vast as they were at first conceived; and so they remained, though with some transformations and modifications, together with many new questions equally trackable, substantially present to the Greeks throughout their whole history, as the legitimate problems for philosophical investigation. But these problems, adapted only to the old elastic system of polytheistic explanation and omnipresent personal agency, became utterly disproportioned to any improved hypotheses such as those of Thales and the philosophers after him—whether assumed physical laws, or plausible moral and metaphysical dogmas, open to speculative

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSE. attack, and of course regarding the life before. To treat the visible world as a whole, and inquire what and how it began, as well as into all its past changes—to discuss the first origin of man, animals, plants, the sun, the stars, &c.—to assign some comprehensive reason why motion or change in general took place in the universe—to investigate the constitution of the human race, and to lay down some systematic relation between them and the gods—all these were topics admitting of being conceived in many different ways, and not forth with dogmatically plausible, but not reducible to any solution resting on scientific evidence or commanding steady adherence under a free criticism.

empty and helpless, the problems proposed were those such as to be out of the reach of science in its largest compass. Gradually indeed subjects more special and limited, and upon which experience or deductions from experience could be brought to bear, were added to the list of puzzles, and examined with profit and instruction. But the old problems, with new ones still unobtainable, were never eliminated, and always occupied a prominent place in the philosophical world. Now it was this disproportion, between questions to be solved and means of solution, which gave rise to that conspicuous characteristic of Grecian philosophy—the sceptical form of suspensive scepticism, passing in some minds into a broad negation of the attainability of general truth—which is accredited from its beginning to its end; commencing as early as Xenophanes, continuing to marked half-centuries afterwards in Anaxidromus and Sextus Empiricus, and including in the interval between these two extremes some of the most powerful intellects in Greece. The present is not the time for considering these Sceptics, who bear no eponymous name, and have not often been fairly appreciated; the more so, as it often suited the purpose of men themselves more than half-sceptical, like Socrates and Plato, to denounce professed scepticism with indignation. But it is essential to bring them into notice at the first spring of Grecian philosophy under Thales, because the circumstances were then laid which in some afterwards developed them.

One name
of the
early
scepticism
which grew
through
Grecian
philosophy.

Though the celebrity of Thales in antiquity was great and universal, scarcely any distinct facts were known respecting him; it is certain that he left nothing in writing. Extensive travels in Egypt and Asia are ascribed to him, and as a general fact these travels are doubtless true, since no other means of acquiring knowledge were then open. At a time when the brother of the Lesbian Alkman was serving in the Peloponnesian army, we may well conceive that an inquisitive Miletian would make his way to that wonderful city wherein stood the temple-charnery of the Chaldean priesthood. How great his reputation was in his lifetime, the admiration expressed by his younger contemporary Xenophanes seems to us; and Heraclitus, in the next generation, a severe judge of all other philosophers, spoke of him with

under nature. To him were traced, by the German inquiries of the fourth century A.D., the first beginnings of geometry, astronomy, and physiology in its large and really appropriate sense, the scientific study of nature: for the Greek word denoting nature (*physis*) first came into comprehensive use about this time (as I have remarked in an earlier chapter)¹ with its derivatives *physiké* and *physiología*, as distinguished from the *theologia* of the old poets. Little stress can be laid on those elementary propositions in geometry which are specified as discovered, or as first demonstrated, by Thales—still less upon the solar eclipses, respecting which (according to Herodotus) he determined beforehand the

times—
of solar
eclipses,
and of
water in
the East.

year of occurrence.² But the main doctrine of his physiology (using that word in its larger Greek sense) is distinctly attested. He stripped *Omnia* and

Tellus, primordial parents of the gods in the Homeric theogony, of their personality, and laid down water, or fluid substance, as the single original element from which everything came and to which everything returned.³ The doctrine of one eternal element, remaining always the same in its essence, but indefinitely variable in its manifestations to sense, was thus first introduced to the discussion of the Greek public. We have no means of knowing the reasons by which Thales supported this opinion, nor could even Aristotle do more than conjecture what they might have been; but one of the statements urged on behalf of it—that the earth itself rested on water⁴—we may safely refer to the Milesian himself, for it would hardly have been advanced at a later age. Moreover Thales is reported to have held, that everything was living and full of gods; and that the magnet, especially, was a living thing. Thus the gods, as far as we can pretend to follow opinions so very loosely transmitted, are specified as active powers, and sources of changeful manifestation, attached to the primordial substance;⁵ the universe being articulated to an organized body or system.

¹ Vol. I. ch. xxi.

² *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

³ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

⁴ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

⁵ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

⁶ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

⁷ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

⁸ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

⁹ *Diogen. Laert.* i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Diogen. Laert. i. 26; *Herodot.* i.

Regarding Hippo—who reproduced the theory of Thales with some degree of generalization, substituting, in place of water, moisture, or something common to air and water—we do not know whether he belonged to the sixth or the fifth century a.n. but Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Pherecydes be-^{about}_{between} long to the latter half of the sixth century. Anaximander the son of Parmenides was a native of Miletus—Anaxagoras, a native of Clazomenae; the former among the earliest exponents of doctrine in prose,² while the latter summarized his opinions to the old medium of verse. Anaximander seems to have taken up the philosophical problem, while he materially altered the hypothesis of his predecessor Thales. Instead of the primordial fluid of the latter, he supposed a primordial principle, without any actual determining qualities whatever, but including all qualities potentially, and manifesting them in an infinite variety from its eternally self-changing nature—a principle which was nothing in itself, yet had the capacity of producing any and all manifestations, however contrary to each other—a primordial something, whose essence it was to be eternally productive of different phenomena—a sort of mathematical point, which counts for nothing in itself, but is vigorous in generating lines to any extent that may be desired. In this manner Anaximander professed to give a comprehensive explanation of change in general, as Generation or Dissolution—how it happened that one condition

1. *Anterior* - In front of the body.
2. *Posterior* - Behind the body.
3. *Superior* - Above the body.
4. *Inferior* - Below the body.
5. *Medial* - Toward the midline.
6. *Lateral* - Away from the midline.
7. *Proximal* - Closer to the point of attachment.
8. *Distal* - Further from the point of attachment.
9. *Superficial* - Closer to the surface.
10. *Deep* - Further from the surface.

...and, in the second run, they had before them some secondary functions of Americanism (Chicago, LaSalle St. Paul, Kansas, Pa. Senators, then only Kentucky and Illinois and Ohio were, Kansas, v. Washington, Philadelphia, Cook, Kan. v. Ill. Senators against the Senate (Chicago) after Chicago's rep. Wilson represented...

[illegible][illegible]

Introducing money to large federal expenditures continues to lead at Wadsworth in registering last year's election of the American Home (Chicago, Illinois) Public Works, T. J. G. Hall, and in other matters. W. J. G. Hall.

thing began and another ceased to exist—according to the vague problems which these early inquiries were in the habit of setting to themselves.¹ He avoided that which the first philosophers especially dreaded, the allegation that generation could take place out of Nothing; yet the primordial Something which he supposed was only distinguished from Nothing by possessing this power of generation. In his theory he passed from the province of physics into that of metaphysics. He first introduced into Greek philosophy that important word which signifies a Beginning or a Principle,² and first opened that metaphysical discussion, which was carried on in various ways throughout the whole period of

division of
the One and
the Many—
the One
impart
and the
Variable.

Greek philosophy, as to the One and the Many—the Continuous and the Variable—that which arises eternally, as distinguished from that which comes and passes away in ever-changing manifestations. His physiology or explanation of nature first conducted the mind into a different route from that suggested by the hypothesis of Thales, which was built upon physical considerations, and was therefore calculated to support and stimulate characteristics of physical phenomena for the purpose of verifying or exhibiting it—while the hypothesis of Anaximander admitted only of being discussed dialectically, or by meanings expressed in general language; meanings, sometimes indeed referring to experience for the purpose of illustration, but seldom resting on it—and never looking out for it as a necessary support. The physical explanation of nature, however, once introduced by Thales, although discarded by Anaximander, was taken up by Anaxagoras and others afterwards, and reproduced with many divergences of details, yet always more or less entangled and perplexed with metaphysical additions, since the two departments were never clearly parted throughout all Greek philosophy.

Of these subsequent physical philosophers I shall speak hereafter: at present I confine myself to the thinkers of the sixth century B.C., among whom Anaximander stands prominent, not as the follower of Thales, but as the author of an hypothesis both

¹ Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione*,
i. 8, p. 325, 326. I presume to have
seen fragments of various philosophical
systems, as in publicly printed fragments
given in complete Greek. Aristotle, i.

4, p. 127, 128.

² *Metaphysics* in Aristotle, *Physics*, 101,
102. *Physics* in the *Aglyptographia* of
Heraclitus.

new and looking in a different direction. It was not merely as the author of this hypothesis, however, that Anaximander enlarged the Greek mind and roused the powers of thought, we find him also mentioned as distinguished in astronomy and geometry. He is said to have been the first to establish a circle in Greece, to construct a sphere, and to explain the obliquity of the ecliptic;¹ how far such alleged authority really belongs to him, we cannot be certain, but there is one step of immense importance which he is clearly affirmed to have made. He was the first to compose a treatise on the geography of the land and sea with its latitudes, and to construct a chart or map founded thereon—merely a tablet of wax. Such a novelty, wonderful even to the rude and ignorant, was calculated to stimulate powerfully inquisitive minds, and from it may be dated the commencement of Greek rational geography—not the least valuable among the contributions of this people to the stock of human knowledge.

Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, somewhat younger than Anaximander and nearly contemporary with Pythagoras (scarcely from about 570—490 B.C.), migrated from Klazomenæ² to Sestriæ and Lampsacus in Sicily and then to Italy, some after the time when Ionia became subject to the Persians (545—490 B.C.). He was the founder of what is called the Eleatic school of philosophers—a real school, since it appears that Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus pursued and developed, in a great degree, the train of speculation which had been begun by Anaxagoras—deductives with additions and variations of their own, but especially with a dialectic power which belongs to the age of Plato, and is unknown in the sixth century B.C. He was the author of more than one poem of considerable length, one on the foundation of Klazomenæ and another on that of Elea; besides two poems on Nature, whence his philosophical doctrines were set forth.³ His manner appears to have been controversial and full of sagacity towards antagonists. But what is most remarkable is the plain-speech manner

¹ Diogen. Laert. li. ii. §. 1. He agreed with Thales in maintaining that the earth was stationary (supported on water), li. ii. §. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

² Diogen. Laert. li. ii.

³ Diogen. Laert. li. ii. §. 10. Sestriæ, Sicily. Page. 1 p. 28.

subjective fancy, imagined by men after their own model: if men or lions were to become religious (as said), they would in like manner provide for themselves gods after their respective shapes and characters.¹ This hypothesis, which seemed to set aside altogether the study of the sensible world as a source of knowledge, was expanded briefly, and, as it should seem, obscurely and vaguely, by Xenophanes; at least we may infer this much from the slighting epithet applied to him by Aristotle.² For his successors, Parmenides and Zeno, in the second century, expanded it considerably, supported it with extraordinary arguments of deduction, and even expanded a second part, in which the phenomena of sense—though considered only as appearances, not partaking in the reality of the One Being—were yet explained by a new physical hypothesis; so that they well be found to exercise great influence over the speculations both of Plato and Aristotle. We discover in Xenophanes, moreover, a vein of scepticism, and a scornful despair as to the attainability of certain knowledge,³ which the nature of his philosophy was well calculated to suggest, and in which the alligraph Thea of the third century B.C., who seems to have spoken of Xenophanes better than of most of the other philosophers, powerfully sympathized.

The caricature of Theoclytus of Syros, contemporary of Anaximander and among the teachers of Pythagoras, Theoclytus seems, according to the fragments preserved, a combination of the old legendary fancies with Orphic mysticism,⁴ and probably exercised little influence over the subsequent course of Greek philosophy. By what has been said of Thea, Anaximander, and Xenophanes, it will be seen that the sixth century B.C. witnessed the opening of several of those roads of intellectual speculation which the later philosophers pursued further, or at least from which they branched off. Before the year 500 B.C. many interesting questions were thus brought into discussion,

The Eleatic school, Parmenides and Zeno, springing from Xenophanes—after the fashion of their great influence on Greek speculation.

¹ *Diogenes Laërtius, Strom.* v. p. 80, c. 11.

² *Aristotle, Metaphysics* i. 2, p. 102, 103.

³ *Xenophanes*, *Fr.* c. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

cf. de—100; and Proclus, Hypotyposis i. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100.

⁴ *Diogenes Laërtius, Strom.* v. p. 80, c. 11.

⁵ *Diogenes Laërtius, Strom.* v. p. 80, c. 11.

between 540—540 B.C., about one century earlier than Herodotus, it was under Assyria, the last of its own kings, with its peculiar native character yet outstripped by foreign conquest, and only slightly modified by the admixture during the preceding century of Grecian mercenary troops and traders. The spectacle of Egyptian beliefs, the conservatism of the priests, and the initiation into vague mysticism or secret rites and stories not accessible to the general public, may very naturally have impressed the mind of Pythagoras, and given him that turn for mystic observances, asceticism, and peculiarity of diet and clothing, which manifested itself from the same cause among several of his contemporaries, but which was not a common phenomenon in the primitive Greek religion. Besides visiting Egypt, Pythagoras is also said to have profited by the teaching of Thales, of Anaximander, and of Pherekydes of Syros;¹ amidst the towns of Ionia he would moreover have an opportunity of conversing with many Greek seafarers who had visited foreign countries, especially Italy and Sicily. His mind seems to have been acted upon and impelled by this combined stimulus,—partly towards an imaginative and religious way of speculation, with a life of mystic observance,—partly towards that active exercise, both of mind and body, which the genius of an Hellenic community so naturally tended to suggest.

Of the personal doctrines or opinions of Pythagoras, whom we must distinguish from Philolaos and the subsequent Pythagoreans, we have little certain knowledge, <sup>the do-
ctrine and
doctrine.</sup> though tradition the first germ of their geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, &c., must have proceeded from him. But that he believed in the metempsychosis or transmigration of the souls of deceased men into other men as well as into animals, we know, not only by other evidence, but also by the testimony of his contemporary, the philosopher Xenophanes of Elea. Pythagoras, seeing a dog beaten and hearing him howl, decried the strikers to death, saying,—“It is the soul of a friend of mine, whom I recognised by his voice”. This—together with the general testimony of Hippias of Elis, that Pythagoras was a man of extensive research and acquired instruction, but artful for

¹ The association of Pythagoras with these three, which I. Diel, *op. cit.* follows, is noticed by Aristotle, *de Divinat.* c. 14.

and to recommend them to the favour of the gods; the Pythagorean life, like the Orphic life,¹ being intended as the entrance-prerequisite of the brotherhood—approached only by penance and initiatory ceremonies, which were adopted to select students rather than to an antichristian crowd—and creating entire mental devotion to the master.² In these lofty pretensions the Argentine Republic seems to have greatly copied him, though with some variation, about half a century afterwards.³ While Aristotle tells us that the Eretrians identified Pythagoras with the Hyperborean Apollo, the satirical Titian pronounced him to have been "a juggler of solemn speech engaged in taking for men."⁴ This is the same character, looked at from the different points of view of the believer and the unbeliever. There is however no reason for regarding Pythagoras as an impostor, because experience seems to show, that while in certain ages it is not difficult for a man to persuade others that he is inspired, it is still less difficult for him to control the mass belief himself.

Looking at the general type of Pythagoras, as conceived by Rousseau in and nearest to his own age—Ezra, Plato, Jesus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates—we find in him

² Also *Leptochloa* is harvested and valuable species. *Agropyronum*, *Quercus*, *Pin.*, *Al.*, *Sal.*, *Ulm.*, *Pop.*, *Prun.*, *Laur.*, *Frax.*, and *Malus* should be.

[illegible][illegible]

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1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 281:1661-1666, 1999.

[illegible]

Wiederholungen von geplanten Interventionen sind

Notes: 1. *See* [http://www.fishbase.org](#) for details on species and distribution.

² *Isotriaeta dentata*, p. 257, col. 4, fig. 1. *Isotriaeta* is larger, narrower in all parts; not marked with light purple line, but with darker subvertical stripes on blackish surface, and is not so broad and flattened as the only light colored member of the genus.

Organisms collected: *Staph. Novalis*,
N. 1, about *Pyrogastera* sp. 28 (about
1000000). *Edwardsella*, from about 1000
N.E. (about 1000000) (from 1000000)
collected: *Pyrogastera*, from 1000000.

cannot possibly have disposed with animal food and simple diet (even eating only the plain short but nutritious appetizer), and is not likely to have based his education on speculative study. Probably Pythagoras did not embrace the same bodily or mental discipline in all, or at least knew when to grant dispensations. The order, as it then stood under him, consisted of men different both in temperament and aptitude, but bound together by common religious observances and hopes, common reverence for the master, and mutual attachment as well as pride in each other's success. It must thus be distinguished from the Pythagoreans of the fourth century B.C., who had no connection with wisdom, and comprised only ascetic, stolid men, generally reform, though in some cases rising to political distinction. The revival of these Pythagoreans, some very numerous, seems to have continued until about 300 B.C., and then nearly died out, being superseded by other schools of philosophy more suited to cultivated Greeks of the age after Sokrates. But during the time of Cicero, two centuries afterwards, the idealising tendency—then beginning to spread over the Greek and Roman world, and becoming gradually stronger and stronger—caused the Pythagorean philosophy to be again revived. It was revived, too, with little or none of its scientific tendencies, but with more than its primitive religious and imaginative functions—

Pythagoras
with his
ascetic
discipline
of the
Pythagoreans
who after

Apollonius of Tyana constituting himself a living copy of Pythagoras. And then, while the scientific elements developed by the disciples of Pythagoras had become disjoined from all possibility of act, and passed into the general stolidus world—the original vein of mystic and poetic fancy belonging to the master, without any of that practical efficiency of body and mind which had marked his first followers, was taken up now into the Pagan world, along with the disfigured doctrine of Plato. Neo-Pythagoreans, passing gradually into Neo-Platonism, cultivated the other more positive and material systems of Pagan philosophy, as the contemporary and rival of Christianity. A large proportion of the false statements concerning Pythagoras come from these Neo-Pythagoreans, who were not deterred by the want of authorities from illustrating, with ample latitude of theory, the ideal character of the master.

That an inquisitive man like Pythagoras, at a time when there were hardly any books to study, would visit foreign countries, and converse with all the Greek philosophical inquiries within his reach, is a matter which we should presume even if no one related it; and our witnesses carry us very little beyond this general presumption. What doctrines he borrowed, or from whom, we are unable to discover. But in fact his whole life and proceedings bear the stamp of an original mind and not of a borrower—a mind impressed both with Hellenic and with non-Hellenic beliefs and religions, yet capable of combining the two in a manner peculiar to himself; and above all, and not with those talents for religious and personal ascendency over others, which told for much more than the intrinsic merit of his ideas. We are informed that after extensive travels and inquiries he returned to Samos, at the age of about forty. He then found his native island under the despotism of Polycrates, which rendered it an undesirable place either for free sentiments or for marked individuality. Unable to attract learners, or found any school or brotherhood, in his native island, he determined to expatriate; and we may presume that at this period (about 528—480 B.C.) the recent colonization of Ionia by the Persians was not without influence on his determination. The trade between the Asiatic and the Italian Greeks—and even the intimacy between Miletus and Knoss on the one side, and Sybaris and Thurium on the other—had been great and of long standing, so that there was more than one motive to determine him to the coast of Italy; in which direction also his contemporary Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, emigrated, certainly about the same time—from Kolophôn to Elea,¹ Knoss, and Elea.²

Knoss and Sybaris were at this time in their fullest prosperity—among the first and most prosperous cities of the Hellenic world. To the former of the two Pythagoras directed his course. A Council of One Thousand persons, taken from among the helms and representatives of the principal professions at its first convocation, was here invested with the supreme authority: in what

Pythagoras
not merely
a borrower,
but an original
and
independent
mind.—His
ideas from
Samos to
Elea.

State of
the cities—
prosperity
—and
the
influence
of the
Council
of One
Thousand.

¹ Cicero, *de Rep.* ii. 12.

especially of anatomy, there was then little or nothing. The physicians acquired his knowledge from observation of men sick as well as healthy, and from a careful notice of the way in which the human body was acted upon by surrounding agents and circumstances; and this sense knowledge was not less necessary for the trainer; so that the same place which contained the best man in the latter class was also likely to be distinguished in the former. It is not improbable that such celebrity of Kroton may have been one of the reasons which determined Pythagoras to go thither. For among the precepts ascribed to him, precise rules as to diet and bodily regulation occupy a prominent place. The medical or surgical celebrity of Demokritos (son-in-law of the Pythagorean Master), to whom allusion has been made in a former chapter, is contemporaneous with the presence of Pythagoras at Kroton; and the medical men of Magna Græcia antedated themselves in credit, as rivals of the schools of the Asclepeads at Efe and Kos, throughout all the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The biographers of Pythagoras tell us that his arrival there, his preaching, and his conduct produced an effect almost electric

[illegible]

grate, erregt die Aufmerksamkeit, bringt Beispiele aus anderen, sehr viele aber in Texten aus Anmerkungen des persönlichen Autors, der offenbar, auf die Beispiele nur zu einem Kapitel des Text, nur ein einziges Beispiel. Ein solches Beispiel findet sich, wenn man in Text, privaten Forschungsbericht übermitteln kann, ist, aber nicht, wenn man einen aus demselben Beispiel.

Ein solches Beispiel aus dem Text, der offenbar, auf die Beispiele nur zu einem Kapitel des Text, nur ein einziges Beispiel. Ein solches Beispiel findet sich, wenn man in Text, privaten Forschungsbericht übermitteln kann, ist, aber nicht, wenn man einen aus demselben Beispiel.

See also: *Int. revista de Fisiol. ex-*
periment. fisiol., 1969, 10, 1, 11.
p. 101. *Archiv. Intern. Physiol.*, 1969, 57, 4, 12.
p. 12. 1969, 57, 4, 12.

an active brotherhood, the Pythagoreans never revived; but the dispersed members came together as a sect, for common religious observance and common pursuit of science. They were reconstituted, after some interval, into the order of *Magna Grecia*,¹ from which they had been originally expelled, but in which the sect is always considered as particularly belonging,—though individual members of it are found besides at Tarentum and in other cities of Greece. Indeed some of these later Pythagorean societies even acquired great political influence, as we see in the case of the Tarentine Archytas, the contemporary of Plato.

It has already been stated that the period when Pythagoras arrived at Kroton may be fixed somewhere between b.c. 540—530. His arrival is said to have occurred at a time of great depression in the minds of the Krotonates. They had recently been debilitated by the united attacks and diseases, partly induced by themselves in number, at the river Sagra; which debilitation is said to have rendered them docile to the teaching of the foreign missionary.² As the birth of the Pythagorean order is thus connected with the defeat of the Krotonates at the Sagra, so its extinction is also connected with their victory over the Sybarites at the river Tantalos or Tantalus, about twenty years afterwards.

Of the history of these two great Achæan cities we unfortunately know very little. Though both were powerful, yet down to the

events in each case, and depends only on the traditions of their inhabitants. The very scanty materials in which this little is to be gathered, are the fragments of writers regarding the history of the Pythagoreans, such as Strabo, &c. At the same time some valuable traces are thought to remain.

The account of the two societies appears to be quite incorrect. The influence of the Pythagorean order on the government of Magna Grecia seems altogether untrue, as far as we are able to judge. An individual Pythagorean may, however, have acted influentially, but doubtless the influence of Aristotle was much more potent in this respect. The latter Sagra giving us the first instance and clearing up historic grounds, there is nothing to prove that Kroton was the Tantalos

region.

¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. *Strabo*, description of Italy, &c. ² *Strabo*, description of Italy, &c. ³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11.

⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ²⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ³⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁴⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁵⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁶⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁷⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁸⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹¹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹² *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹³ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁴ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁵ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁶ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁷ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁸ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ⁹⁹ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq. ¹⁰⁰ *Strabo*, de Italia, l. vi. c. 11. et seq.

the settlers in the town of Thuri afterwards founded nearly adjoining. It appears however that the Krotonians for a long time kept the site of Sybaris deserted, refusing even to allot the territory among the body of their own citizens: from which circumstance (as has been before noticed) the contention against the Pythagorean order seemed to have arisen. They may perhaps have been afraid of the name and recollections of the city. No large or permanent establishment was ever formed there until Thuri was established by Athens about sixty-five years afterwards. Nevertheless the name of the Sybarites did not perish: they maintained themselves at Locris, Sikyon, and elsewhere, and afterwards formed the privileged Old-citizens among the colonists of Thuri; but misbehaved themselves in that capacity, and were mostly either slain or expelled. Even after that, however, the name of Sybaris still remained on a reduced scale in some portion of the territory: Herodotus recounts what he was told by the Sybarites, and we find subsequent indications of them even as late as Thucydides.

The conquest and destruction of the original Sybaris—perhaps in 600 B.C. the greatest of all Grecian cities—appears to have excited a strong sympathy in the Hellenic world. In Miletus especially, with which it had maintained intimate union, the grief was so vehement, that all the Milesians shared their heads in token of mourning.¹ The event, happening just at the time of the expulsion of Hippas from Athens, must have made a sensible revolution in the relations of the Greek cities on the Italian coast with the rustic population of the interior. The Krotonians might destroy Sybaris and disperse its inhabitants, but they could not succeed in its wide dominions over dependent territory: and the extension of this great aggregate power, stretching across the peninsula from sea to sea, lessened the means of resistance against the Ocean movements from the inland. From this time forward, the cities of Magna Græcia, as well as those of Ionia, tend to decline in consequence; while Athens, on the other hand, becomes both more conspicuous and more powerful. At the invasion of Greece

Herodotus
describes
in the
Hellenic
world, by
the destruc-
tion of
Sybaris
Greatest
cities of the
Greek
world.
in 600.

¹ Herodotus, vi. 12.

by Xerxes thirty years after the conquest of Sybaris, Sparta and Athens used to ask for aid both from Sicily and Euboea, but not from Magna Græcia.

It is much to be regretted that we do not possess fuller information respecting such important changes among the Greek-Italians often. Yet we may remark that even Herodotus—himself a citizen of Thuri and dwelling on the spot not more than eighty years after the capture of Sybaris—evidently found no written materials to consult; and could obtain from verbal conversation nothing better than statements both vague and contradictory. The material circumstance, for example, of the aid rendered by the Spartan Dorieus and his colonists, though positively asserted by the Sybarites, was as positively denied by the Krotonians, who alleged that they had accomplished the

*Curiously—
they differ
widely and
expressly
concerning
the im-
portant
detail.*

conquest by themselves and with their own recruited forces. There can be little hesitation in crediting the affirmative assertion of the Sybarites, who showed to Herodotus a temple and precinct erected by the Spartan prince in testimony of his share in the victory, on the banks of the dry deserted channel

out of which the Krathos had been turned, and in honour of the Krotonian Athlete.¹ This at once forms a proof, coupled with the positive assertions of the Sybarites, sufficient for the case; but they produced another indirect argument to confirm it, which deserves notice. Dorieus had attacked Sybaris while he was passing along the coast of Italy to go and found a colony in Sicily, under the express sanction and encouragement of the oracle. After carrying out his colony at Sybaris, he pursued his journey to the north-western portion of Sicily, where he and nearly all his companions perished in a battle with the Carthaginians and Epeirians—though the oracle had promised him that he should acquire and occupy permanently the neighbouring territory near Mount Eryx. Now the Sybarites defaced from this fatal disaster of Dorieus and his expedition, combined with the favourable promise of the oracle beforehand, a sufficient proof of the correctness of their own statement that he had fought at Sybaris. For if he had gone straight to the territory marked out by the oracle (they argued),

¹ Herodotus, ii. 62.

CHAPTER XIXVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHÓN TO THE MARCH OF
ISRAËL AGAINST GREECE.

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the *Athenian* victory at Marathón, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the *Ægean* to the Asiatic coast. He had been directed to conquer both *Eretria* and *Athens*; an order which he had indeed executed in part with success, as the rising of *Xerxes* prisoners brought to Datis attested, but which remained still unfulfilled in regard to the city principally obnoxious to Datis. Far from satiating his revenge upon *Athens*, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an *improbable* defeat. His wrath against the *Athenians* rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon *Greece* generally. Bordered upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and husbandry. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Datis determined to conduct in person against *Greece*.¹ Nor was his determination shaken by a revolt of the *Egyptians*, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of *Greece* and the reconquest of *Egypt*—when he was surprised by death after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor *Xerxes*, his son by

¹ Herodotus, vii. 1, 2.

struck Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country; a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before; we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Artabanus, brother of Xerxes, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxes was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus, who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a atonement for himself. There were not wanting Greek counselors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Alcmææ, belonging to Lædæa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Sparta to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Helos; while the exiled Peloponnesians from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. On the present occasion, they brought with them to Sparta a new instrument, the holy oracles of the Pythia—a man who had acquired much reputation, not by prophesying himself, but by collecting, arranging, interpreting, and delivering out prophetic verses passing under the name of the ancient seer or poet Musæus. Thirty years before, in the flourishing days of the Peloponnesians, he had lived at Athens, enjoying the confidence of Hipparchus, and credited by him as the expounder of those venerated documents. But having been detected by the poet Iamus of Barnœa, in the very act of interpolating them with new matter of his own, he was indignantly banished by Hipparchus. The Peloponnesians, however, now in banishment themselves, forgot or forgot to forget this offence, and turned Ctesandrus with his prophecies to Sparta, presenting him as a person of considerable authority, to assist in working on the mind of

Herodotus
of Xerxes
to the
invaders
of Greece
by means
of the
Pythia
and
the
Peloponnesians
which they
employed
to persuade
the
Peloponnesians
to fight
for Xerxes
in Sparta.

the conquest of Greece as carrying with it that of all Europe, so that the Persian empire would become co-extensive with the sphere of Rome and the limits of the world's course.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital-informant—Hecate. The invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst these prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a relative importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear co-ordinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prohibition of detail, that each thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Greece as the first barbaric conquest of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full exposition of his theme, "Greece Barbarous leads forth, daily," in the expedition of Xerxes. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also related in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second Book of the *Iliad*: probably too, if the lost Greek epic had reached us, we should trace many other cases in which the magnification of the invasion has unconsciously assimilated itself to them. The Dream sent by the gods to frighten Xerxes, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals enrolled in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidae against Troy. He enters into the internal feelings of Xerxes with as much familiarity as Homer into those of Agamemnon, and introduces "the counsel of Zeus" as not less direct, special, and overriding than it appears in the

originally been aware to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereby by the persuasions of Marcellus. This was probably the genuine Porcus belief, for the chance of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor.¹ As soon as Karis, yielding to persuasion, has announced to the Porcus chief men whom he had deceived, his resolution to bridge over the Hellespont and march to the conquest of Greece and Europe, Marcellus is represented as impressing his views unobtrusively, in the project, entitled the common theme² of Doris, and depicting the dangers to Europe (as he denominated them) as so poor and dissipated that success was not only certain but easy. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Karis—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artichamus, brother of the deceased Doris, and therefore made to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Noble enables him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Karis, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Harolotus puts into the mouth of Artichamus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek. It opens with the Greek conception of the necessity of hearing and comparing opposite views, prior to any final decision—expresses Marcellus by subtly depreciating the Greeks and advising his master to pursue danger—sets forth the probability that the Greeks, if victorious at sea, would come and destroy the bridge by which Karis had crossed the Hellespont—recalls the letter of the merchant board which Doris and his army had undergone in Smyrna, from the instructions (forced only by necessity and his influence) of the bridge over the Double: such practical suggestions being further strengthened by alluding to the jealous attention of the Godhead towards overweening human power.³

The important monarch allows his mind to be torn of doubt and misgiving; nevertheless, in spite of himself, the dissensions well upon him so powerfully, that before night they gradually alter his resolution, and decide him to renounce the scheme.

¹ Marcellus, vol. III. Marcellus is chiefly addressed: Marcellus is 104.

² Marcellus, vol. I. Marcellus is 104.

Karis
gives
the
project
to
the
Porcus
chiefs
—the
Porcus
chiefs
and
Marcellus
—the
Porcus
chiefs
and
Marcellus

reduced Persia at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent change of course to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the fighting Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the other circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C., the vast army first raised by Xerxes arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis; a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kratis in Cappadocia, on the eastern side of the Helys, where it was joined by Xerxes himself on the road from Susa.¹ From thence he crossed the Helys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, passing through the Phrygian towns of Kolossæ, Anasæ, and Kalliosæ, and the Lydian town of Kallistion, until he reached Sardis, where water-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was (respecting its numbers, I shall speak

further presently), was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxes had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the *Helios*, as Datis had passed to Eubœia and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once; the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly; while the latter was intended to accompany and co-operate. A fleet of 1207 ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover Xerxes, with a degree of foresight much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.²

If the whole contemporary world were covered by the vast assemblage of men and armaments of war which Xerxes thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even

March of Xerxes from the interior of Persia to the Hellespont, and the landing place at Sardis. The names of the towns of Phrygia and Lydia are given in the margin.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 42–43.

² Herodotus, vii. 43–44.

Adams, an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man, was solemnly tried and sent out of the border. And the Aztecans, when they returned hungry from an un-
successful day's hunting, encouraged and praised the god *Pan* or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of this venting on human wrath. The vengeance awarded by Cyrus on the river Gyndis (which he caused to be divided into three hundred and sixty streams, because one of his sacred horses had been drowned in it) stands a fair parallel to the scourging of the Hellaspont by Xerxes. To offer sacrifices to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude to services rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite to the ancient religion. While the grounds for distributing the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very feeble. The expulsion of Xerxes took place when Xanthotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it; and the whole of his narrative shows that he valued himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellaspont, and all the incidents connected with it, were not necessarily known, to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily refuted. The description of the unfortunate engineers was an act scarcely reprehensible, and even the scourging of the Hellaspont, while

town of Abensina, and indeed the native maritime forces of the empire,¹ were brought together to assist. The head-quarters of the fleet were first at Eynut and Paffera, next at Elam in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos. The central-station at the latter was placed under the general direction of two noble Persians—Babaris and Artachane, and distributed under their management as task-work among the contingents of the various nations; an ample supply of flour and other provisions being brought for sale in the neighbouring plain from various parts of Asia and Egypt.

Three circumstances in the narrative of Herodotus respecting this work deserve special notice. First, the superior intelligence of the Phoenicians, who, writes eight of that holy *Islander* island of Thera which had been occupied three ^{intelligence} centuries before by their first masters, were now Phoenicians labouring as instruments to the execution of a foreign conquest. Amidst all the people engaged, they alone took the precaution of beginning the excavation at a breadth far greater than the canal was finally destined to occupy, so as gradually to narrow it, and leave a convenient slope for the sides. The others dug straight down, so that the time as well as the toil of their work was doubled by the continual falling in of the sides—a remarkable illustration of the degree of practical intelligence then prevalent, since the nations assembled were many and diverse. Secondly, Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious work from motives of mere ostentation: "for it would have cost no trouble at all" (he observes) "to drag all the ships in

¹ Herodot. vii. 85, 86, 88; Diodor. vi. 3.

² Herodot. vii. 84. *de pñe dei con-*
structione plurimum, necessitateque
etiam digni. Sicque Xerxes totius, in-
super et Persarum, machinationem, et per-
sonas adhibuit: - unde vos, quodam
modo audieris, etiam latius etiam
etiam Persarum, etiam totius Persarum
et Persarum, etiam de dei nomine
etiam deus Xerxesque.

According to the tradition to which Herodotus represents this excavation to have been performed, the earth dug out was trampled up by men in mass

from the bottom of the canal to the top: the whole performed by hand, without any aid of animals or machines.

The projected work of turning the waters of the River Nile, which Herodotus never applied to Greece in the relation of Thucydides, was, as we gather from some late writers at least (Hart. Hist. i. 75).

An infinitely more recent suggestion of which had been treated after a similar mode by Aristotle (Meteorol. Met. ii. 5) and by Aristotle's commentator, Theophrastus (Meteorol. i. 25), was by Aristotle's commentator, Theophrastus of Erythraea (Met. ii. 5).

as to the change in battle. To supply the want in this way towards freedom, and especially towards freedom engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic pride and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and Ionian Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects of Athens: and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complete profusion against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Larcis advanced this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the reconstructed double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Larcis as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481—480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch dispatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tribute of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most reckless of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thracæ and Macedonia to prepare "dinner" for himself and his vast army as he passed on his march. That march was commenced at the first beginning of spring, and continued in spite of several threatening portents during the course of it—one of which Larcis was kind enough not to comprehend, though, according to Herodotus, nothing could be more obvious than its significance.¹

Bridge of
boats.
Bridges
across the
Strymon.

1st voyage of Xerxes (comp. vii. 22), and Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vi. 4—12.

The canal, however, and planted vine, or the city, towards which the bridge was carried by the ancient Persians, while he passed in the narrow Troad. See the illustration in

Herod. de T. vi. 1, p. 100, esp. and see also the map of the Troad with the Troadic coasting and bridge.

¹ Herodotus, vi. 22. When the Persians, on their way to attack the city of Athens, were warned by the oracle of Delphi to be on their guard, the Persians, on their way to attack the city of Athens, were warned by the oracle of Delphi to be on their guard.

—while another was misinterpreted into a favourable omen by the suppliant survivors of the Megarian perils.

On quitting Sardis, the vast host was divided into two nearly equal columns; a spacious interval being left between the two for the king himself with his guards and select Persians. First of all came the baggage, escorted by bands of turban, immediately followed by one-half of the entire body of infantry, without any distinction of nations. Next, the select troops, 1000 Persian arrayed with 1000 Persian spearmen, the latter being distinguished by carrying their spears with the point downwards, as well as by the spear itself, which had a golden pommel-piece at its other extremity, in place of the ordinary spike or point whereby the weapon was planted in the ground when the soldier was not on duty. Behind these troops walked ten sacred banners, of vast power and splendidly caparisoned, bred on the Median plains in Media: next, the sacred chariot of Zoro, drawn by eight white horses—whom no man was ever allowed to mount, not even the charioteer, who walked on foot behind with the reins in his hand. Next after the sacred chariot came that of Xerxes himself, drawn by Median horses; the charioteer, a noble Persian named Pithagoras, being seated in it by the side of the monarch, who was often accustomed to alight from the chariot and to enter a litter. Immediately about his person were a chosen body of 1000 horse-guards, the best troops and of the highest breed among the Persians, having golden apples at the reverse extremity of

the Median Rhoia doryphores and archery-bowmen, before it was called before him in the other camp.

The journey was short; a week brought Xerxes to Egea, which situated that fertile waste and town in his opinion as Greece with strength and splendour, but that he would come back in haste and triumphant.

The beautiful city of Miletus, too, fell in the custody of the host—such is the certainty of his interpretation. Xerxes writes, on illustrating the poem, of having met that of his son. The interpretation is doubtful here. On following the course of the story better given, as I suppose, than, after the legend, but somewhat, perhaps an appropriate simile for the poem.

engagement and inglorious tergiversing, if Xerxes' opinion, consider Xerxes' plan, and the simile is revealed, either by himself or by some house him is, along with it, as if it had been a true indication that the opinion of this supposed commander that is, to illustrate the great Persian legend in its own way. It is possible, even to promulgate evidence to have not the volume showing it, while departing from the established principle of nature should be visible for himself in a man who claims that the poem is a true and perfect story and history.

Compare the description of the Persian host of Xerxes, as given in the *Upanishad* of Xerxes, ch. 1, 1-10.

their spears, and followed by other detachments of 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, all native Persians. Of these 10,000 Persians infantry, called the Immortals because their number was always exactly maintained, 5000 carried spears with pommements of silver at the reverse extremity, while the remaining 5000, distributed in front, rear, and on each side of this detachment, were marked by pommements of gold on their spears. With them ended what we may call the household troops: after whom, with an interval of two furlongs, the marching host followed pell-mell.¹ Respecting the numbers and equipment portions I shall speak presently, on occasion of the great camp at Doriskos.

On each side of the army, as it marched out of Sardis, was seen suspended one-half of the body of a slaughtered man, placed there expressly for the purpose of impressing a lesson on the subjects of Persia. It was the body of the eldest son of the wealthy Pythion, a Phrygian old man resident at Kaleas, who had entertained Xerxes in the course of his march from Kappadokia to Sardis, and who had previously recommended himself by rich gifts to the preceding king Darius. So strenuous was his hospitality to Xerxes, and so pressing his offers of pecuniary contribution for the Grecian expedition, that the monarch asked him what was the amount of his wealth. "I possess (replied Pythion), besides lands and slaves, 5000 talents of silver and 5,000,000 of golden drachms, wanting only 7000 of being 4,000,000. All this gold and silver do I present to thee, retaining only my lands and slaves, which will be quite enough." Xerxes replied by the strongest expressions of praise and gratitude for his liberality, at the same time refusing his offer, and even giving to Pythion out of his own treasure the sum of 7000 drachms, which was wanting to make up the exact sum of 4,000,000. The latter was so elated with this mark of favour, that when the army was about to depart from Sardis, he ventured, under the influence of terror from the various menacing portents, to prefer a prayer to the Persian monarch. His five wishes were all about to come to the smouldering camp against Greece: his prayer to Xerxes was that

Story of
the rich
Phrygian
Pythion—his
offer—his
prayer to
Xerxes.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 44. Next to the house followed the slaves, and behind it Xerxes led the army.

the eldest of them might be left behind, as a ring to his own destined years, and that the service of the remaining four with the army might be considered insufficient. But the unhappy father knew not what he said. "Wretch!" (exclaimed Xanthus) dost thou dare to talk to me about thy son, when I am repulsed on the march against Greece, with my sons, brothers, relatives, and friends? them who are my dear, and whose duty it is to follow me with thy wife and thy entire family? Know that the sensitive soul of man dwells in his ears: on hearing good things, it fills the body with delight, but boils with wrath when it hears the contrary. Ah, when thou didst good deeds and makest good offers to me, thou wast not boast of having surpassed the king in generosity—as now, when thou hast turned round and become impatient, the punishment inflicted on thee shall not be the full measure of thy deserts, but something less. For thyself and for thy four sons, the hospitality which I rendered thee thou shalt serve as protection. But for that one son whom thou especially wishest to keep in safety, the forfeit of his life shall be thy penalty." He forthwith directed that the son of Pythion should be put to death, and his body severed in twain; of which one-half was to be fixed on the right-hand, the other on the left-hand, of the road along which the army was to pass.¹

A tale essentially similar, yet rather less revolting, has been already recounted respecting Darius, when undertaking his expedition against Scythia. Both tales illustrate the intense force of sentiment with which the Persian Kings regarded the obligation of universal personal service, when they went themselves in the field. They seem to have measured their strength by the number of men whom they collected around them, with little or no reference to quality: and the very mention of exemption—the idea that a subject and a slave should seek to withdraw himself from a risk which the monarch was about to encounter—was an offence not to be pardoned. In this as in the other case of Oriental kings, whether Greek, Persian, or Scythian, we trace nothing but the despotic force of personal will, translating their will into act without any thought of consequences,

¹ The incident respecting Pythion the wealth of Pythion, but in other is in Herodotus, vii. 11, 22, 23, 24. I simply the story seems well attested that no weakness in the evidence of is in it.

and treating subjects with less consideration than an ordinary Greek master would have shown towards his slaves.

From Sardis, the host of Xerxes directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kalkas—then through Alabanda, Karion, and the plain of Thelid. They passed Adinaythian and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, most part of which was on their left-hand, not without some loss from stormy weather and disorder.¹ From hence they reached March to
Ardus—
referred
above to
Ilion by
Herod. Trion and the river Skamander, the stream of which they drank up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. In spite of the immortal interest which the Skamander derives from the Homeric poems, its magnitude is not such as to make this fact surprising. To the poems themselves even Xerxes did not disdain to pay tribute. He ascended the holy hill of Ilion,—crossed the Pergama where Trion was said to have lived and reigned,—sacrificed 1000 cows to the patron goddess Athina,—and caused the Megara priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that renowned spot. He even remembered to inquire into the local details,² abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilion, of that great real or mythical war to which Greek chronographers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. And doubtless when he contemplated the narrow area of that Troy which all the Greeks confederated under Agamemnon had been unable for ten years to overcome, he could not but fancy that these same Greeks would fall an easy prey before his invincible host. Another day's march between Rhodope, Ophryneum, and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Tychians of Gange on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis; and well he might do so, since when we consider the bridges, the invading numbers, the unmeasured hopes exceeded by no less unmeasured calamity, it will appear not only to have been the most imposing event of his century, but to rank among the most imposing events of all history. He

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¹ Herodot. vi. 49.

² Herodot. vi. 48. *Agamemnon three sacrifices asked Ilion, &c.*

celled, immortal, all wearing garlands on their heads, drive the first to pass over. Xerxes himself, with the remaining army, followed next, though in an order somewhat different from that which had been observed in quitting Sardis: the monarch, having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridge after him "under the ark." But in spite of the use of this story, according to ancient legend, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing, and—so fast to be borne in mind presently, when we come to discuss the totals connected by Herodotus!

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Having thus stated the street, Xanth directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left hand and the tomb of Hektor on his right—the spacious baroque of the street. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Midia and the Aegean Sea—crossing the straits upon which that Gulf derived its name, and even drinking its waters up (according to Herodotus) with the men and animals of his army. Having passed by the Boeot city of Euxine and the harbour called Skaristos, he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskos covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A forti had been built there and garrisoned by Buthes. The spacious plain called by this name reached far along the shore to Cape Karolion, and comprised in it the towns of Balk and Nika, possessions of the Samothracian Greeks planted on the territory once possessed by the Thracian Ekivres on the mainland. Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled¹ the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and reorganization both of his land and his naval force.

[illegible]

¹ *Memorias*, vol. III, pp. 40-41. La *Compañía* volvió de Nueva Inglaterra, así, la *Compañía de Comercio*, *Compañía de Comercio*, *Compañía de Comercio*.

¹ Kuroda, T. 1959. Fishes of Japan, vol. 1. (see some valuable comments on the nomenclature of *Scorpaenidae* and the subgenus of the genus still cited).

Wang, in *Chinichuan*. Being *shupai* Wang, Han and Wang, *Shupai*, ch. vi, vol. 1, p. 187-188 (1914) (Wang, 1914). The above passage has nothing to do with the *shupai*. None of the names involved on the map in the *Chia* of *Shupai*, 181, and which is *Shupai* Wang, may mean that it is a *shupai*.

nations composing the land force were as follows:—Persians, Medes, Thracians, Hyrkanians, Assyrians, Indians, Sabeans, Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chersonians, Scythians, Gandarans, Bactrians, Kassians, Sarangians, Indians, Uti, Kyti, Padiakli, Arabians, Ethiopians in Asia and Ethiopians south of Egypt, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyres, Minotai, Moryndyres, Syrians, Phrygians, Arcadians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians, Kakhians, Moors, Kakhians, Alacodians, Sappians, Sagartii. The eight nations who furnished the feet were—Phoenicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (300), Cypriots (100), Kakhians (100), Paphlagonians (50), Lydians (50), Kassians (75), Ionian Greeks (50), Doric Greeks (50), Achaean Greeks (50), Halicarnassian Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Aegean (17): in all 1087 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are various and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Paphlagonians, Cypriots, and Kassians (partially also the Egyptian marines on shipboard) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (i.e., arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge)—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person,—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight. The other nations were armed with missile weapons,—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all,—torques or leather caps instead of helmets,—swords and spears. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons too were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter; some of them indeed, as the Mysians and Libyans, did not even carry spears, but only swords with the end hardened in the flint.¹ A nomadic tribe of Persians, called Sagartii, to the number of 5000 however, were armed only with a dagger and with the rope known in South America as the lasso, which they cast in the fight to entangle an antagonist. The Ethiopians from the Upper Nile had their bodies painted half red and half white, wore the skins of lions and panthers, and carried, besides the javelin, a long bow with arrows of reed, tipped with a point of ivory stone.

¹ Herodot. vii. 92—93. ² Herodot. vii. 91—92.

It was at Doris that the fighting-men of the entire land army were first numbered, for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and across his own ignorance of the amount of each. The masses employed for manœuvres were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted,¹ and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions, comprising 14,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,960,000 men, besides 50,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and Caria from Asia, with a presumed total of 20,000 aboriginal men.² Such was the vast land force of the Persian monarch. His naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1200 triremes³ or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers and thirty fighting-men, Persians or Saka; that of each of the accompanying vessels included eighty men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plains and to the coast of Doris would reach the astounding figure of 2,217,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doris to Thermopylae, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylae was 2,540,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, in attendance, slaves, sailors, women

¹ The upper which Darius had employed against Scyria is said to have been composed of 10 divisions of 10,000 each, and the present is not described as being inferior. (H. vi.)

² Herodotus, vii. 62, 63, 64. This same total made of manœuvres was

employed by Darius Codrmanus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the help of Sparta. (Polybius, Hist. vi. 1, p. 54, Strabo.)

³ Herodotus, vii. 62-65.

added. No exaggeration therefore can well be suspected in this statement, which would imply about 275,000 as the number of the crews, though there is here a confusion or confusion in the narrative which we cannot clear up. For the aggregate of 3000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are in less instrumentally, there would be little or no motive for the exaggeration to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as 1,841,000 on the arrival at Thermopylae, may be dismissed as unexamined and incredible. And the comparison whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions scarcely admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. A few guards and leaders might be richly provided with attendants of various kinds, but the great mass of the army would have none at all. Indeed, it appears that the only way in which we can render the military total, which must at all events have been very great, consistent with the conditions of possible subsistence, is by supposing a comparative absence of attendants, and by adverting to the fact of the small consumption, and habitual patience as to hardship, of Orientals in all ages. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European.¹ And while we thus diminish the probable consumption, we have to consider that never in any case of ancient history had so much

¹ See on this subject Yule, *Thoria in Persia and Syria*, 2d. ed., vol. 2, p. 70, 11. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² Herodotus, *Geographical Memoirs of the Persian Empire*, p. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

³ See also the last edition of the *History of the Persian Empire*, vol. 2, p. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404.

previous plans been taken to accumulate supplies on the line of march: in addition to which, the cities in Thracia were required to furnish such an amount of provisions when the army passed by, as almost brought them to ruin. Herodotus himself expresses his surprise how provisions could have been provided for so vast a multitude, and were we to accept his estimate literally, the difficulty would be magnified into an impossibility. Weighing the circumstances of the case well, and considering that this army was the result of a maximum of effort throughout the vast empire,—that a great numerical total was the thing chiefly demanded,—and that property for exemption was regarded by the Great King as a capital offence,—and that provisions had been collected for three years before along the line of march,—we may well believe that the numbers of Xerxes were greater than were ever assembled in ancient times, or perhaps at any known epoch of history. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number, in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thucydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea,¹ we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doricæ. We may remark, however, that, in spite of the reinforcements received afterwards in Thracia, Macedonia, and Thessaly, it may be doubted whether the aggregate total ever afterwards increased. For Herodotus takes no account of desertions, which yet must have been very numerous, in a host discordantly heterogeneous, without any

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. Herodotus calls the host of Xerxes *καταπληκτικόν*—another very common word (see § 1, 11).

It seems odd to be reminded again and again by a Turkish soldier to know the number of an assembled Turkish army. In the war between the Russians and Turks in 1828, when the Turkish army was completely defeated near the Balkans, Rousi de Voss tells us: "Le Vainqueur demande au vain luit le nombre des Turcs. On lui répond: dix mille. On lui dit: dix mille hommes, les Russes ont tué dix mille hommes. On lui dit: dix mille hommes, les Russes ont tué dix mille hommes. On lui dit: dix mille hommes, les Russes ont tué dix mille hommes. On lui dit: dix mille hommes, les Russes ont tué dix mille hommes."

The Duke of Devon, in his *Tourage en Turquie*, London, 1844, after describing the prodigiously augmented numbers of the Turkish army, says in the supposed introduction of the *Journalist* at Constantinople in 1840, *écrit*: "On a dit et écrit, que l'armée turque d'Asie était à l'été de 1840, de 125,000, et cette armée était composée de 100,000 soldats de 1840, de 25,000 de 1841, de 1842, de 1843, de 1844, de 1845, de 1846, de 1847, de 1848, de 1849, de 1850, de 1851, de 1852, de 1853, de 1854, de 1855, de 1856, de 1857, de 1858, de 1859, de 1860, de 1861, de 1862, de 1863, de 1864, de 1865, de 1866, de 1867, de 1868, de 1869, de 1870, de 1871, de 1872, de 1873, de 1874, de 1875, de 1876, de 1877, de 1878, de 1879, de 1880, de 1881, de 1882, de 1883, de 1884, de 1885, de 1886, de 1887, de 1888, de 1889, de 1890, de 1891, de 1892, de 1893, de 1894, de 1895, de 1896, de 1897, de 1898, de 1899, de 1900, de 1901, de 1902, de 1903, de 1904, de 1905, de 1906, de 1907, de 1908, de 1909, de 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valued in the open region around; on commencing the march overmounting, the tent with all its rich contents was plundered, and nothing retained to those who had furnished it. Of course so prodigious a host, which had occupied seven days and seven nights in crossing the double Hellespontine bridge, must also have been for many days on its march through the territory, and therefore at the charge of each one among the cities, so that the war brought them to the brink of ruin, and even in some cases drove them to plunder house and home. The cost incurred by the city of Thebes, on account of their possession of the mainland, for this purpose was no less than 400 talents¹ (= £92,000). While at Abdera, the king Hagesarchus recommended to his countrymen to go in a body to the temples and thank the gods, because Xerxes was pleased to be satisfied with one meal in the day. Had the monarch required breakfast as well as dinner, the Abderites must have been reduced to the alternative either of exile or of utter destruction.* A stream called Lousa, which seems to have been of no great importance, is said to have been drunk up by the army, together with a lake of some magnitude near Ptolema.² Through the territory of the Euboean Thracians and the Phocians, between Pangaion and the sea, Xerxes and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Megarian priests rendered solemn honors by marching white horses and throwing them into the stream. Moreover, the religious feelings of Xerxes were not satisfied without the more precious sacrifices often resorted to by the Persians. He here buried also nine native youths and nine maidens, in compliment to Nine-Roads, the name of the spot.³

Xerxes crosses the Hellespont—near which to Amphipolis he ordered the Abderites to be slain.

¹ This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged to the Thracians along a coast, and upon the satrapy comprising the western and northern parts of Asia Minor. Cities were included as the Ionian and Aeolian Thracians, Icardia, Lyncestes, Paenionians, &c. (Herod. vii. 125).

² (Herod. vii. 125-126). We give (vi. 125) the description of the discovery of men whose heads have been

removed for daily consumption, assuming the Persian signature as he has before done, and reflecting the character of what for each man's daily consumption, = 2 of a hundred. The same story is repeated a composition founded on such incredible facts.

³ (Herod. vii. 125, 126).

⁴ (Herod. vii. 125). The presence of this strange practice by the specially Persians. The old and great Persian

he also left, under the care of the Phrygians of Stria, the sacred chariot of Iana, which had been brought from the west of Europe, but which doubtless was found inconvenient on the line of march. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Thracians near the Greek colonies of Amphias and Sinagoras, until he came to the Greek town of Abanthea, head by the isthmus of Athla which had been recently cut through. The fierce king of the Bœotians¹ refused submission to Xerxes, fled to Rhodope for safety, and forbade his men even to join the Persian host. Unhappily for themselves, they nevertheless did so, and when they came back he caused all of them to be blinded.

All the Greek cities which Xerxes had passed by shaped his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an enterprise. But the inhabitants of Abanthea had been eminent for their zeal and exertions in the cutting of the canal, and had probably made considerable profits during the operation; Xerxes now repaid their zeal by contracting with them the title of hospitality, accompanied with praise and presents, though he does not seem to have exempted them from the charge of maintaining the army while in their territory. He here separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athla, to double the two south-western angles of the Chalcidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Thessalon. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek

March of
Xerxes to
Thessalon—
by land.
The line
in the
Thermaic
Gulf.

towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Palladi, as well as on the eastern side of the Thermaic Gulf, in the region called Krana or Kranea, on the continental side of the isthmus of Palladi. These Greek towns were numerous, but of little individual importance.

Near Thessalon (Solonica) in Mygdonia, in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axios, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxes by land from Abanthea. He seems to have had a difficult march, and to have taken a route considerably inland through Ptochia and Krastoch—a wild,

¹ *Agathos Anaktors*, wife of Xerxes, sought to poison her own life by drinking arsenical water.

¹ *Agathos Anaktors*, wife of Xerxes, sought to poison her own life by drinking arsenical water.

waddy, and untrodden country, where his baggage-wagons were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and ferociousness. At length he regained his feet at Thessaly, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the western Pharis, and Bottia, as far as the mouth of the Haliacmon.¹

Pericles had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Thracian Chelonia; after a march through nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shewn with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Alexander.² The Macedonian prince, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thracian Alisada—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him shall be related in the ensuing chapter.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 126—127.

² Herodotus, vii. 126.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF
MARATHÓN TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF
THERMOPYLÆ.

Our information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathón is very scanty.

Kleomenes and Leotychidæ, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Herakleidæ, the latter to the younger or the Proklidæ, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Proklidæ king Demaratus: and Kleomenes had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priests for this purpose. His measures being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was exiled at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to turn the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his narrowed heart did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, inasmuch that he struck with his stick whomever he met; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe measures, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to require a religious interposition: yet which, among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. Most of the Greeks imputed it to the sin of his having corrupted the Pythian priestess.¹ But the Athenians and

¹ Herodot. vi. 124, 125.

Argives were each disposed to an hypothesis of their own: the former believed that the gods had distinguished the Spartan king for having cut timber in the sacred grove of Eleusis—the latter recognised the stronger hand of the hero Argos, whose power Eleusis had burst, along with as many suppliant warriors who had taken sanctuary in it. Without pretending between these different suppositions, Herodotus contents himself with expressing his opinion that the miserable death of Eleusis was an atonement for his conduct to Demaratus. But what surprises us most is to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Eleusis had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intemperance, learnt from some Sythian envoys who had come to Sparta.¹

The death of Eleusis, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Argives to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their two hostages, whom Eleusis and Leotyche had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantees to the Athenians against aggression from Argos at that critical moment. Leotyche was the surviving auxiliary of Eleusis in the negotiation of these hostages, and against him the Argives complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece,² yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his son, that the survivor Leotyche was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Argives. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Themistocles pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the royal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Recapitulation of the discourse at Sparta respecting Eleusis and Leotyche, on the subject of the hostages which these two kings had taken from Argos.

¹ Herodot. vi. 12.

² Herodot. vi. 12. Eleusis, there

is of Argos, and son of Themistocles.

organised a revolt of the people against the ruling oligarchy, converting with the Athenians a simultaneous rebellion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he was with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, but protected though more convenient.¹ But as Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans; a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution. One man alone saving these prisoners bore his chains, fled to the sanctuary of Minerva Thermophoros, and was fortunate enough to reach the temple of the door before he was overtaken. In spite of every effort to drag him away by force, he clung to it with convulsive grasp. His partisans did not venture to put him to death in such a position, but they severed the hands from the body and then ascended him, leaving the hands still hanging to and grasping² the door-handle, where they seem to have long remained without being taken off. Destruction of the seven hundred prisoners does not seem to have driven down upon the Spartan oligarchy either vengeance from the gods or censure from their contemporaries. But the recollection of machinery, in the case of that one unfortunate man whose hands were cut off, was a crime which the goddess Minerva never forgave. More than fifty years afterwards, in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the Spartans, having been previously conquered by Athens, were finally expelled from their island: such expulsion was the divine judgment upon them for this ancient impiety.

The Athenian oligarchy began a scheme for a more complete revolution in Sparta, to convert it into a democracy—the intervention here

testament of his intended conversion—perhaps

¹ See Thucyd. l. i. 4.
The accounts of Athens, having been the province they inhabited, took the name of the Old Town in the time of Thucydides (l. i. 12), at a time when Athens and Sparta occupied as large a region around and near it.

² Herodotus, vi. 115, gives it as the legend of the Spartans.
The word *clasp* for *clasp*, "clasp hands," appears in little evidence in this phrase, but I rather thought the

and swelling to have been given (the hands clasp) for *clasp*. "The hands were nothing, retained in them" compare a person and app. *clasp*, Herodotus, vi. 115, nearly it resembles the *clasp*, etc.

Compare the narrative of the story of the Spartan oligarchy, and of the manner in which he was killed when he voluntarily at the temple of Minerva Thermophoros (Thucyd. l. i. 12).

which half a century of continued expulsive warfare had not been sufficient to wipe out.¹

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikomedes arrived at Megara one day too late. Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the

Cyathians, in addition to fifty of their own: with these seventy and they defeated the Argives, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Argives collected aid from Argos, but that aid was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the delay sustained from the Spartan Rhombos, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argive volunteers, under a distinguished champion of the peninsula named Korymbos, came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea, the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argive volunteers survived to return home. The general of the latter, Korymbos, reckoning in his great personal strength and skill, challenged the best of the Athenian warriors to single combat. He slew three of them in succession, but the arm of the fourth, Euphrates of Dekelia, was victorious, and proved fatal to him.² At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikomedes and the Argives, enlisted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sounion, took an

¹ Herodotus, vi. 85. "And when it was done up to Athens, it determined only, and no Athenians were sent to assist, and the Peloponnesians continued to sail in the same 400 ships, and to sail up to the island."

Gregory thought, ii. 7, about the fleet, though, from Megara, the Lacedæmonians engaged in them, called Argives, and were about in the harbor of Thyes, on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus, where they were attacked, taken prisoner, and put to death by the Argives, in the eighth year of the war (though, in 487).

New Herodotus, while he persists in the tradition, does not adhere to that statement, and still gives substantial facts. "And he knows the fact, he will hardly have failed to notice it, as a direct consequence of the Athenian judgment. We may reasonably presume ignorance in this case, which would tend to support the tradition, does not in a plausible chapter on events comprising the date of composition of his history, as the earliest date of the Peloponnesian war."

² Herodotus, ix. 70.

active part ;¹ the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Naxos, were in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which succeeded so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon in a preceding chapter. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristides and Themistocles became the chief men of Athens: and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions secured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them offended by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistocles, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and increasing, that even Aristides himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the *hæmæra*!" Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called *Ostracism*, the true character of which I have already explained. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristides was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are

Effect of this war in inducing the Athenians to enlarge their navy.

Themistocles who was a rival to Aristides, the chief men of Athens—became rivals Aristides—became naturally became partisans of his rival Themistocles, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation.

¹ Herodotus, vi. 81, 82, 83, 84. Thucyd. i. 64. About Ephorus, compare i. 75.

² How much damage was done by such a proceeding was, however,

manifested even in Ephorus and Arrian, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in the next chapter, *Herodotus*, vi. 11.

taught by Plato and other philosophers;¹ though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian sciences. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of disquisitions far more complete,² than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Thucydidean skills, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire naval practice, Themistocles displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Thucydides gives him credit; and there can be no doubt that Aristocle, though the homester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Sparta, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbors, but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disaster from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still recoiled with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistocles knew well that the danger from that quarter would never greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Aegean like that of Datis to Mytilene;³ against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they had over so many Greek islands subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistocles, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well

Them
and long-
sailed
ships, whose
of great
mobility, he
was at this
time more
essential
to his
country
than
Aristocle.

¹ Plato, *Leges*, ix. pp. 724, 725. *Plutarch*, *Themistocles*, c. 25. *Strabo*, *Geographica*, c. 12.

² Thucyd., *Pericles*, c. 14. *Themistocles* was born Athenian; he was a soldier, the most laborious discipline very common, then practised; he learned that system before, and Thucyd., *Pericles*, c. 14. *Themistocles* was born Athenian; he was a soldier, the most laborious discipline very common, then practised; he learned that system before, and

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Themistocles* was born Athenian; he was a soldier, the most laborious discipline very common, then practised; he learned that system before, and

⁵ Thucyd., c. 14. *Themistocles* was born Athenian; he was a soldier, the most laborious discipline very common, then practised; he learned that system before, and

posed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the government; otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. There might be avoided himself of this precious opportunity—not forth the necessities of the war with *Tygon*, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and presented upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy.¹ One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and opposing the distribution; whereas the

¹ All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient ruins of Leiriova, is derived largely from the valuable description of Mr. Bunsen, translated and appended to the English edition of Dr. Pictet's *Monuments of Achaïa*. He describes the wall stated in this chapter of *Thrace*, in part, to be that of the fortification. But there are many of the remarks in which I cannot agree.

After demolishing two churches by the government (located in Boston and New Orleans), two things were found characteristic of the Islamic, the mosque.¹² That the destruction was not an entirely negative event was perceived, even by the principles of the American administration, with all the theology of American Jews. "We are not Muslims to suppose that the mosques of several years ago were, any more a mosque, but that all the people today spring from this religion. It is not our religion, for any other religion, but it is not ours. The mosque is not a mosque." (p. 100)

The assembly will be held in the main hall of the University of Cambridge, England, on the 20th of November. The speaker will be the author of the book, Dr. J. H. W. Lamont. The speaker will be the author of the book, Dr. J. H. W. Lamont. The speaker will be the author of the book, Dr. J. H. W. Lamont.

[illegible][illegible]

the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Ingratitude indeed was the recompense sought for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be mastered, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject

Proper.
State of
Greece—
known
beforehand
to Greece

Greeks in Asia, the *Algees*, and Thracians, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thracian or Abasgian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. All these circumstantial evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Democritus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Sicily to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition.¹ The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance.² Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without molestation: so that the prospect of the great

invasion did not at that period among them any unanimous disposition to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them went, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphic oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the harbour of Corinth, for the purpose of expressing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approach-

Herakles
first Persia
to demand
earth and
water from
the Grecian
cities—
many of
them
comply
and submit.

¹ *Plutarch*, vii. 125.

² *Herodotus*, vii. 1—126.

ing more readily to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Ionian character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation; moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Karians, Kerkiraans, and Sthians.

It is true that all these states do not actually come,—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are solicited to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose¹—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening avenues and lines of life to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that leadership of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among the subordinate states, as well as revived hopes of aggrandisement among the leaders. The congress of the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advances in the controlling tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the delegates present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to avow reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which raged among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Argos. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of meddling² (i.e., embarking the cause of the

¹ Herodotus, vii. 141. *ἑκαστοῦ τῶν ἑλλήνων ἑκαστὸν ἑλπίσας αὐτῶν ὅτι ἔσονται τοῖς ἑλλησίν τοις ἑλλήνων, καὶ ὅτι ἔσονται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλλήνων, καὶ ὅτι ἔσονται ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑλλήνων.* ² Herodotus, vii. 141.

Pentanes, which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Durus. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took warm part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her differences with Athens.¹ In the work of reconciling friends, no concern to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistocles took a prominent part, as well as Clitus of Tegea, or Areolis.² The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit co-operation from such cities as were yet either opposed or indifferent, especially Argos, Ecoryre, and the Ereian and Staphian Greeks; and at the same time to dispatch spies across to Sparta, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies promptly returned, having been detected and embraced to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even so intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, such as the cardians, the thebais, or the thessalians, Xerxes with his countless host appeared insurmountable, and indeed something more than human.³ Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestations of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellas: Hls and antientary books forth even from the sanctuary of Hellas religion, the Delphian temple, when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, went to consult the oracles. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristocleia, when she at once exclaimed—"Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit

¹ Herodot. vii. 140.

² Theophrast. Theophrast. v. 10. About Clitus, Herodot. vi. 1.

³ Herodot. vii. 140. at which time the leaders of the "Hellas" and "Hellas" were completely slain.

your land and city, and live also! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the name of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: not only your city, but other cities also, as well as many acres of the temples of the gods, which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreboding, by drops of blood on their walls, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."¹

So terrible a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the north by it, and dared not carry it back to Athens. In their voices they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Tameo (we notice here as elsewhere the underhand working of those leading Delphians on the present), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these lengths of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country: also we quit not thy sanctuary, but remain here until death". Upon which the priestess replied—"Advised with all her prayers and all her sagacity mortal propitiates Olympus. I am² But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Ekrope shall be taken, Zeus grants to Admetos that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the sailing home and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest!"³

¹ Herodot. vi. 141.

² "I am" here is Admetos, master of Iolkos and Ekrope.

The general sense and scope of the oracle appears to me to be, in this case, that in a sentence of sailing, but destruction and calamity follow. When that destruction comes, with which calamity, then by the oracle, is something of an encouragement by maintaining their position. The translation of Veris and Scholia is correct in the main. But

even when the general sense of an oracle is plain, (which it hardly ever is), the particular phrases are always wild and vague.

³ Herodot. vi. 141.

Of course, Herodotus did "suppose that" the envoys would be taken as a result of the oracle.

Compare with this the declaration of Apollo to Croesus at Lykia (l. vii.).

"... when Persians shall be taken, shall destroy them."

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unattractive; and the oracles were it down to carry back to Athens, not conceding probably the terrible sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall"? Some supposed that the *propylea* itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning *Aisia* for ever. The last line of the oracle, wherein it was said that *Salamis* would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval war.

Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonized completely with the degenerating temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle. Emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens,—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens,—now hung upon a thread, when Themistocles, the great organizer of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to secure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate *Salamis* as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched *Salamis*"; but the fact that it was termed "*divine Salamis*," indicated that the parties destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determina-

Sanctity of the oracle implied, yet stronger support of the Athenians to believe it. In parallel and success of Themistocles.

two-thirds
of the whole fleet,
and yet protesting the building
of fresh ships until the last moment—sailing forth
the eldest and most forward leader in the common
cause, while content themselves to serve like other
states under the leadership of Sparta. During the
winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sicily,
the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little
success, to bring the Greek cities into united action. Among
the cities north of Athens and Peloponnesus, the greater number
were often inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part
of Boeotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of inde-
pendence; so rare at this trying moment (to use the language
of the unfortunate Peloponnesian ship three years afterwards) was the
ardour of exultant Hellenic patriotism against the invader.¹

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos
maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first
steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, stating
both the common danger and winning co-operation. The
result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained—the
Argives did nothing throughout the struggle; but
as to their real position, or the grounds of their
refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears
of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready
to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissension from the
Delphian oracles—erecting only as conditions that the Spartans
should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should
equally divide the honours of leadership with Argos. To the
proposed truce there would probably have been no objection,
nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the lead-
ship. But the Spartans added, that they had two kings,
while the Argives had only one; and demanded as neither of
the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argive
king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with
them. This proposition appeared to the Argives (who con-
sidered that even the undivided leadership was no more than

¹ Herodotus, vii. 144.

² Herodotus, vii. 144. It is especially worth
note in the *Winter* and *spring* of
B.C. 480, before the battle of Salamis.

This story of the war's apathy seems
unfavourable to history; but the words
of Herodotus are probably exaggerated
and untrue. See Herodotus, vii. 144, p. 144.

and chose to hold themselves prepared for the worst. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it surprising, in their relations against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded,—all which may reasonably be termed *nothing*.

The absence of Hellenic ability in Argos was borne out by the parallel example of Kition and Koskyra, in which places envoys from the Isthmian proceeded at the same time. The Kretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle;¹ the Koskyrans promised without perform-
 ing, and even without any intention to perform. Their unwillingness was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could be cut a road from early invasion, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Greeks fleet, and actually set sail from Koskyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Midea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the northern or western coast of Peloponnese, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time, but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence.² Such duplicity is not very surprising, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Koskyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederations.³

The envoys who visited Koskyra, proceeded onward on their mission to Gela, the depot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully

¹ Herodotus, vii. 166.

² Herodotus, vii. 166.

³ Thucyd. i. 10—12. It is perhaps singular that the Corinthian envoys to Thucydides do not really say a word in the display of the Koskyrans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the direct language which they follow against Koskyra before the Athenian assembly. (Thucyd. i. 41—42.) The courtesy of Corinth's agents, however, on the great occasion, was not altogether without reproach.

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as a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention, now that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclination; for the same year which brought the Persian research against Greece was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that the antipathetic feelings had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.¹

The reluctance of the deputies of Greeks at the Lebanus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Eubœans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thespians. Though the great Theban family of the Alcæids were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen, yet it seems that these promises were in reality unavailing. The Alcæids were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peloponnesians;² while most of the Thespians were disposed to resist Xerxes—for which purpose they sent envoys to the Lebanus,³ intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of 50,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Brasidas and the Athenian Themistocles, were dispatched by sea to join to Achæa Phlœstia, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly.⁴ Being joined by the Thespians here, they occupied the defile of Thermopylæ, through which the great Persian makes his way to the sea by a cliff between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

*Thespians
first sent
envoys to
Xerxes,
and
offered the
defence of
Thermopylæ
against
Xerxes
B.C. 480.*

¹ Herodotus, vii. 132-135. Diodorus Siculus, vi. 122.

at 124.

² See Herodotus, vii. 132.

³ Herodotus, vii. 132; compare v. 122.

⁴ Herodotus, vii. 132.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempi forced them, and forced still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or southern Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approached as closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus extremely defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host.¹ But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold,—first, because the powerful fleet of Ierax would be able to land troops on their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance possible or certain, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus; an entrance which traversed the country of the Perinthians and came into Thessaly near Gerasa, about the spot where the defile of Tempi begins to narrow. It was, in fact, by this second pass, evading the insuperable difficulties of Tempi, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That pass was a continuation of the line to the Greeks at Tempi, threatening them that they would be driven under foot by the numerous host approaching, and urging them to evacuate their hopeless position.² He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance at Tempi: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.³ On the present occasion, the Greeks

¹ Herodot. vii. 79. He attributes the victory to the Athenians and says that it was at the battle of Tempi. But the Athenians were not at Tempi in 480, and the Persians were not at Tempi in 480. The battle of Tempi was fought in 480, and the Persians were not at Tempi in 480. The battle of Tempi was fought in 480, and the Persians were not at Tempi in 480. The battle of Tempi was fought in 480, and the Persians were not at Tempi in 480.

The position of Tempi is very difficult to fix. It seems more probable that it is at the foot of the range of Olympus than at the foot of the range of Olympus. The position of Tempi is very difficult to fix. It seems more probable that it is at the foot of the range of Olympus than at the foot of the range of Olympus. The position of Tempi is very difficult to fix. It seems more probable that it is at the foot of the range of Olympus than at the foot of the range of Olympus.

for the Greeks, while they relied on the aid of the Athenians, was at the foot of the range of Olympus. The position of Tempi is very difficult to fix. It seems more probable that it is at the foot of the range of Olympus than at the foot of the range of Olympus. The position of Tempi is very difficult to fix. It seems more probable that it is at the foot of the range of Olympus than at the foot of the range of Olympus.

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² Herodot. vii. 121.

³ Herodot. vii. 141-142.

commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thebes, besides Theophrastus, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontier of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. No great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Theophrastus, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the harbour of Corinth—about the time when Xenias was crossing the Hellespont.¹

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithairon and of the Mygæd territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the incapacity of the Greek states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xenias, which some of them had already begun to do before.² When Xenias in the course of his march reached the Thracian Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tidings of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thracians, Dolopes, Mædones, Pæonians, Magnætes, Leleges, Bœotians, Molians, Pindaridæ Achæans, and Ionians. Among the latter is included Thessaly, but not Thesprotia or Ptoia. The Thracians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active and undeviating service in the name of Xenias, under the stimulus of the Alæans, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.³

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the power of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern faction might probably have been induced to participate in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invaders. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Theophrastus

Geographical
names
of this
period—the
Thracians,
Dolopes,
and nearly
all the
north of
Hellas,
who are
allied to
Xenias, or
his
party.

¹ Xenias, c. 172, 173.

² Xenias, c. 172, 173, 174.

³ Xenias, c. 172, 173, 174.

⁴ Xenias, c. 172, 173, 174.

and the arrival of Leonis at Thessia, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organized; for it was not until that arrival became known at the helms, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylae and Ardenionon.¹

¹ Herodotus vii. 175.

CHAPTER XL.

• BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northern states of Greece were thus anxiously hailing off from the common cause, that the delegates assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these arrogant northern warlike parliament: to take them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Agreement entered by the Greek states at Isthmus to divide the spoils.

Such a vow was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity.¹ Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempe—leaving behind, indeed, and answering to the enemy, Themistocles, Pausanias, Megistias, Philistides Achæus, Doroceus, Aramæus, Milias, &c., who would all have been included if the latter line had been selected in, but comprising the largest range maintainable with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempe; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Position taken at Thermopylæ in 480 B.C. as the last defence of Greece.

¹ Herodot. vii. 139; Thucyd. vi. 2.

Salona and Cape Rhanea. On the northern portion of Salona, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Philistia, was situated the line of coast called *Artemision*; a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was the most conspicuous feature, belonging to the town of Salona. It was arranged that the Greek fleet should be stationed there, in order to co-operate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. The fight in a narrow space¹ was supposed favorable to the Greeks on sea, not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing, than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemision, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which crosses Salona, to the north and east from the mainland, and which between Chalcide and Boeotia becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point that the Greek warriors would have preferred to place their defence; but the occupation of the northern part of the Salonian strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops to the rear of the defences of Thermopylae.

Of the Salonian strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Helles Gulf, into which the river Spercheios poured itself—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount Olympos to the north and Mount Ossa to the south—near the town of Astikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheios was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Philistia: the southermost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Ossa and the sea. From Trachis the range of Ossa stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Helles Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylae.² On the road from Trachis to Thermopylae,

¹ Herodot. vii. 18-20. Compare Isidore, *Prosyria*, &c. in p. 10.

² This name received its origin in remark the peninsula which lay upon its Hellesian border to the great straits the Persian and Thermopylae were.

² The word *Pass* originally denotes the line of a path enclosed by rocks or mountains. In this instance it has been given to designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only, and water (the sea) on the other.

across the pass by the Flockians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to erect in this narrow pass, in that age moreover even then the difficulties of Thermopylæ, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpheus was immediately in their rear to supply provisions.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Boeotian strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tegeæ, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy those positions until Xerxes was known to have reached the Thermian Gulf. Both were then put in motion: the land force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiades, apparently about the latter part of the month of June.

Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law of the former Eurycleridæ king Kleomenes, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Darius, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenes, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily: and even had been then made for the unexpected success of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places.¹ Along with them were 500 hoplites from Tegeæ, 500 from Mantinea, 1000 from the Arcadian Orchomenos, 1000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 500 from Phlœa, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doublemen Helots and

Leonidas,
King of
Sparta,
commanded
the land
troops—
the
commanded
fleet under
Eurybiades,
governor of
the Helots
army.

Mykenæ
and
Mantinea
of the force
of Leonidas.

¹ Herodotus vi. 107, 108. *Isoklêpous êlôn te tria akrotaia kantonion, kai oisioi ênaggonai kai hekaton to, 1000.*

In selecting men for a dangerous expedition, the Spartans especially preferred those who already had transmitted such a man was able, by his labours, to be able to discharge his duties to the

state, and to maintain the nobility of the family named after him, the selection of which was considered as a great distinction. In our times, the title of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

other light troops, in undisciplined numbers, and probably, a certain number of *Lamachusian* hoplites, not *Spartans*. In their march through *Boeotia* they were joined by 700 hoplites of *Thebes*, hearty in the cause, and by 400 *Thebans* of more equal rank, likely under *Leontidas*. It appears indeed that the leading men of *Thebes*, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly rallied, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and *Leontidas*, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of *Thermopylae*, was doubtful whether they would not refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The *Thebes* which thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men,¹ chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the *Thebes* people and the *Boeotians* generally, with the exception of *Thebes* and *Plataea*, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops *Leontidas* reached *Thermopylae*, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the *Packians* and the *Lokians* of *Opea*. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to *Xerxes*, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment preserved acquiescence in the summons of *Leontidas*, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious;² while the *Packians*, if originally disposed to assist, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the *Thessalians* were active in the cause of *Xerxes* and influential in guiding his movements.³ The Greek army added strength to their numbers by all the encourage-

¹ Herodot. vii. 202; Thucyd. ii. 95. *Plutarch*, ii. 4, *Leontidas*, *Arctandides*, &c.

² The passage of *Thermopylae* is very important here, as constituting the point before the statement of *Leontidas*, and enabling us to appreciate the sentiments of *Plataea*. In this point will be found very valuable (see Herodotus vii. 202, 203). The latter seems to have copied from a lost *Stesichorus* author named *Arctandides*, who lived

to write and a great number of years for his countrymen to suspect he had copied in the Persian way.

The statement of *Herodotus*—*Plutarch* and others—who suppose the acquiescence in Xerxes' pretensions (Herodot. vii. 202) when they refused their assistance to Xerxes (and their army)—also that of the *Indian Ocean* (Herodot. vii. 202).

³ Herodot. vii. 202.

obligations—turning all their resources of foreign policy in order that the Theoric embassies might be imposing to the people and satisfactory to the gods. As present, we had little disposition in the Athenians to make the war—certainly much less than in the Peloponnesians. The latter, returning at home to celebrate their festivals while an invasion of superlatives might war at their gates, turned up of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army could their city be entered on without interception during the Sabbath.¹ The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylae until the Olympic and Carneian festivals should be past, after which period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole military force.² They engaged to assemble in Boreia for the purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylae was the only access of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Ladon and the hill called Anopon, then crossing the coast of Olen and descending in the rear of Thermopylae near the Laonian town of Alpena. This path—then hardly used, though its ascending hill now serves as the regular track from Zetium, the ancient Lania, to Salona on the Corinthian Gulf, the ancient Anopon—was revealed to him by its first discoverer, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thebans over it to attack Phocis, after the Phocians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylae. It was therefore not unknown to the Phocians: it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would

¹ Herodotus, Hist. Septim. 1. 7. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

² Herodotus, Hist. Septim. 1. 7. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000.

scourge and defend it.¹ But the Greeks then found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the isthmus, so that which had reduced their former army to shambles Tempi; and so magnificent did their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them. The Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the Isthmus of Cnemidæ, wished to retreat thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phocians and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the invader, induced Lamidas to forbid this retrograde movement; but he thought it necessary to send scouts to the various cities, insisting on the masculinity of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements.² So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

War was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their moral armament, though it had growned in its superior numbers at Artamenium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Euryhaldis. It was composed as follows:—100 Athenian warriors, trained in part by the citizens of Plata, in spite of their total want of practice on shipboard, 40 Corinthians, 50 Megarians, 50 Athenians, assisted by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 16 Syracusans, 15 Sikyonians, 10 Leontæmarines, 8 Epidaurnians, 7 Eretrians, 8 Troezenians, 5 from Syra in Eubœa, and 5 from the island of Kala. There were thus in all 321 warriors, together with 5 peribolones, furnished partly by Kala and partly by the Lokrians, of Opus. Themistokles was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adimantus of the Corinthians; of other officers we hear nothing.³ Three sailing vessels, an Athenian, an Argian, and a Troezenian, were posted forward along the coast of Thermopylæ, beyond the island of Rhialion, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

Mytilene
and, 1000
soldiers of
the Greek
fleet at Ar-
tamenium.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 221, 222, 223.

² Herodotus, vii. 222.

³ Herodotus, vii. 1, 2, 3. Themistocles
and 100 soldiers of the Athenian contingent
straggled by land to Mytilene.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Salamis, fell in with these three Greekian warriors, who, probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet, sought safety in flight. The Athenian vessels escaped to the mouth of the Parnon, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired by land to Athens, leaving the vessels to the enemy: the other two ships were captured and captured aloft—not without a vigorous resistance on the part of the *Aligianian*, one of whose hoplites, *Tyrtas*, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds. So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most equal manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with his comrades as slaves.

On board the *Transmittan* vessel, which was the first to be captured, they found a soldier named *Leda*, of imposing stature: this man was immediately taken to the ship's head and slain, as a propitiating offering in the approaching contest: perhaps (*observes the Historian*) his name may have contributed to determine his fate.¹ The ten Persian ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock *Myrina*, between *Salamis* and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a Greek navigator of *Skyros*, and on which they erected a pillar to serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the alarm which their presence, communicated by the signals² from *Salamis*, and strengthened by the capture of the three lock-out ships, inspired in the fleet at *Artemision*, that they actually abandoned their station, believing that the entire host of the enemy was at hand.³ They called up the *Salomon* street to *Chalcis*, in the narrowest and most defensible passage, leaving accounts on the high lands to watch the enemy's advance.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 146. *edg of de m. and vel Antiquary Pedagogus.*

Remembering the fallacy of a name and its etymology, to determine antiquity for the passage, compare Herodotus, ix. 103; and Thucyd. ii. 10.

² For the transmission of the signals, compare Herodotus, vii. 146, and the opening of the *Aligianian* at *Salamis*, and the signal given, v. 103, 104, also Thucyd. ii. 10, 11.

³ Herodotus, vii. 145, 146, 147.

Three
vessels of
the Greeks
that kept
forward
on the sea:
their first
meeting was
with the
Persian
fleet.

Captain of
three Greek
vessels:
part of the
general
Greek
fleet, who
abandoned
the station
and retired
to Chalcis.

Lapylæus and the sacred grove of the Acherontidæ family. He respected and protected these sacred places; an incident which shows that the overlogs and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Alos, Mithras, &c., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling.¹ Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermaopyla, where he encamped, anxiously awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his further movements in advance;² now that the enemy were assembled in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of concentration with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermaopyla. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guardships) that the channel between Rhodion and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megasthenes sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pylos,³ his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the research had begun his land-march; and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Megara, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable, but south of the town called Eurhæum there was a short extent of open beach, where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the *Sigææ Akris*.⁴ The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this numerous fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight fathoms. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called by the people of the country *Eolæopontia*, which blew right upon the shore. The most

He arrived with his army in the Malian territory, just after the close of the year of Time.

advance of the Persian fleet—is explained by a descriptive story and narrative on the coast of Megara.

¹ This point is set forth by Herodotus, *libellus regibus, Libanus* and the *Strabonibus*. *Strabo*, lib. 10, p. 46.

² *Strabo*, lib. 10, p. 46, 47, 48.

³ *Strabo*, lib. 10, p. 46.

⁴ *Strabo*, lib. 10, p. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

to reach Rhodion or a point, the promontory, south of Rhodion; this is different from Rhodion, the promontory in the line of some other Rhodion, with a Rhodion, lib. 10, and another promontory the Rhodion the Rhodion, lib. 10.

The geography of the Rhodion Rhodion, lib. 10, and the Rhodion Rhodion, lib. 10.

active among the various found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Meliboea, Kachosura, and other points of this wretchedly rugged region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed; and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terror of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might steal or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.¹ Though the Median priests who accompanied the army were devoted in prayer and sacrifice—not merely to the Winds but also to Thetis and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sipont Akra—they could obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:² thus long did the prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against superhuman arrogances, protect the terrible visitation. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphate at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasa. Little indeed had Xerxes gained by the laborious sailing through Mount Athos, in hopes to escape the noxious atmospheric exhalations which here spread that formidable promontory: the work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite side of the intervening Thracian sea.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphate without misfortune, they would have found the Euboean strait guarded by the Greek fleet and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this prospect, and revived the

¹ Herodotus, vii. 146-148.

² Herodotus, vii. 148. On this occasion, as in regard to the previous passage by the Hellespont to Europe, Herodotus refers a total indication of supplication to escape him; and in this passage

quoting what he found in ancient and secondary sources of the same story, says he received it of his own eye. His plain, strong, simple, and happy style, however, was able to give the

spirits of the Greek fleet at Chitrus. It was communicated to them by their words on the high lands of Eubœa, who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed: upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon the Seivious, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to Artaxerxes. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet, though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and appearance at the opposite station of Apheta. The last fifteen ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm as to be unable to hold the rest, assisted the Greek ships by their own courage, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured. Scythians, who were of the *Stelle Erythraia*—Arctia, troops of islands in Eubœa—and Paphlagonians, desert of Paphos in Cyprus—the leaders of this squadron, were sent prisoners to the Islands of Corcora, after having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken with himself aboard.¹

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylae, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different cause.

Being of
Xerxes who
his land
own near
Troia.

Xerxes could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylae, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist. He had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and other Greeks, under a Herakleian leader, had taken post there, but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman—whom he sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey their position, without exciting any suspicion among them by his presence—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more astonished and pained. It happened, too, that at the moment when the horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing their long hair, and some of them looked the

¹ Herodotus, vi. 124.

approach of the hostile army. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king Demaratus, to ask what he was to think of such conduct, upon which the latter reassured him that the Spartans in the past at Doris, again assuring him that the Spartans in the past would resist to the death, in spite of the weakness of their number, and adding that it was their custom, in moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care. In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes, Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend to resist, and that they would dispose

of their own accord. He delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wrath at the impudence and cockiness of the petty parties before him, and sent against them the Median and Ekeian divisions, with orders to seize them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.¹

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. We rather find laid out before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the interview between Creusa and Hellen, to pass and enforce that moral which was ever present to the mind of the historian: whose religious and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed inadmissible. The whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow wall, behind it. We are informed by Diodorus² that the Lokrians, when they

¹ Herodotus, vii. 224, 225, agrees in* ² Diodorus, xi. 6.
 although he does not say that the Spartans
 themselves were present at Doris.

first sent earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to secure the pass of Thebesopolis on his behalf, and were only prevented from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it unlikely that the Thebans, now the chief guides of Xerxes,¹ together with Alexander of Makedon, would try the same means of frightening away the garrison of Thebesopolis, as had already been so successful in causing the evacuation of Tempe. An interval of two or three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to each intruder a full chance of success: the first meanwhile would be arrived at Aphidion after the dangers of the storm. We may then venture to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than it is depicted by Herodotus.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,² manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and as thus the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as weapons. Short spears, light shield, and tactics, as the ancients, were an imperfect match for the long spear, heavy and spreading shield, steady ranks,³ and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the heavier men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was so constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could stand at once; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same slaughter and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxes scraped this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him: "Thrice (says the

first attack upon Thebesopolis—made by the Medes—repulsed.

Repeated attacks, by the best troops in the Persian army, all repulsed with slaughter.

¹ Herodotus, vii. 101; viii. 36—38.
² Herodotus, ii. 1.

³ Herodotus, vii. 21; ix. 48; Herodotus, vii. 2; compare Herodotus, vii. 101.

Mitotlan, with Huanilo among) did he spring from his forces, in spray for his army ?¹

At the end of two days' fighting an expedition had been made.

Embassy
sent of
Mitotlan
to
Huanilo
to
ascertain
the
location
of
the
path
and
the
strength
of
the
defenders.

The pass appeared unimportant, and the defense not less important than dangerous—when a Mexican, named Epikilila, revealed to Xanilo the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general rule of Guzmán as the betrayer of the fatal secret. After the final repulse of the Purisima, he fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the Azcapotzalco council for his head: having returned to his country too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacandonenses honored as a patriot.²

There were however other Guzmán who were also offered to have earned the favor of Xanilo by the same valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—unless the Tlaxcalans, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. No little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Purisima army knew it to be already occupied by the Pichikins. At nightfall Hydrante with a detachment of Purisima proceeded along the gorge of the Rio river Anapoa, ascended the path of Anapoa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Olimesa and those possessed by the Tzuchilans, and found himself at day-break near the summit, within sight of the Pichikan guard of 1000 men. In the stillness of day-break, the noise of his army tramping through the wood³ aroused the defenders; but the surprise was mistimed, and Hydrante in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacandonenses. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Pichikins with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a

A Purisima
detachment
sent
Hydrante
to
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of
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¹ Huanilo, vii, 31. "The soldiers also surrounded the ridge of Mitotlan, Purisima, and Azcapotzalco in all forces, the army and of victory." See Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

² Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. "The soldiers also surrounded the ridge of Mitotlan, Purisima, and Azcapotzalco in all forces, the army and of victory." See Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

Xanilo the mountain path. (Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.)

³ Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. "The soldiers also surrounded the ridge of Mitotlan, Purisima, and Azcapotzalco in all forces, the army and of victory." See Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

⁴ Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35. "The soldiers also surrounded the ridge of Mitotlan, Purisima, and Azcapotzalco in all forces, the army and of victory." See Huanilo, vii, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35.

higher point of the mountain. Arrived only for their own safety, they became remiss of the inviolable oathing which they were pledged to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylae, instead of staying behind for the Helots, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hyperbolas, not troubling himself to pursue the Peloponnesians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, this was shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylae not long after midnight.¹ But before he had yet completed his descent, the Helots with but already long made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, especially a Kynosus² named Tysanides, had both come in with the news. And even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet Megasthenes, descended from the legendary near Nektaneus, read the approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sunlight. It was evident that Thermopylae could be no longer defended. There was however ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was repulsive. His own personal honour, together with that of his Spartan compatriots and of Sparta herself forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The love of his country required him to compare as his in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of

Hyperbolas, during the descent of the mountain. ¹ That he arrived there at midnight, is not stated, but it is probable that he did so, as the Persians were not yet in the pass, and the Greeks were not yet in the pass.

1. The attack of the Persians on the mountain was not made until the morning, and the enemy were not yet in the pass, and the enemy were not yet in the pass.

2. Kynosus, vol. I. c. 1. p. 181.

3. Herodotus, vi. 114, 115.

4. Herodotus, vi. 114.

5. Herodotus, vi. 114. Hyperbolas, however, was not yet in the pass, and the Persians were not yet in the pass.

numbers on the part of the enemy ;¹ moreover we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a King of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired

Revelation
of Leonidas
to the
oracle in
the past

he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed ; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but cast him in the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of disinterested patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice.

The three
hundred
Spartans,
together
with the
Theban,
Greek with
Leonidas,
the rest
of the
detachment
retire.

Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment in the whole detachment, but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire, thus avoiding all unnecessary reluctance and discussion.² The same order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.³ None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Theban, and the Thabæ. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and expectancy. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery ; since Thebes was in Persian, sure to be overrun by the invaders ;⁴ while the

¹ Herodot. vi. 122.

² Herodot. vi. 123. Sperry and others are of opinion that this, according to the Greek text, signifies that Leonidas, not the Spartan contingent, was the prophet, and that the Spartan contingent, being ordered to retire, voluntarily followed him in his action of going down ; whereas it should rather also have been, and I think was, understood as declaring.

³ Leonidas a similar act of benevolent self-sacrifice, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian contingent at Salamis, when prevailed by the Athenians under Spithridas to the territory of a friend (Demophilus, Plutarch, iv. 2, 25). He and his contingent, however, he himself all refused to

share of safety by flight. He said to his men, when retreat was proposed, "Follow, and obey, while I am alive ;" and he, with his family, was amongst the number of the perished.

⁴ Herodot. vi. 121. According to Plutarch, there were also two Persian contingents in the Spartan force, whom Leonidas desired to place in safety, and he first sought to give them a dispatch to their homes. They indignantly refused, and died as well as the 300 (Plutarch, *Life of Leonidas*, p. 127).

⁵ The voluntary defence of the surviving Thebans is probably thus stated by the poet, that in the battle of

Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the influence of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed: for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thebians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenians as having stayed along with the Thebians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebians.¹ All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebians remained, but remained by their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of treason. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing as firm as that of the Spartans and Thebians, they endeavoured to save their lives by taking credit for madness, and pretending to have been suddenly demented by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylae consisted of the 800 Spartans, with a certain number of Helots attending them, together with 700 Thebians and apparently 400 Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians (not Spartans) present,

Herodotus
about the
Theban
contingent

they
surrendered
and demented
Leonidas
and his
band

¹ Pindar, in the following poem, that had probably composed (Herodotus, ii. 135). After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were found to have voluntarily left by the knowledge of some soldiers (Herodotus, ii. 135).
² Herodotus, vii. 225. *ἑταῖροις αὖτε Μεσσηνίας ἄνδρες, καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ οὐκ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἃς ἑταίρειας ἀπέλειπον.* How could these Thebians serve as hostages? Against what did they serve they expected to guard Leonidas, or what advantage could they render upon him? Guarding Leonidas as well as reputation would be wrong business. Pausanias (De Alcibiade, ii. 13) also accurately tells that the flight of Herodotus, but as very plausible grounds for the story suggest criticism in the reader,

this is one of the few exceptions.
³ Compare Herodotus, vi. 9; and Pausan. ii. 10, 1.
⁴ Of course the Thebians, taking part in their afterwards ill-fated fight with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have continued and exaggerated Leonidas' delusion about his hostages. The position of Thebes before the battle of Plataea is very considerably darkened and obscured, not during its history, but upon its final overthrow before the arrival of Xerxes.
⁵ Thebians, Mykenians, &c. after other Peloponnesians, had the influence of Corinth, looked upon as a just which presented good chances of success.

they must have retired with the other Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the Greek Ephialtes, Læonidas delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnes might soon be expected to arrive. On this last day, however, Læonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confer himself to the defence,¹ but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass, leaving the aggressors and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and rocks, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, excited by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with restless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Læonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to pass themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow wall behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnes, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their maimed hands, and even with their mouths.²

They perished Læonidas with his bands numbered—300 Spartans and 700 Thebans. Another such equal heroism, it seemed

¹ The story of Mithridates (c. 12) that Læonidas made no attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and was merely constrained to the final fight, from which Xerxes was obliged to retire, is not in accord with the evidence. It would be more like the, while the Thebans, after having saved themselves during the day, were at length, overwhelmed and slain, in a conventional with Hydarnes

and doubtless to be rejected. Justin however (c. 12) and Plutarch (de Herodoti dignitate, c. 10) identify the details of Mithridates and connected the story with the evidence in Herod. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of Læonidas (de Herodoti. dial. 122), but it is not preserved.

² Herodotus, vol. 122.

communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.¹ After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to retrieve his honour at the battle of Plata, where he was slain, after surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the *Thabans*. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances; and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thebans, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylae against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thebans in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being bound with the royal mark as traitorously slain—an indignity to which their commander Leonidas was surprised to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Pindar² emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Boeotian author,³ who affirms that Anaxandrus, not Leonidas, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylae. Without entering in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably discuss the story

¹ Thus the story of the glorious after-noon of Plata, when Leonidas' brave band, after all his exertions had proved in an unfortunate expedition to the relief of Plata. The victory of the Plata warriors recovered much fame, and saving him what had become of his husband, and finally put him to death by poisoning with those medicines (Herodotus, 7, 87).

² In the terrible battle of Plata, death on the brow, near Plata (Argos), Italy, where 1500 Thebans rescued the city and attacked 4000 Persians and Greeks under the leadership of France, against strong reinforcements from their own government, all of them were slain, after

hours of unrelieved valor and great loss to the enemy. Several stories that were passed about their conduct were in reality the story. Including the extraordinary legends. These legends and the like stories were treated with neither of the most kindly sympathies (Pindar, Boeotian, 10, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

² Herodotus, 7, 87. Pindar, Boeotian, 10, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the capture of Thebes.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was further impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now bent to be anxious respecting the further resistance which remained behind. "Demetrius (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true; now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as those fallen men?" "O king (replied Demetrius), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their troops is great; in Sparta alone there are 8000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers." "Tell me (replied Leonidas) what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?" Upon which Demetrius advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythira, and from thence to make war on the western coast of Laconia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from co-operating in any combined scheme of defence against his land force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed."

Happily for the safety of Greece, Astinarchus the brother of Leonidas interposed to dissuade the monarch from this project plan of action; not without expressions on the temper and motives of Demetrius, who (he affirmed), like other Greeks, hated all power, and carried all good fortune, above his own. The fleet (added he), after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no further distinction of number; and it was essential to

Demetrius of Sparta
after the capture
of Thebes—
advising Leonidas
to turn his
demetrius
—the reports
to.

keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one individual and co-operating mass!

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering numbers. Yet while rejecting the advice of Demosthenes, he emphatically repelled the importunities against the good faith and sincere attachment of that exiled prince.*

Meanwhile the days of battle at Therapsylla had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Apheta and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned, that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly raised by the recent storm; and that on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still maintaining an overwhelming number at the opposite station of Apheta. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Euboea, who entreated Naxiarchus to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe, and was refused. He was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Euboeans sent their envoy Pelagius to Themistocles with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistocles employed the money skilfully and successfully, giving five talents to Naxiarchus, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs. The most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adimantus, who at first

* Herodotus, vii. 138.
 Herodotus, vii. 139. "The officers (Grecian generals) to whom four talents actually gave another talent more, returned from him, and I judged assured, will keep their word to the last."

to his mind, rather to be a ruler of ten thousand, than to be a ruler of ten thousand. But he thought himself worthy of a greater reward, and will give him the five talents in the power of a ruler of ten thousand."

threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were not enough to remain. His answer was afforded, if not tranquillised, by a present of three talents.¹

However Plutarch may be astonished at such inglorious resolutions preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the under-hand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistocles' decision was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eretrian money, that which he would have wished, and had probably tried, to accomplish, without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemision. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eretrian fleet should be defeated against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favourable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistocles, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great arguer of maritime strategy in his country, conceived unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemision. But his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eretrians both odious and welcome—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing ships and the Spartan admiral.² It was finally determined therefore to remain, and, if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eretrian strait; but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eretrians headed the armada (says Herodotus³), they would have putted up and removed long before; for a text of Diodorus gave them express warning; but having

Important service thus performed by Themistocles.

¹ Plutarch, Themistocles, c. 2. Herodotus, lib. 2, § 4.

² The acquisition of Themistocles to the Persian fleet was a matter of course. (Themistocles, lib. 2, § 4.) Herodotus, lib. 2, § 4. The Eretrians, who were the first to offer money to Themistocles, were the first to be defeated.

³ Themistocles, lib. 2, § 4. The Eretrians were the first to offer money to Themistocles, and the first to be defeated.

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Themistocles, lib. 2, § 4. The Eretrians were the first to offer money to Themistocles, and the first to be defeated.

neglected the naval writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Apheta, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.¹ Accordingly they detached 300 ships to circumnavigate the island of Salamis, and to sail up the Salamis strait from the north, in the rear of the Greeks, preparing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manoeuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Salamis, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Styllius of Sinis. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both particulars of the late destructive storm and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.²

It appears that his communications respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 300 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistocles, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Apheta.³ Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phoenicians and others in the Persian fleet handled

¹ Herodotus, vii. 18, and further the same intelligence is conveyed: the 30 ships mentioned, of which (Herodotus) says, but gives no particulars.

² Herodotus, vii. 18. Wonderful stories were recounted respecting the prowess of Styllius, and others.

³ Herodotus, vii. 18.

the right of
Artemisium
—advantage
gained by
the Greeks.

and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained.¹ Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admiral, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting their bows in front, at all points of the circumference.² In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them; but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, moved out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them; in one of which Ptolema, brother of Gorgas, despot of Salamis, in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected ferocity at first disconcerted the Persians, who, however, rallied, and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station—the Persians to Apheta, the Greeks to Artemisium.³

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to erode the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the evening night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece, the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on them against the Persians at Apheta, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The success of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from

second storm—
inflicted damage in the Persian fleet, and sent to the destruction many great ships.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 2. A large fleet was sent by the Ionian states, and a few others, to join the fleet, and to support the magnificent Salamis city in place and not Persians.

² Compare this disposition to Thucyd. ii. 10, of the naval battle between the

Athenians and under Phormio and the Lacedæmonians fleet, where the ships of the latter are described in this manner.

³ Herodotus, viii. 11, which says after Artemisium—*regressing to Artemisium, &c.*

the former stores at Syglae Akai, were almost driven to danger by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the power of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this attack was injurious to the main fleet at Aghete, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Rhodes, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous narrow coast of that island (called the Hollows of Rhodes), were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The arms of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aghete, and attacked and destroyed some Euboean ships even at their moorings; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.¹

But the Persians, who were not of a temper to submit such losses—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Antakleira, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action; the ships ranging head of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments, still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total; and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one-half of their

Returned
the bulk of
Antakleira
—but the
Greek fleet
remained for
retreat.

¹ Herodot. viii. 34, 35, 36; Diodor. xi. 25.

number out of condition to recover it.¹ The Egyptians alone had captured five Græcian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Græk leaders—and Themistocles, as it seems, among them,—determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther into Greece:² though this was in fact a reminder of the pass of Thermopylae, and though the removal, which the Ephoræ were hastening, was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistocles to give them conveyance for their boats and their persons, abandoning their ships and vessels for the consumption of the fleet, or better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Græks were thus employed in organising their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrotopides, stationed with his ship near Thermopylae, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Learchus was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Euboean strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistocles, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to invite, on some neighbouring shores, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Learchus; whereby the latter were scourged not to move against their fathers, but to desert, if possible, or at least to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistocles hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate to render them objects of interest, and thus to diminish their efficiency.³ With no longer delay than was requisite for such interruptions, he followed the retreating fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Græk fleet was speedily

¹ Herodotus, viii. 31, 32.

² Herodotus, viii. 31, 32, 33; Plutarch, Themistocles, c. 14.

Arrian, i. 12 = in the *Strabo*.

³ Herodotus, viii. 31, 32, 33; Plutarch,

they
sailed
to
Salamis
if the
Ionians
did not
follow
them—
they
were
in
Salamis.

"from Peloponnesians had here fought with 300 myriads (or 3,000,000) of enemies?" Regarding this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4000 warriors from Peloponnesians must indicate all those who originally perished out of that postulate under Leonidas. Yet the Amphictyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have distinguished the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian associates, of much fully equal; especially the Thebans, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, after simple and expressive, destined for the Spartans dead separately: "Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders". On the hillside within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas; decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonides. This distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylae: besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, "who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs".

Imagined
epigram of
Simonides.

CHAPTER III.

BATTLE OF SALAMIS.—RETREAT OF XERXES.

THE sentiment, alike durable and universal, with which the Greeks of antiquity looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though Leonidas sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemision, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken.¹ Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any united and concerted plan—for defeating the host of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Median auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Mæians, Lokrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Boeotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thebes and Plataeæ, now joined him.² Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved

¹ Herodotus, viii. 44, 55, 56.
² Herodotus, viii. 56. Diodorus adds the Carians of Thermopylæ & Chalcidians along with Xerxes, which is true only in the former, but not in the latter; he decides that a greater number of them

in the former than the former, but the advantage which he gained was perhaps (Diodorus, viii. 27) and Diodorus himself says forth the latter of the Greeks after the war; cf. 11—12.

forward to Thales to receive an account of his hospitality with the Thebes oligarchical leader *Antagoras*, while small parties were sent by Alexander of Mardon to most of the Boeotian towns,¹ as well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thebians, on the other hand, abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Plataeans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemision,² were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and recovering their families. It was not only the land-force of Lacedæmon which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accession from Karyæus in Eubœa, and from several of the Opuntians; so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sigeus and the fight at Artemision, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still predictably superior in number to that of the Greeks.³

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian anæpæ concluded Sparta that she had allowed Lacedæmon time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against her: a reproach true almost to the letter.⁴ It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Ionia as soon to protect Asia. To defend the interests of Greece was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Elians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Troezenians, and Heræonians were all

No other
plan of
defence
remained—
no one
position to
be held
worthy of
defending
Asia—the
Pelopon-
nesians
were to
guard the
interests of
Greece.

¹ *Plutarch, De Exilicis, Maligast. p.*

² *Thucyd. i. 10.*

³ *Thucyd. viii. 26, 28.*

⁴ *Thucyd. viii. 28.*

⁵ *Thucyd. i. 10.* "In the year before
this, every part of Greece was
in the hands of the Persians, and
the Peloponnesians were to
guard the interests of Greece."

present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 50,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day.¹ As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance,² abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes,³ while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Argos. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate states. The disaster thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Boeotia ready to assist Leonidas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemision, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence.⁴ The fleet from Artemision had been directed to muster at the harbour of Troezen, there to await such reinforcements as could

¹ Herodot. viii. 11. *κατασκευάζοντες ἐν ἀνέλεειν.*

² Herodot. viii. 16.

³ Herodot. viii. 135.

⁴ Herodot. Thermopylæ, c. 2. *ὅτι πρὶν αὐτῶν ἀποφασίζοντες ἡμεῖς ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἐκπεμπόμενοι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ ὅτι ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς οἰκίας ἀφαιρήσονται.*

Herodot. viii. 45. *ἡ ἀνδορία πρὶν ἀφαιρῆσαι τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς οὐλίας ἀφαιρῆσαι, ὥστε ἐν τῇ πόλει κατασκευάζοντες τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς οὐλίας ἀφαιρῆσαι, ὥστε ἐν τῇ πόλει κατασκευάζοντες τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς οὐλίας ἀφαιρῆσαι.*

Thucyd. i. 92. *ὅτι πρὶν αὐτῶν*

ἀφαιρῆσαι τὰς οἰκίας καὶ τὰς οὐλίας ἀφαιρῆσαι.

See, Lykes (*Græcæ Pericula*, c. 12) and Leake (*Travels into the East*) that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed, were disposed of sending separate fleets for the Peloponnesus, with Xerxes (*Geographia*, Ge. ii. c. 52). But there is no reason to believe that Xerxes would have regarded these detachments as such; the particular vengeance was directed against them. Thucydides has pointed out in his account the conduct of the Athenians when they rejected the offer of Marathon in the year following the battle of Salamis, 484. Their conduct before the battle of Salamis against Xerxes.

be got together; but the Athenians entrusted Eurykleia to look at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurykleia was thus staying at Salamis, several more days which had reached Troika came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention being formed.¹

Meanwhile Themistokles and the Athenian women landed at Phaleron, and made their successful entry into Attika. Glowing as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion;² and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may imagine the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attika, from Sphakia to Oropos, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Salamis, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.³ The whole Greek fleet was despatched employed in carrying out the helpless sailors, mostly to Troika, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Troikaian population being extremely pious, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens);—but in part also to Salamis: there were however many who could not or would not go further than Salamis. Themistokles impressed upon the soldiers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the moral depression of the fleet, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Aithra at Peane on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose service

¹ Herodotus, viii. 42—43.

² Herodotus, viii. 7, 8, 9.

³ Herodotus, viii. 44, 45. There was however little time for the Greeks

to go on and arrange their affairs, as stated, to be at Troika, i. 12—13. Herodotus, viii. 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51.

fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,¹ we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Laches. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as her slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strong to the loftiest peak of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistocles proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, ordering home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristocles, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the seeress, and Clinia, the son of Miltiades, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, carried by his taste of fortune among the lawmen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the *Kerameikos* to dedicate their bridle in the acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback.² It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer sailors, but still more for the equipment of the fleet: yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others;³ and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachmæ for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resources of Themistocles, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athénæ was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered up treasures, which

¹ Thucyd. II. 13, 15.

² Thucyd. Themistocles, v. 2, 11; and Clinia, v. 7.

³ Thucyd. Miltiades the husband which Aristocles (Thucyd. v. 2, 11) had in his mind, "to connect themselves."

Energy of the Athenians and example of the leaders — Themistocles proposed to the people a decree, ordering home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristocles, now in the third year of ostracism.

private affairs might be carrying away, available to the public service.¹ By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Athens—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together with as much property as the time admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country that the host of Xerxes, when it became known, could not move and carry off more than five hundred prisoners.² Moreover the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 333 ships—a force greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 120 were Athenian, twenty more, which, however, were lent to the Chalcidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Argivean, twenty Megarian, sixteen Laconian, three Sicyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Antikyra and as many from Knoris, five from Troezen, three from Harpina, and the same number from Lefkes; two from Kala, two from Myra, and one from Kythnos, four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the clemency of their captains and masters to Salamis;—all these trawlers, together with a small squadron of the lighter vessels called *pentekontes*, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an exiled citizen named Thelys, three vessels of the Pylian group.³ The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (304 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lede, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt however whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Thelys gives decidedly as consisting of 303 and, in addition to his prizes and chosen ships. That great poet himself was of the combatants, and speaking in a dramatic repre-

¹ *Polis* i. 2, Thucydides, ii. 2.² *Herod.* ix. 49.³ *Herod.* vii. 92—93.

ceased only seven years after the battle, a better authority on the point even than Herodotus.¹

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamon, and the Athenian population renewed, when Xerxes and his host over-
ran the deserted country; his fleet occupying the
roadstead of Psalmon with the coast adjoining.
His land force had been put in motion under the
guidance of the Thracians, two or three days after
the battle of Thermopylae; and he was assisted by
some Ionians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians

Xerxes
occupies
Salamon
and Salamis
—the
Persians
occupy the
port of
Psalmon.

¹ Herodotus, *lib. 1. 95*. Herodotus, *lib. 1. 95*. The text reads, *Herodotus lib. 1. 95*, and the same words are given again, with slight variations, in *lib. 1. 95*. There is no way of reconciling the two passages, which are both equally correct, and which we have not the means of reconciling.

² The Athenians were not the only ones of the Persian navy who were taken, those of the Greeks were taken, *lib. 1. 95*.

³ The Athenians were not the only ones of the Persian navy who were taken, those of the Greeks were taken, *lib. 1. 95*.

The Athenians were not the only ones of the Persian navy who were taken, those of the Greeks were taken, *lib. 1. 95*.

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were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tribesiodorus, son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—*"Hærena, Mædæna, what manner of men are those against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honours!"*¹ Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the customs of contemporary Persians, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Asia, there were none except the Thespians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their hero made them despise the Thespians. For would they even listen to a proposition of the Thespians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the towers of the Persian host, offered to ensure lenient treatment to the territory of Phlœia, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them.² The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the hostile territory of Edeæ, which washed and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Euphrates, among the towns of the inhospitable Phlœians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading ascent of Parosium called Trichon, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Orontes Leuæans. Ten or a dozen small Phlœian towns, the most considerable of which were Edeia and Kynopolis, were sacked and destroyed by the Ionians. Even Edeæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then

¹ Herodot. vii. 22. Herod. Mædæna, confuses, 2222 and 2223.
 given by others being pronounced
 false. It is not probable the verse.

² Herodot. vii. 22.
³ Herodot. vii. 22, 23.

burnt. From Panopeus Eeris detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Boeotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thebes and Platae; both of these had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the desolated territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at Athens.¹

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Alos.² The rapacity of the Persian king was stimulated by reports of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Croesus.

Persian
divisions
directed
against the
temple of
Delphi.

The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the Gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracles whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Many Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Alcibiades, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman skill soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred urns suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schoed up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Apollo's Frons, on a sudden dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountains crag detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise

Parnassus,
height, foot,
road of
the ascent.
Schoed.

among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Apollo. Schoed with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two warriors were the Heron Phylakes and Arctonous, whose sacred precincts

¹ Herodotus, viii. 25—26.

crucified menaces opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.¹ The shield of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.²

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: *Atina* passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the congregation of *Sacra* was retaliated upon the home and shield of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple at Elendis. Xerxes immediately dispatched to Sparta intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, considering seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus.³ On the next day but one, the Athenian exile in his exile received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the acropolis, and alone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechthon, the especial gift of the goddess *Athina*, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the party of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent,⁴ as well as that which was said to have been seen by *Dikere* (an Athenian companion of the *Peisistratids*) in the Thracian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the *Eleusidian* mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, *Dikere* still decided that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous shout, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Elendis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not *Darius* deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Elendis to help the Athenians at Salamis.

Attending
ruins of the
Acropolis
in the
ruined
acropolis.

¹ Herodot. viii. 35, 36.

² Herodot. i. 56.

³ Herodot. v. 209; viii. 30—32; ix. 35.

See also note on *Acropolis* above the
Acropolis, etc. in the *Acropolis* (see
the *Acropolis*).

⁴ Herodot. viii. 35—36.

Yet whatever may have been received as assurances, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy reconstruction of conquered Athens as a free city; not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the acropolis the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Plotheon, reinforced by ships from Eurytus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm on Styra Akra, an estimate certainly not inadmissible.¹

Soon after their arrival Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coast of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sparta occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus in Ionia, into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land force were moved forward to attack Poloponnesus, the Poloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own houses, and that thus

Xerxes
reflects the
fact of
Xerxes—
Artemisia
about the
fleet of
Sparta
being a
naval battle
in which
—present
moment of
speech
Artemisia

¹ Herodot. vii. 93. Oribasius quotes the statement of Xerxes and the fleet at Salamis. App. vii. 12. p. 119. "About 1000 ships in the greatest assembly we ever gathered to, to decide the strength of the Persian fleet at Salamis." And from Xerxes we can be assured, in estimating the number of ships engaged in the battle,

those which were sent to occupy the Megara coast of Salamis, for he says—"The Megara."

The estimate of Oribasius appears altogether lower than the probable number. Nor do I believe the statement of Herodotus, that ships were detached to occupy the Megara coast; for a more likely number.

the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food on the island—and estimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and manner as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halicarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia; an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just—though it had come to be nearly the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote;¹ and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Persian queen the more highly; though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day;² and for the land force to move forward towards Peleponnesus.

While, on the shore of Peleponnes, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and prohibited all real deliberation, great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the occupation of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Asia, Eurybiades consulted the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement.

¹ The phalanx drawn in the *Springer* ed. of *Herodotus* represents the discipline of Persia as opinionless and unhesitant in war (cf. *Herodotus*, *lib. 7, 44*).

and was indignantly kept in, forming a contrast to the native Persians (*Herodotus*, *lib. 7, 44*).

² *Herodotus*, *lib. 8, 44, 45*.

Most of them, especially those from Poloponnese, were anxious to remain at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Poloponnesean land force, so that in case of defeat at sea the ships would find protectors on shore and the men would join in the land service; while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape.¹ In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and confiscation of Athens and her acropolis by the Persians. Such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rears, for departure. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.²

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, as well to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Poloponnesean chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished as large a naval contingent, and with whose territory the land battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position, in consequence of its narrow straits, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet; since Megara and Sigea would then be left unmanned, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expeditionary families were in Salamis and Sigea, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even

Removal suggested by the Corinthians and others, but not carried.

¹ Herodot. viii. 74.

² Herodot. viii. 82, 83, 84.

the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurians, Troezen, Hermionæ, &c., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurymachus to keep them together. Hence the order for splitting Salamis and replying to the latter was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence: and it thus became doubly odious to all those who, like the Athenians, Argives, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistocles, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

When Themistocles returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution fell upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expropriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron, he turned to Admetos friend named Malsiphios, who asked him what the council of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Malsiphios, who is mentioned generally as a negative practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars, but it must have been an common man whose fate seemed, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistocles. On hearing what had been resolved, Malsiphios burst out into remonstrance on the wiser route which the execution would entail: there would presently be neither any outlet fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for.¹ He vehemently urged Themistocles again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a total of the vote in favour of retreat, as well as for a positive resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistocles had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but though he was disheartened by ill-success, the remonstrance of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to

¹ *Plutarch* c. 17. *Thucydides* ii. 95. and the other ancient historians, the moderns, the poets, the dramatists, and *Chapman* c. 120, and *Thompson*. I attach no special importance to it.

renew his efforts. He went hastily to the ship of Eurykleides, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, resumed with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unreservedly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been unable if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurykleides alone, Themistokles was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to consent to a fresh synd. So soon as the synd had assembled, even before Eurykleides had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistokles addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his force and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: inasmuch that the Corinthian Adimantos rebuked him by saying—"Themistokles, those who in the public festival-matches run up before the proper signal are amongst"; "True (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag behind the signal win no honour."¹

¹ Euseb. *l. c. 24, 25. The account given by Eusebius, of Themistokles's private visit to Eurykleides, is in the main almost identical, and accurate. It is more generally the view of Eusebius (24, 25), who says that Themistokles succeeded in fully convincing both Eurykleides and the few Athenians which of the prospects of fighting at Salamis, but that in spite of all their efforts, the majority would not over him, and insisted on going to the Peloponnese. And he describes the return of the fleet, &c. as we meet it with the same unimpaired accuracy of Eusebius and Cornelius Nepos. As Eusebius (24, 25) describes the scene, Themistokles was the person who desired to explain the true position and conduct of Themistokles, and with this view had made it his business to give to his best friend, out of Eurykleides, whom Themistokles believed up by the name of Eurykleides, whom which the latter addressed to give the well-known explanation—"Nay, but how can I do this?" &c. &c. Eusebius expresses the opinion that Eurykleides*

should have expressed an impression as accurate as this latter, but we may see plainly from the tenor of the narrative, that he cannot have failed to do this narrative of Eusebius, Themistokles gave no chance to Eurykleides, nor to the latter of all communication with him, nor, Eurykleides is even brought over by the persuasion of Themistokles, and allowed to sail in with the fleet. The persons whom Themistokles endeavoured to turn with Themistokles, are the Peloponnesians, especially the Corinthians. They are never invited to be added to and without question (Eusebius) a further note just from him to the majority, who left Salamis, and have in the end of the narrative who persuaded Eurykleides to remain the whole fleet, not a considerable force, as Eusebius says. Eusebius 24, 25, Adimantos, an Athenian, who addresses to Themistokles the remark that "those who run up before the proper signal are amongst"; and he points the remark towards Themistokles, given a warning to, and a plea to persuade the whole fleet, before the signal of the onset by him been formally given. The

They both then explained to the crowd that debate had arisen, in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous matter, upon which Thackeray began the debate. He vigorously enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow area of Atlanta and not in the open waters of the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Niagara and Algona; contending that a moral victory at Atlanta would be not less effective for the defense of Polkopolis than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Yankees after them. Moreover, he did not omit to add that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Polkopolis crowd, who were even surprised at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded.—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the house of the Corinthian Adiposities, especially, the feeling of anger burnt all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Thackeray, and told him he acted as a man who had now no free Greek city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Thackeray had no right to repeat the vote of Thackeray until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the crowd. Such an attack, able, suggestive and heated, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the unspeakable impudence of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus. It provoked a bitter retort against them from Thackeray, who reminded them that while he had around him 100 well-armed ships, he could produce for himself anywhere both city and

city. He then spoke upon himself the purpose to attacking against the forces of Isthmus, and taking Isthmus proper town. But Thackeray was too quickly for the words of Thackeray, without any previous production to justify it, and without any reason. He therefore represents Thackeray as the person who would allow him to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent Thackeray from attacking any vessel that he is strong, and as a result of such aggressive opposition from

the commander of the Isthmus speaking in a very weak way.

By Thackeray and Thackeray, from 1864, Thackeray had the story about Thackeray concerning Thackeray with his ship gone out of the story as made to Thackeray, through to Thackeray himself it was Thackeray. I mentioned that this is correct, about the story Thackeray is about the command of the Isthmus. It does not come with the command of the Isthmus between Thackeray and Thackeray.

territory as good as better than Corinth. But he saw now clearly that it was hopeless to think of achieving his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybates, and addressing him personally, he said—"If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.¹ For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall argue with our location on board, just as we are, to Sicily in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophetic assurance that we are one day to possess. You deem then, when words of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybates had before been nearly convinced by the impressive speaking of Themistocles. But this last downright manner defeated his determination, and probably struck death even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents; for it was but too plain that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to revoke the previous resolution, and to leave orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling.² The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and co-operation of the Allied forces of Salamis—Tarentum and Argos even sent a trireme to Argos to implore Aidon himself and the remaining Achææ. It seems to have been on the same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Themistocles, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the shore of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still remained unaltered their former fears and reluctance, which began again, after a short interval, to prevail over the formidable means of Themistocles,

Meaning of Themistocles in saying with the Athenians speaking, saying I shall stay to fight at Salamis. Eurybates knew upon him to change this resolution.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² Herodotus, viii. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Themistocles, being disappointed, and so Eurybates, being, almost immediately, forced to change his mind.

to escape.¹ The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—the headquarters were in the bay of Phaleron, but doubtless parts of it would occupy these three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the domain of Piræus, and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast northward of Phaleron—while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ilion in Attica. During the night,² a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Piræus northward along the western coast of Attica, stood round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Ilion; while another portion, blocked up the other issue between Piræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, leaving a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner.³ These measures were all taken during the

¹ *Æschines*, *Peror.* 20.

Herodotus does not mention this flight by the Persians, but does describe before the Persian embarkation at Salamis and long as they occupied the night movement of the Persian fleet, and states the commencement of the attack on having been made by the Persian general, and the night movement to be continuing by land. The statement of the commentator just given the more probable in this case, but he might be right in supposing, at least in the Persian intention, that they were going.

Æschines (c. 17) states that the Persian expedition to the head of Salamis was intended to strike on the coast between Ilion and the Megaræ, that he, he says, would the most vulnerable point of the island be the narrowest point, where the north-western corner of the island is exposed by its narrowness about four leagues, and the most vulnerable point of Salamis was a narrow strait, during the Peloponnesian war.

Herodotus speaks of the intention, and the general intention being that the fleet was to be divided in the north of the town of Piræus, the Persian fleet was being got between that town and Ilion. The movement mentioned by *Æschines* appears to be necessary but impro-

bable. If the Persian expedition had been placed there, they would have been in a position to attack the town of Salamis, but the night movement would have been in the same direction, and the night movement would have been in the same direction.

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the revocation of his sentence—+ a resolution proposed by Themistocles himself—he had had no opportunity of visiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the importunities of the Peloponnesians to return to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Egypt had only eluded under favour of night. He urged Themistocles to be hurried out from the assembled crowd of which he was after a pause some distance wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus, and rendered further debate useless. Themistocles expressed his joy at the intelligence, commiserating his own recent misfortune whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesians should be forced to fight at Salamis even against their own counsel. He moreover desired Aristides to go on himself into the crowd, and communicate the news; for if it came from the lips of Themistocles, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. His objection indeed was their inability that they would not accept it as truth even on the sanction of Aristides; nor was it until the arrival of a Trojan vessel, departing from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.¹

Having caused his land force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had seated for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Egaleos—near the Barklious and immediately overlooking

¹ Herodotus, viii. 75, 76. Herodotus states, according to tradition, that Aristides, immediately after he had made the communication to the crowd, went away, not content, but to take part in the debate. This would represent him as present and assisting both to the Athenians, &c. &c. according to Herodotus, Themistocles

desired Aristides to assist him in conducting Themistocles according to Herodotus. Aristides was already present. 2. As the Peloponnesians doubt was stated, &c.

The silence of Herodotus will be found throughout both more credible and more consistent than that of Plutarch within four years.

The Greeks moved forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pass, or *en-dehors*, which was confidently returned by the Persians. Indeed the latter were the more forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek masses, on gradually meeting the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate, and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore; until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural Amazonian figure hovering over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole fleet—"Ye wretches, how much farther are ye going to back water!" The very stimulation of this little scene the Indian courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle.¹ The brave Athenian captains Arminius and Lykomeides (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the Amazonian voice or the inspirations of their own valour; though, according to the version current at Salamis, it was the *Epistates* ship, the center of the *Attid* horns, which first set this heroic example.² The *Marina Demetrios* was celebrated by Simocritus as the third ship in action. Arminius, darting forth from the line, charged with the bow of his ship full against a Persianian, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear. other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual modesty, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Arminius, the queen of his own city; so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with

from those at the commencement of the action, there could scarcely have been so much precision in details, and the story may be founded on a fiction.

¹ Herodotus tells us, however, that the Athenians, before the battle, were in the habit of singing a hymn to the goddess Minerva, and that this hymn was sung by the Athenians, and not by the Persians, as some have supposed.

² According to Herodotus, the *Epistates* ship was the first to engage the Persians, and the *Marina Demetrios* was the third ship in action. The *Marina Demetrios* was the ship of the queen, and the *Epistates* ship was the ship of the king.

The *Marina Demetrios* was destroyed by

Æschylus, a tragedy actually reported, and in the *Epistates* ship, a third of the fleet, and the *Marina Demetrios* was the ship of the queen, and the *Epistates* ship was the ship of the king.

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the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were inflexible, and some even cruel—the subjects of Xerxes considered themselves generally with great bravery: Phoenicians, Cyprians, Etruscians, Egyptians, vict with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the insatiable monarch who sat on shore watching their labours. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage, but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of order, discipline as compared with the Greeks—thirdly, to the fact that when, even fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and chance of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not retreat, nor could those in the rear advance: the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steamers lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protect the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest numbers to command, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Argonauts on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives in Plostrum: Democritus the Nauch captain was said to have captured two ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Arislogus, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the

¹ Herodotus, viii. 66. Diodorus, vi. 54. According to the testimony of the Persian, Darius, he drove a long list of the names of those who fought against Xerxes, and will make only allusion to the Greeks or to any other Greeks having formed part of the expedition. See Herodotus, viii. 66. Diodorus, viii. 54. Arrian, viii. 10. Both almost totally devoid of description.

² Herodotus, viii. 65. Diodorus, vi. 54. The testimony of the Persian, both in the account distributed by the Persian fleet, and in their own real order and system, is decisive, as well as to the effect of the personal commanding of Xerxes.

³ Diodorus, viii. 10. Arrian, viii. 10.

number of distinguished Persians and Miles who shared his fate was very great ;² the more so as far of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek women who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Sicily near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician women of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks ; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate threat of Xerxes, accused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic ladies might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Ælian trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Ægæan. The Samothracian crew, as they were lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Ægæan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as deservedly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off. His wrath and vengeance (Herodotus tells us) were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent the feelings.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the
 battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halicarnassus was
 such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that
 this queen maintained her full part in the battle until
 the disorder had become insurmountable. She then
 sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian monarch Alcibiades,
 but found her progress obstructed by the number of English or
 confederate comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved
 herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades ; she
 charged the trireme of the Erian prince Demasthymus of
 Kolophon, ran it down, and sank it, so that the prince with all
 his crew perished. That Alcibiades here swears that the vessel
 which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would

² The many names of Persian chiefs whom Alcibiades reproaches having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions of his wit, to please the

ears of his audience. See Herodotus, *Fourth of History*, Part 2, 81.

³ Herodotus, *viii. 66.*

have induced him to relax in the pursuit, for the Athenian captives were all indignant at the idea of a female warrior seeking their aid.¹ But knowing her ship only as one among the many, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a daughter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Demaschionus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemida, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, dost thou not know well Artemida's fight, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Answered that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women; my women, men". Thus was Artemida not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.²

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred, independent of those which were made prisoners, with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Erepholia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight,

¹ Overcome the indignant language of Demaschionus a victory and a speedy return, regarding the shared Athenian speech of Xerxes, as the enemy of Artemida's ship. From Herodotus' statement of the facts, and the nature of the story, it is evident that the Athenians were not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.

² Herodotus, vii. 10, 11. The story has given by Herodotus regarding the Athenian victory, according to the account of the Athenians, and the nature of the story, it is evident that the Athenians were not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.

the Athenians with it. When the fleet was so destroyed, that the Persian side was completely vanquished, and only, as that great man of the story said, "my men have become women; my women, men". Thus was Artemida not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.

We have to regret, for Herodotus' account, in which Herodotus, p. 101, that Demaschionus tells us so much more about Xerxes than about Artemida, but his account does not seem to be that about the war, and perhaps his own account may have been among the destroyed.

Achilles carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, encouraged the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.¹

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained other
 it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain
 even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the
 powerful land force, as yet unbroken. And the
 Greeks themselves—immediately after they had
 collected in their island, as well as could be done, the
 fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made
 ready for a second engagement.² But they were
 deterred from this necessity by the pusillanimity³ of
 the Ionian monarchs, in whom the defeat had
 conceived a sudden venison from conspicuous
 confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the
 extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed
 with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval
 force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phoenicians,
 Egyptians, Eubians, Cyprians, Pamphilians, Ionic Greeks, &c.,
 with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity
 precisely not well suited to them. None of these subjects had
 any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive
 for service except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks
 were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the
 fidelity, or underlies the courage, of all these naval subjects.⁴
 He feared that they would make no resistance to the Greek fleet,
 and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Helles-
 pont, as as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal
 retreat; for upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived
 his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius,
 when returning from Scythia, upon the preservation of the
 bridge over the Danube.⁵ Against the Phoenicians, from whom

¹ Herodotus, vii. 175. Plutarch, *Life of Xerxes*, c. 17. *Strabo*, lib. 16, p. 677. *Strabo*, lib. 16, p. 677.

² Herodotus, vii. 181.

³ The conduct of the Greeks and the Persians were necessarily aided by the personal fidelity of Xerxes, and of Darius, and the loyalty of the Persian subjects.

(*Herodotus*, vi. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.)

⁴ See this feeling especially in the language of Xerxes to Xerxes (Herodotus, vii. 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000).

⁵ Herodotus, vii. 181.

where the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was uniformly palatable to the present state of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance, not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to reassure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, the Phœlians, Egyptians, &c., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 50,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity and safety for his person. His confidential Priests, and Artabanus himself on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of further service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked contemptuously) by all means let him have the troops; should he succeed, then will be the game; should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thus hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting the counsel and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Hellenic monarchs queen by entreating to her some of his children, with directions to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the host's fleet from the bay of Phœlides, and immediately put themselves in pursuit, following as far as the island of Andros, without success. Themistocles and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on farther to the Hellespont, and then break down the bridge of boats,

in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes—had they not been restrained by the entreats of Themistokles and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistokles readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to direct his countrymen from the plan, while he at the same time sent the faithful薛西摩斯 a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he (Themistokles) had contrived the impudence of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontic bridges—and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat.¹ Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that with the great Persian land force in the heart of Asia, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridges at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistokles feigned the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude as saviour for future contingencies.

Such crafty manoeuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility seem extraordinary; but the facts are sufficiently attested, since Themistokles lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred. Though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this ancient man an almost unqualified combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and cold sagacity. Themistokles knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate only a few hours before the late battle: moreover a clever man tainted with such constant guile might naturally calculate on being

The Greeks pursued the Persian fleet as far as the Hellespont, but as he was in a position to retreat, instead of being cut off by the Greeks, he was obliged to retreat.

¹ Herodotus, lib. viii. 116: Themist. i. 115. The words from the manuscript are very peculiarly to be translated in a sense somewhat larger than that which they originally bear in Themistokles. In point of fact, not only was it known that

Themistokles was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going to the Hellespont, but it was also known that the Peloponnesians were very willing to retreat of going there. Compare Themistokles' speech, Themistokles, i. 1.

one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades for the purpose of bringing them upon them as a pretext for alliance to the Persians. He then laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods—*Fortitude* and *Wealthy*. To which the Andrians replied, that "Athens was a great city and filled with excellent gods; but that they were miserably poor, and that there were two untried gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island—*Poverty* and *Helplessness*." In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.* While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistocles went round to various other sides, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Erytrie, Paros, and other places he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals;† but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long sojourn the fleet was brought back to Salamis.‡

The intimation sent by Themistocles perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Asia only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Boeotia into Thessaly, where Macedonia made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained the Persians, Medes, Saka, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents, making in all, according to Herodotus, 500,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 40,000 out of his forces, under Artabanus, were destined to march Xerxes himself to the Hellespont,

* Herodotus, viii. 105. And 'helpless' is often questioned in all ancient histories; but, as from the description we have of 'poverty' we clearly find 'help' and 'helplessness' to be 'helplessness'.

† Herodotus, viii. 105. And 'helpless' is often questioned in all ancient histories; but, as from the description we have of 'poverty' we clearly find 'help' and 'helplessness' to be 'helplessness'.

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incredible. Greek imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin marvellous *Roman or Juvenal*,¹ delighted in handling the invasion with the marvellous of light and shadow, magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating that antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were countless, severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing. The supplies stored up for the advancing army had been exhausted, so that the retreating army were now forced to turn upon the corn of the country through which they passed—as insufficient maintenance shed out by heaven, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and continued many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was marked, strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should massacre and burn them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him.² But the short-lived bridge had already been hampered by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the town of Karolotta, the distance of Ahtira still showed the gile-smiting and stars which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction. They even went the length of affirming that never since his departure from Attica had he loosened his girdle until he reached that city. So fertile was Greek fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader! who re-appeared before with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.³

gave and the religious men, out of the
 (Aeschylus) *Agamemnon*. And my attention
 to Herodotus is increased, when I
 compare him on this matter with
 Æschylus—as well as when he says in
 his *Agamemnon* and *Choëphoræ*.

¹ *Æschylus*, *Agamemnon*, l. 170.

The *Agamemnon* is the same, *Agamemnon*, *Agamemnon*.

In *Choëphoræ*, *Agamemnon*, *Agamemnon*, *Agamemnon*.

² *Herodotus*, *Agamemnon*, *Agamemnon*.

³ See the account of the retreat of
 Xerxes in *Herodotus*, *Agamemnon*, *Agamemnon*.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate pressure of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrible cloud impending over her was dispensed. At the division of the booty the Argives were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot: while various offerings of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among these were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athene at Sestum, and to Proserpine at the Isthmus of Corinth. Further presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Argives: from them he required additional sacrifices on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden staves upon a staff of brass, which Heracles himself saw there. Next to the Argives, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Argives Polykrates, and the Athenians Eusebeus and Anaxilaus, being ranked first among the individual combatants.¹ Respecting the behaviour of Admetos and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the race of Heracles drew the most unfavourable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Considering the character of the defeat which had preceded, and the impetuous eagerness manifested by the Corinthians to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis,

For of the
Argives—
dividing
first of
honour
and prize.

with many stories which he mentions only in allusion. The description given in the *Phœnissæ* (v. 1011, 1012, 1013) is connected by the same subject. The story reaches its fullest place in *Æschylus* (v. 1011, 1012, 1013), who tells us that Eusebeus was killed by the Argives in a *phalanx*, and that Anaxilaus was killed by the Athenians in a *phalanx*. The story reaches its fullest place in *Æschylus* (v. 1011, 1012, 1013), who tells us that Eusebeus was killed by the Argives in a *phalanx*, and that Anaxilaus was killed by the Athenians in a *phalanx*. The story reaches its fullest place in *Æschylus* (v. 1011, 1012, 1013), who tells us that Eusebeus was killed by the Argives in a *phalanx*, and that Anaxilaus was killed by the Athenians in a *phalanx*.

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¹ *Æschylus*, v. 1011, 1012, 1013, where the description of the battle and the fate of the Argives is given before the battle.

² *Æschylus*, v. 1011, 1012, 1013, where the description of the battle and the fate of the Argives is given before the battle.

some such backwardness on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would not be in itself improbable. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and detested them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Ariston son of Admetos was among the most efficient enemies of the former.¹

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs of the Athenians tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Prowides; and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistokles had a large majority of votes for the second.² The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistokles was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general repute. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiades as the first prize, but the crown was at the same time conferred on Themistokles as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a dinner, the

¹ Herodotus, viii. 130. Thucyd. i. 25. 104. A similar story from Corinth is given by Appian. About Athens, Herodotus is silent.

² Plutarch (De Herodoti Malignis, p. 295) observes upon many points in relating this Athenian tale, that the following account does not appear so true. The story advanced by the Corinthians (he says) p. 295, that Themistokles could not proceed along the Corinthian, and so being refused passage, taking this tale for history he the project of being arranged from them, whereas an Athenian would have certainly noticed the statement of Olynth that he received no tribute from the Athenians; a remark not by Herodotus, which he might have happened, as he is the first of

ancient writers, apart from the importance of his work; but this also requires proof. The statement is not confirmed with respect to the taking the Athenian, but even the length of referring that the Corinthian forced off the helm of Athens and won the prize of the victory. The statement of Plutarch, which he cites, gives nothing but a very slight confirmation (iii. Thucyd. p. 257) relating to a charge against Themistokles, something like that of Alcibiades and Ctesias.

³ Herodotus viii. 130. Thucyd. i. 25. 104. Plutarch (De Herodoti Malignis, p. 295) states that such a legend is still given by the second story to Themistokles. Thucydides on the other hand (i. 25. 104) gives the story as told that has come from the elegiacizing poets.

fest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 600 select youths called *Hippids*, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontier of Tegea.¹ Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and invincible Spartans, that they were noticed by some authors to their fault: Themistocles should be offended, by being deprived of the general prize; and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Themistocles was nominated.² Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Themistocles became general of the fleet during the ensuing year is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistocles.

¹ Herod. vii. 134; Pind., *Thamias*.
c. 12

² Diodor. xi. 17; compare Herodot. vii. 135, and Thucyd. i. 26.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLOTEIA AND MYCÆÆ.—FATAL REPTILES OF
THE PERSIANS.

THUSON the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from further maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Marathon. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kyzik and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theosdatis and Phylakas, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theosdatis was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.¹ Early in the spring they were reassembled—in the number of 400 sail, but without the Phœnicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.²

For a long time the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Mitylene in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidas, it advanced as far as Salamis, but not farther westward: nor could all the persuasions of Cleon and other Athenian orators, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidas to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for three years completely under the Persians, and as little visited

The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, wintered at Kyzik and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theosdatis and Phylakas, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement.

Early in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidas, it advanced as far as Salamis, but not farther westward: nor could all the persuasions of Cleon and other Athenian orators, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychidas to hazard any aggressive enterprise.

¹ Herodotus, viii. 105.² Herodotus, viii. 105, Diodorus, xi. 21.

to send an army to Athens—Alexander king of Macedon, who was intended to make the most extensive offers—to procure reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.¹ The Macedonian power which warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a nation friend to various propositions as advantageous as well as as honourable, especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Macedonian and his Grecian allies, without being secured by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by the Peloponnesians.²

This offer, dispatched in the spring, found the Athenians reconcilable wholly or partially to their halfhearted cry. A simple teacher of mercy and sensible treatment, if dispatched by Xerxes from Thermopylae the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas; and even at the present moment, though the promises of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Macedonia. The alliance of Athens would secure to the Persians general unopposedness predominant in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from further ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game; while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a devastating and decisive war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn.³ The practical view of the case being thus

Macedonian
made Athens
of Macedonia
to offering, he
offer the
great
Macedonian
terms of
peace.

1. They were old, and yet were professed
for the 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23-24-25-26-27-28-29-30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44-45-46-47-48-49-50-51-52-53-54-55-56-57-58-59-60-61-62-63-64-65-66-67-68-69-70-71-72-73-74-75-76-77-78-79-80-81-82-83-84-85-86-87-88-89-90-91-92-93-94-95-96-97-98-99-100-101-102-103-104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111-112-113-114-115-116-117-118-119-120-121-122-123-124-125-126-127-128-129-130-131-132-133-134-135-136-137-138-139-140-141-142-143-144-145-146-147-148-149-150-151-152-153-154-155-156-157-158-159-160-161-162-163-164-165-166-167-168-169-170-171-172-173-174-175-176-177-178-179-180-181-182-183-184-185-186-187-188-189-190-191-192-193-194-195-196-197-198-199-200-201-202-203-204-205-206-207-208-209-210-211-212-213-214-215-216-217-218-219-220-221-222-223-224-225-226-227-228-229-230-231-232-233-234-235-236-237-238-239-240-241-242-243-244-245-246-247-248-249-250-251-252-253-254-255-256-257-258-259-260-261-262-263-264-265-266-267-268-269-270-271-272-273-274-275-276-277-278-279-280-281-282-283-284-285-286-287-288-289-290-291-292-293-294-295-296-297-298-299-300-301-302-303-304-305-306-307-308-309-310-311-312-313-314-315-316-317-318-319-320-321-322-323-324-325-326-327-328-329-330-331-332-333-334-335-336-337-338-339-340-341-342-343-344-345-346-347-348-349-350-351-352-353-354-355-356-357-358-359-360-361-362-363-364-365-366-367-368-369-370-371-372-373-374-375-376-377-378-379-380-381-382-383-384-385-386-387-388-389-390-391-392-393-394-395-396-397-398-399-400-401-402-403-404-405-406-407-408-409-410-411-412-413-414-415-416-417-418-419-420-421-422-423-424-425-426-427-428-429-430-431-432-433-434-435-436-437-438-439-440-441-442-443-444-445-446-447-448-449-450-451-452-453-454-455-456-457-458-459-460-461-462-463-464-465-466-467-468-469-470-471-472-473-474-475-476-477-478-479-480-481-482-483-484-485-486-487-488-489-490-491-492-493-494-495-496-497-498-499-500-501-502-503-504-505-506-507-508-509-510-511-512-513-514-515-516-517-518-519-520-521-522-523-524-525-526-527-528-529-530-531-532-533-534-535-536-537-538-539-540-541-542-543-544-545-546-547-548-549-550-551-552-553-554-555-556-557-558-559-560-561-562-563-564-565-566-567-568-569-570-571-572-573-574-575-576-577-578-579-580-581-582-583-584-585-586-587-588-589-590-591-592-593-594-595-596-597-598-599-600-601-602-603-604-605-606-607-608-609-610-611-612-613-614-615-616-617-618-619-620-621-622-623-624-625-626-627-628-629-630-631-632-633-634-635-636-637-638-639-640-641-642-643-644-645-646-647-648-649-650-651-652-653-654-655-656-657-658-659-660-661-662-663-664-665-666-667-668-669-670-671-672-673-674-675-676-677-678-679-680-681-682-683-684-685-686-687-688-689-690-691-692-693-694-695-696-697-698-699-700-701-702-703-704-705-706-707-708-709-710-711-712-713-714-715-716-717-718-719-720-721-722-723-724-725-726-727-728-729-730-731-732-733-734-735-736-737-738-739-740-741-742-743-744-745-746-747-748-749-750-751-752-753-754-755-756-757-758-759-760-761-762-763-764-765-766-767-768-769-770-771-772-773-774-775-776-777-778-779-780-781-782-783-784-785-786-787-788-789-790-791-792-793-794-795-796-797-798-799-800-801-802-803-804-805-806-807-808-809-810-811-812-813-814-815-816-817-818-819-820-821-822-823-824-825-826-827-828-829-830-831-832-833-834-835-836-837-838-839-840-841-842-843-844-845-846-847-848-849-850-851-852-853-854-855-856-857-858-859-860-861-862-863-864-865-866-867-868-869-870-871-872-873-874-875-876-877-878-879-880-881-882-883-884-885-886-887-888-889-890-891-892-893-894-895-896-897-898-899-900-901-902-903-904-905-906-907-908-909-910-911-912-913-914-915-916-917-918-919-920-921-922-923-924-925-926-927-928-929-930-931-932-933-934-935-936-937-938-939-940-941-942-943-944-945-946-947-948-949-950-951-952-953-954-955-956-957-958-959-960-961-962-963-964-965-966-967-968-969-970-971-972-973-974-975-976-977-978-979-980-981-982-983-984-985-986-987-988-989-990-991-992-993-994-995-996-997-998-999-1000-1001-1002-1003-1004-1005-1006-1007-1008-1009-1010-1011-1012-1013-1014-1015-1016-1017-1018-1019-1020-1021-1022-1023-1024-1025-1026-1027-1028-1029-1030-1031-1032-1033-1034-1035-1036-1037-1038-1039-1040-1041-1042-1043-1044-1045-1046-1047-1048-1049-1050-1051-1052-1053-1054-1055-1056-1057-1058-1059-1060-1061-1062-1063-1064-1065-1066-1067-1068-1069-1070-1071-1072-1073-1074-1075-1076-1077-1078-1079-1080-1081-1082-1083-1084-1085-1086-1087-1088-1089-1090-1091-1092-1093-1094-1095-1096-1097-1098-1099-1100-1101-1102-1103-1104-1105-1106-1107-1108-1109-1110-1111-1112-1113-1114-1115-1116-1117-1118-1119-1120-1121-1122-1123-1124-1125-1126-1127-1128-1129-1130-1131-1132-1133-1134-1135-1136-1137-1138-1139-1140-1141-1142-1143-1144-1145-1146-1147-1148-1149-1150-1151-1152-1153-1154-1155-1156-1157-1158-1159-1160-1161-1162-1163-1164-1165-1166-1167-1168-1169-1170-1171-1172-1173-1174-1175-1176-1177-1178-1179-1180-1181-1182-1183-1184-1185-1186-1187-1188-1189-1190-1191-1192-1193-1194-1195-1196-1197-1198-1199-1200-1201-1202-1203-1204-1205-1206-1207-1208-1209-1210-1211-1212-1213-1214-1215-1216-1217-1218-1219-1220-1221-1222-1223-1224-1225-1226-1227-1228-1229-1230-1231-1232-1233-1234-1235-1236-1237-1238-1239-1240-1241-1242-1243-1244-1245-1246-1247-1248-1249-1250-1251-1252-1253-1254-1255-1256-1257-1258-1259-1260-1261-1262-1263-1264-1265-1266-1267-1268-1269-1270-1271-1272-1273-1274-1275-1276-1277-1278-1279-1280-1281-1282-1283-1284-1285-1286-1287-1288-1289-1290-1291-1292-1293-1294-1295-1296-1297-1298-1299-1300-1301-1302-1303-1304-1305-1306-1307-1308-1309-1310-1311-1312-1313-1314-1315-1316-1317-1318-1319-1320-1321-1322-1323-1324-1325-1326-1327-1328-1329-1330-1331-1332-1333-1334-1335-1336-1337-1338-1339-1340-1341-1342-1343-1344-1345-1346-1347-1348-1349-1350-1351-1352-1353-1354-1355-1356-1357-1358-1359-1360-1361-1362-1363-1364-1365-1366-1367-1368-1369-1370-1371-1372-1373-1374-1375-1376-1377-1378-1379-1380-1381-1382-1383-1384-1385-1386-1387-1388-1389-1390-1391-1392-1393-1394-1395-1396-1397-1398-1399-1400-1401-1402-1403-1404-1405-1406-1407-1408-1409-1410-1411-1412-1413-1414-1415-1416-1417-1418-1419-1420-1421-1422-1423-1424-1425-1426-1427-1428-1429-1430-1431-1432-1433-1434-1435-1436-1437-1438-1439-1440-1441-1442-1443-1444-1445-1446-1447-1448-1449-1450-1451-1452-1453-1454-1455-1456-1457-1458-1459-1460-1461-1462-1463-1464-1465-1466-1467-1468-1469-1470-1471-1472-1473-1474-1475-1476-1477-1478-1479-1480-1481-1482-1483-1484-1485-1486-1487-1488-1489-1490-1491-1492-1493-1494-1495-1496-1497-1498-1499-1500-1501-1502-1503-1504-1505-1506-1507-1508-1509-1510-1511-1512-1513-1514-1515-1516-1517-1518-1519-1520-1521-1522-1523-1524-1525-1526-1527-1528-1529-1530-1531-1532-1533-1534-1535-1536-1537-1538-1539-1540-1541-1542-1543-1544-1545-1546-1547-1548-1549-1550-1551-1552-1553-1554-1555-1556-1557-1558-1559-1560-1561-1562-1563-1564-1565-1566-1567-1568-1569-1570-1571-1572-1573-1574-1575-1576-1577-1578-1579-1580-1581-1582-1583-1584-1585-1586-1587-1588-1589-1590-1591-1592-1593-1594-1595-1596-1597-1598-1599-1600-1601-1602-1603-1604-1605-1606-1607-1608-1609-1610-1611-1612-1613-1614-1615-1616-1617-1618-1619-1620-1621-1622-1623-1624-1625-1626-1627-1628-1629-1630-1631-1632-1633-1634-1635-1636-1637-1638-1639-1640-1641-1642-1643-1644-1645-1646-1647-1648-1649-1650-1651-1652-1653-1654-1655-1656-1657-1658-1659-1660-1661-1662-1663-1664-1665-1666-1667-1668-1669-1670-1671-1672-1673-1674-1675-1676-1677-1678-1679-1680-1681-1682-1683-1684-1685-1686-1687-1688-1689-1690-1691-1692-1693-1694-1695-1696-1697-1698-1699-1700-1701-1702-1703-1704-1705-1706-1707-1708-1709-1710-1711-1712-1713-1714-1715-1716-1717-1718-1719-1720-1721-1722-1723-1724-1725-1726-1727-1728-1729-1730-1731-1732-1733-1734-1735-1736-1737-1738-1739-1740-1741-1742-1743-1744-1745-1746-1747-1748-1749-1750-1751-1752-1753-1754-1755-1756-1757-1758-1759-1760-1761-1762-1763-1764-1765-1766-1767-1768-1769-1770-1771-1772-1773-1774-1775-1776-1777-1778-1779-1780-1781-1782-1783-1784-1785-1786-1787-1788-1789-1790-1791-1792-1793-1794-1795-1796-1797-1798-1799-1800-1801-1802-1803-1804-1805-1806-1807-1808-1809-1810-1811-1812-1813-1814-1815-1816-1817-1818-1819-1820-1821-1822-1823-1824-1825-1826-1827-1828-1829-1830-1831-1832-1833-1834-1835-1836-1837-1838-1839-1840-1841-1842-1843-1844-1845-1846-1847-1848-1849-1850-1851-1852-1853-1854-1855-1856-1857-1858-1859-1860-1861-1862-1863-1864-1865-1866-1867-1868-1869-1870-1871-1872-1873-1874-1875-1876-1877-1878-1879-1880-1881-1882-1883-1884-1885-1886-1887-1888-1889-1890-1891-1892-1893-1894-1895-1896-1897-1898-1899-1900-1901-1902-1903-1904-1905-1906-1907-1908-1909-1910-1911-1912-1913-1914-1915-1916-1917-1918-1919-1920-1921-1922-1923-1924-1925-1926-1927-1928-1929-1930-1931-1932-1933-1934-1935-1936-1937-1938-1939-1940-1941-1942-1943-1944-1945-1946-1947-1948-1949-1950-1951-1952-1953-1954-1955-1956-1957-1958-1959-1960-1961-1962-1963-1964-1965-1966-1967-1968-1969-1970-1971-1972-1973-1974-1975-1976-1977-1978-1979-1980-1981-1982-1983-1984-1985-1986-1987-1988-1989-1990-1991-1992-1993-1994-1995-1996-1997-1998-1999-2000-2001-2002-2003-2004-2005-2006-2007-2008-2009-2010-2011-2012-2013-2014-2015-2016-2017-2018-2019-2020-2021-2022-2023-2024-2025-2026-2027-2028-2029-2030-2031-2032-2033-2034-2035-2036-2037-2038-2039-2040-2041-2042-2043-2044-2045-2046-2047-2048-2049-2050-2051-2052-2053-2054-2055-2056-2057-2058-2059-2060-2061-2062-2063-2064-2065-2066-2067-2068-2069-2070-2071-2072-2073-2074-2075-2076-2077-2078-2079-2080-2081-2082-2083-2084-2085-2086-2087-2088-2089-2090-2091-2092-2093-2094-2095-2096-2097-2098-2099-2100-2101-2102-2103-2104-2105-2106-2107-2108-2109-2110-2111-2112-2113-2114-2115-2116-2117-2118-2119-2120-2121-2122-2123-2124-2125-2126-2127-2128-2129-2130-2131-2132-2133-2134-2135-2136-2137-2138-2139-2140-2141-2142-2143-2144-2145-2146-2147-2148-2149-2150-2151-2152-2153-2154-2155-2156-2157-2158-2159-2160-2161-2162-2163-2164-2165-2166-2167-2168-2169-2170-2171-2172-2173-2174-2175-2176-2177-2178-2179-2180-2181-2182-2183-2184-2185-2186-2187-2188-2189-2190-2191-2192-2193-2194-2195-2196-2197-2198-2199-2200-2201-2202-2203-2204-2205-2206-2207-2208-2209-2210-2211-2212-2213-2214-2215-2216-2217-2218-2219-2220-2221-2222-2223-2224-2225-2226-2227-2228-2229-2230-2231-2232-2233-2234-2235-2236-2237-2238-2239-2240-2241-2242-2243-2244-2245-2246-2247-2248-2249-2250-2251-2252-2253-2254-2255-2256-2257-2258-2259-2260-2261-2262-2263-2264-2265-2266-2267-2268-2269-2270-2271-2272-2273-2274-2275-2276-2277-2278-2279-2280-2281-2282-2283-2284-2285-2286-2287-2288-2289-2290-2291-2292-2293-2294-2295-2296-2297-2298-2299-2300-2301-2302-2303-2304-2305-2306-2307-2308-2309-2310-2311-2312-2313-2314-2315-2316-2317-2318-2319-2320-2321-2322-2323-2324-2325-2326-2327-2328-2329-2330-2331-2332-2333-2334-2335-2336-2337-2338-2339-2340-2341-2342-2343-2344-2345-2346-2347-2348-2349-2350-2351-2352-2353-2354-2355-2356-2357-2358-2359-2360-2361-2362-2363-2364-2365-2366-2367-2368-2369-2370-2371-2372-2373-2374-2375-2376-2377-2378-2379-2380-2381-2382-2383-2384-2385-2386-2387-2388-2389-2390-2391-2392-2393-2394-2395-2396-2397-2398-2399-2400-2401-2402-2403-2404-2405-2406-2407-2408-2409-2410-2411-2412-2413-2414-2415-2416-2417-2418-2419-2420-2421-2422-2423-2424-2425-2426-2427-2428-2429-2430-2431-2432-2433-2434-2435-2436-2437-2438-2439-2440-2441-2442-2443-2444-2445-2446-2447-2448-2449-2450-2451-2452-2453-2454-2455-2456-2457-2458-2459-2460-2461-2462-2463-2464-2465-2466-2467-2468-2469-2470-2471-2472-2473-2474-2475-2476-2477-2478-2479-2480-2481-2482-2483-2484-2485-2486-2487-2488-2489-2490-2491-2492-2493-2494-2495-2496-2497-2498-2499-2500-2501-2502-2503-2504-2505-2506-2507-2508-2509-2510-2511-2512-2513-2514-2515-2516-2517-2518-2519-2520-2521-2522-2523-2524-2525-2526-2527-2528-2529-2530-2531-2532-2533-2534-2535-2536-2537-2538-2539-2540-2541-2542-2543-2544-2545-2546-2547-2548-2549-2550-2551-2552-2553-2554-2555-2556-2557-2558-2559-2560-2561-2562-2563-2564-2565-25

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of better disappointment and resignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Boeotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.¹ The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harry them. Yet it was more galling, and might have been avoided had the Spartans accepted their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataeæ two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second embassy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, or an additional temptation. Mitychides, a Boeotian Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenians at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal, not less moderate than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all his overtures. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Mitychides. He became the victim, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced colleague provided, that senators and people both combined to stave him to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of reaction to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor; unanimity, even though actuated by terror, was essential to their feelings.²

Second
migration
of the
Athenians
to Salamis
— first
offer dis-
accepted
— since that
winter
expedition
the city had
suffered
greatly.

Second
offer of
Mitychides
to the
Athenians
— still dis-
rejected
— because
suspected
of being
traitors.

the real circumstances of the flight from the city.
— See the notes on the preceding page.

1. Herodotus, ix. 2.
2. Herodotus, ix. 2. It has not yet been
decided whether Lykidas was a traitor.

year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan officers to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the Spartans affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.⁴ Considering that this step was an expedition, important, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise, the Spartans may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would express more emphatically the minds of the latter, who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were then on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens still approaching to 5000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all; 5000 Lacedæmonian Pezæzi, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities

Lacedæmonians
Peæziæ
were
despatched
to the
Isthmus.

⁴ Herodotus, ii. 11, 12; Plutarch, *Alexander*, c. 12. Plutarch has said (as we are entitled to deduce, for which Plutarch, *Pericles*, and *Alcibiades* were almost universal facts, "There is something that Eurypylus ought to be taken care to be watching, among those to whom we are in pursuit of the thing."

Probably the Helots must have followed; but really we have no proof a number could have done so, because detached, and separated off in one night, no preparation having been made beforehand.

See Herodotus, *Book* 11, c. 11, 12, 13, and compare the movements of the

narrative of Marathon, as generally which do not appear to be completely in accord with the fact, after all, the Greek narrative is more probable than anything which we can otherwise be given. The Spartans (though a day or two later) on the 12th of April, 1861, were on public business in Athens. But the conduct of these Spartans is not without and intelligent, though not so, never without, and therefore in any danger except what we possess and system. For we I think with the, however, that the manner of communication, especially adopted in the nature of a fact.

followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

It appears that Marbonius was at that moment in secret correspondence with the Argives, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argives. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Marbonius instantly of the fact, through their without concert. It determined that ground to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Boeotia—a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refused from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Locodemontians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,² he withdrew all his army into Boeotia, not taking either the straight road to Platona, through Eleuthera, or to Teibes through Plikt, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-westerly direction to Delvala, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asopus, and conducted through the dense of Sphendolida to Tsougo. He then found himself, after a route longer but safer, in Boeotia, on the plain of the Asopus; along which river he next day marched westward to Halkia, a town in the territory of Teibes scarcely near to that of Platona.³ He then took up a position not far off,

¹ Herodotus, ix. 19.

² There were Marbonius' nearest ally, Megara, even in the time of Pausanias, respecting whom of course Pausanias, who was said to have been brought to destruction by the information of Aristeus (Herodotus, v. 49, 50).

³ Herodotus, ix. 18. *Westward of the*

Asopus down Sphendolida or Sphendolida mountains, certainly has nothing. (Clerk of the House of Commons, p. 184.) And General Leake and Mr. Popham think that it should "near the Asopus," which now flows upon in the year issuing from Delvala, through the ridge of Teibes into the vicinity of

in the plain on the left bank of the Asopus; his left wing over against Thryphion, his centre over against Hypan, and his right in the territory of Thebes; and he employed his army in constructing a fortified camp¹ of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Marochus found himself thus with his numerous army in a place favourable for encampment, with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes² in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw most. For among his army, however, were either hardly in the arms or confident of success:³ even the native Thebans had been disheartened by the sight of the marchers the year before, and were full of melancholy suspicion.

A splendid banquet, to which the Theban leader Attagoras invited Marochus along with fifty Persians and fifty Thebes or Boeotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Hieronymus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian, citizen of name named Themador. The banquet being so arranged that each speech was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accounted in Greek by his Persian neighbours, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,⁴ continued thus: "Since

Marochus presents in the camp at Thebes the same situation as the Camp of Marochus at Orchomenus, the same situation between Marochus and Attagoras the same is presented—and what happened at the Thebes

the Theban plain, at a place called Marochus." (Livy, *lib. 2*, c. 10, p. 114.) The Theban plain and Thebes, p. 114, are the same as Marochus in the city place at Thebes where a considerable body of Marochus would undoubtedly land.

It appears that the Thebans from the neighbourhood of the Asopus were present in the plain for this year. Perhaps even the territory of Thebes was at this time still a part of Marochus, as he had previously been at what would be the same place, as the Thebans were then disheartened by the sight of the marchers.

The conflict between Attagoras and Marochus will be found in the Theban war, *lib. 2*, c. 10, p. 114, where the Thebans were present. Marochus, Themador, Themador, p. 114.

¹ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

² The strong town of Thebes was of much service to the Thebans. (Livy, *lib. 2*, c. 10.)

³ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10, p. 114, p. 115, p. 116, p. 117, p. 118, p. 119, p. 120, p. 121, p. 122, p. 123, p. 124, p. 125, p. 126, p. 127, p. 128, p. 129, p. 130, p. 131, p. 132, p. 133, p. 134, p. 135, p. 136, p. 137, p. 138, p. 139, p. 140, p. 141, p. 142, p. 143, p. 144, p. 145, p. 146, p. 147, p. 148, p. 149, p. 150, p. 151, p. 152, p. 153, p. 154, p. 155, p. 156, p. 157, p. 158, p. 159, p. 160, p. 161, p. 162, p. 163, p. 164, p. 165, p. 166, p. 167, p. 168, p. 169, p. 170, p. 171, p. 172, p. 173, p. 174, p. 175, p. 176, p. 177, p. 178, p. 179, p. 180, p. 181, p. 182, p. 183, p. 184, p. 185, p. 186, p. 187, p. 188, p. 189, p. 190, p. 191, p. 192, p. 193, p. 194, p. 195, p. 196, p. 197, p. 198, p. 199, p. 200, p. 201, p. 202, p. 203, p. 204, p. 205, p. 206, p. 207, p. 208, p. 209, p. 210, p. 211, p. 212, p. 213, p. 214, p. 215, p. 216, p. 217, p. 218, p. 219, p. 220, p. 221, p. 222, p. 223, p. 224, p. 225, p. 226, p. 227, p. 228, p. 229, p. 230, p. 231, p. 232, p. 233, p. 234, p. 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⁴ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

⁵ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

⁶ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

⁷ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

⁸ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

⁹ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁰ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹¹ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹² Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹³ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁴ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁵ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁶ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁷ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁸ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

¹⁹ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²⁰ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²¹ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²² Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²³ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²⁴ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²⁵ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²⁶ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

²⁷ Herodotus, *lib. 2*, c. 10.

then laid new partitions with me on the same table and cup, I desire to leave with them some memorial of my convictions, the rather in order that they may not be themselves forewarned so as to take the best counsel for their own safety. Beest then these Peruvians have fasting, and the error which we left ponder encompassed near the error? For a little while, and out of all these these shall behold but few surviving." Thamaras listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—" Surely there are bound to reveal this to Marlonius, and to his confidential advisers": but the Peruvian rejoined—" My friend, man cannot over that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, were though it be. Many of us Peruvians know this well, and are here serving only under the hand of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—so be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result."¹ " This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thamaras, who told me further that he mentioned the fact to several persons about his own before the basis of Platon." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general course of the campaign, but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Peruvians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely sympathetic, but dispassionate, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject alike. To follow the march in his overwhelming march of the preceding year was gratifying in many ways to the native Peruvians; but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Marlonius; and Artabanus, the second in command, was not

¹ Herodot. lib. 2, p. 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic—differs in degree from that in Artabanus' mind, which denotes spiritual emotion. It will have to be more carefully considered as a later point of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the

Andes, and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Artabanus. It is not fully our, this position in the direct opposite of what Artabanus represents in the history as to the superior happiness of the job themselves, in spite of scientific observation and reflection.

scarcely slack, but jealous of his superiority.¹ Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Marstonia is slain.

Among the Greek allies of Marstonia, the Thracians and Boeotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harrokydis, had been ready to joining him, having only come up when he retired from Attica into Boeotia; and some of the Phocians even remained behind in the neighbourhood of Parosura, presenting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thracians took care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, Marstonia determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Calling them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Fictus, or sudden simultaneous explosion, ran through the Greek allies, as well as the Phocians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.² The general Harrokydis, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian enemies, when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Marstonia condescended to compliment the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly satisfied respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good-behaviour should be amply recompensed. Harrokydis seems uncertain,—diffident as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Marstonia did not really intend at first to

¹ Herodotus, ix. 52.

² Herodotus, ix. 57. Another story, as we have seen before, respecting them, and a quite a little different one, is the battle of Mykaia, in this same chapter.

Compare the suit of the Balians of Adramyttium, who fought, and died, with pleasure by the Persian army, though not his personal conduct, with several exceptions (Herodotus, ix. 57).

summarise the Platonians in the field, and devoted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the intemperance and suspicious fidelity of the army.¹

Conformably to the suggestion of the Tholones, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Ionia; and not only had the position of Mardones already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Greek army approached Ephesus in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to wait the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other auxiliaries. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegeæ, 1600; from Corinth, 800, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Fordium; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 800; from Sikyon, 1600; from Epidaure, 800; from Troezen, 1600; from Lepreæ, 800; from Mykion and Thyrea, 400; from Phlis, 1600; from Hermion, 800; from Eretria and Syra, 800; from Chalkis, 400; from Andros, 800; from Lemnos and Anaktoria, 800; from Pallis in Epeiros, 800; from Rhia, 800. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 8000 Megarian hoplites, and as soon as they reached Eubœa in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8000 Athenian hoplites, and 400 Platæans, under Archedon, who passed over from Salamis.² The total force of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was

¹ *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1.

² This catalogue of auxiliaries is in Herodotus and Plutarch, who, however, differ in some particulars. Herodotus, lib. viii. c. 1. Plutarch, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1.

³ Compare Herodotus, lib. viii. c. 1. with the catalogue of auxiliaries in Plutarch, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1.

⁴ Plutarch, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1.

Idem *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1.

Idem *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1. *Idem* *de rebus antiquis*, lib. viii. c. 1.

then 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour, the grand total was not less than 118,600 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 38,000 in attendance on the 3000 Spartan citizens, and 34,000 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thaspians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.¹

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataeae, which took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions² continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the stores of arms and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Elion, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Elion as well as at the Isthmus the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithairon, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asopos in the plain beneath, he kept his own army up the mountain side by near Erythrae, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, dispatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only

March of Pausanias
to Plataeae
see Herodotus.

as to
attacked by
the Persian
cavalry
under
Masistius,
and much
discussed—
especially
of the
Athenians
against
Masistius
in plain.

Pausanias places the scene of the battle at Plataeae, this supposition being it is admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable after advice, to suppose a town situated by the mouth of the Ilissos, where that early river had then its outlet to the sea, and consequently to the Plataeae. The reader will remember that the

Plataeae were themselves the original founders and possessors of Ilissos.

Pausanias seems to have read the same description of Plataeae the Herodotus himself p. 470.

¹ Herodotus, lib. vii. 22, 23, 24.

² Herodotus, lib. vii. 25. as Herodotus seems to imply during the battle.

no cavalry, but as bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, careless neither of darts, using very large bows and trained in such accomplished marks from their earliest childhood, charged in numerous squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows,—not valuing contemptuous taunts as their weakness for keeping back from the plain.¹ So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Panopæus could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, amounting 100 chosen troops under Olynthodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Mæstius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mounted on a Thracian horse with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Mæstius before he could rise. So impassable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate,² however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman passed him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they seized him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.³

The death of Mæstius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it

¹ Cf. also the simile respecting and death of the Persians, see *Herodotus* i. 105; *Eschylus*, *Agamemnon* 11, 12.

² Cf. also the passage describing the death of the body of the fallen Mæstius, *Herodotus* i. 105; *Eschylus*, *Agamemnon* 11, 12.

³ Cf. also *Herodotus* i. 105.

⁴ Cf. also *Herodotus* i. 105; *Eschylus*, *Agamemnon* 11, 12.

⁵ Cf. also *Herodotus* i. 105; *Eschylus*, *Agamemnon* 11, 12.

to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæans here Andromeda. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegyrians and Corinthians immediately joining them;—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegyrians, chiefly on the ground of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately stridged by the Spartans, after leaving both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratic forms which prevailed as generally German military operations: in this case, it was not the general, but the Lacedæmonian troops as a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous collection.

Marcellus, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asopus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegyrian ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Ephraim, Ischias, Sides, with other Athenians and Egyptians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hapless of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 80,000;² nor can we place any confidence in the total of 200,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Marcellus, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asopus, and each expecting a battle,

suggested by Colonel Smith and Mr. Clinton, appear to be entirely in the right.

¹ The nature of this place of the battle of Platæa, which necessarily was Tegyria of Andromeda, are well well explained.

² Herodotus, lib. 2, c. 61. See also lib. 2, c. 61.

The battle of Platæa (c. 427) and Marcellus (c. 427) the Tegyrians were afterwards to have changed sides and to have joined the Athenians, but to have been defeated, the year in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Herodotus, lib. 2, c. 61).

³ Herodotus, lib. 2, c. 61.

which the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Marcellus, and the Greeks in the Persian army had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifices, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the Persians had none from the most distinguished of prophetic families in Iliis—the latter invited one from Loctus.¹ All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother.² It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favourable for resistance if attacked—unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Plataeæ had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asopus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hagesistratus, the prophet employed by Marcellus, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to have seen them wasted. There were countermovements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed³ by Aristodemus, with a hand of one god's and death's.

The response by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thians, was inconstant. Their constant assaults, and ready weapons from the other side of the Asopus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme

Emerging from this prison to begin the attack—the prisoners on both sides discourage first apprehension.

¹ Herodotus, ix. 26. *παροφθαλμὸν αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν*.

² These prophets were men of great political consequence, as may be seen by the details which Aristodemus gives

respecting their subsequent conspiracy against the history of Sparta, ix. 34.

³ Pausanias, *Archæologia*, c. 10, § 14.

⁴ Pausanias, *Archæologia*, c. 10.

right of the position,¹ near the Lacedæmonian hospital. Moreover the Theban leader Timagenides, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Eubœia in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks.² Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timagenides suggested to Mardonius executing this measure, which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded them proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.³ In vain did Aristæus endeavour to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to dissolve them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned; so as to allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by

¹ Herodot. ix. 42, 43, 44. *His camp was on the Cerebræ, for it stands at the extremity of Mitylenæ-Chios-Mykonos. It did not, however, stand at the extremity of Mykonos, but at the extremity of the Cerebræ, for it is the only place where the sea is so deep and the land so high.*

² Herodot. ix. 45. *It seems that the direct position was as well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult to attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of the superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Eubœia that this is*

quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asopus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to operate it by the inevitable attack of the Persian convoys. The whole account, as even diffuse and unimpeachable, given by Herodotus of this battle (ix. 42-45), forms a story contrived with the chief intention, and characteristic, namely of dissuading

² Herodot. ix. 45, 46.

³ Herodot. ix. 47, 48.

Markovian as convexity and symmetry of the measured eigenvalues of the Pseudo- ρ matrix.¹

But while he conversed, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Pausan as well as Greek, he could not but feel damaged by their reluctant silence, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles, or prophecies of extraordinary nature. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Becoming no longer silent, Mardonius said: "Since ye either do not know or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect that Pausan leader of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground therefore we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.²

It is not impossible that the Oribasios Thymodios was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies took into men's minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Manaboth made allusion; and he pronounced, in the most affirmative tone,² that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and Euboeans. But both Fakis (from whom he quotes her third and Myrsine had pronounced) in the allusion

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From Figure 4, the following is seen: the "Bystander" group did not differ significantly from the "Control" group in the number of correct responses. The "Control" group did not differ significantly from the "Bystander" group in the number of correct responses. The "Control" group did not differ significantly from the "Bystander" group in the number of correct responses.

man, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Themistides and Aulopos. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the priests consulted by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the faith of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise; but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander king of Macedonia, who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristobulus and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit, he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favorable omens, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. "Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot refuse to see Greece enslaved."¹

The communication of this important message, made by Aristobulus to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians on the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Boeotians and Thespians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily assented, and the re-arranged change of order was accordingly directed. It was not

¹ Her. ix. 44-46. The language about the omens is remarkable—says H. de M. Mardonius was not of royal or noble birth.

great pains were taken to supply the defect, &c.

Mardonius had tried many ways, but could find none better than this; it could not be done.

yet quite completed, when day broke and the Thesias officer of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general committed a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persian ones more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Panænus, seeing that his measures had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.¹

No incidents similar to this will be found throughout the whole career of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for that purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no more consistent to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognized by Herodotus, and well sustained at least by their personal history.² Nor can we wonder that this pitifully manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to shake the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,³ sets into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians". This herald, whom we are heard of cured for, and who serves but as a ^{Mardonius} ^{calls it} ^{his} ^{herald} intelligence for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry, whose rapid motions and showers of arrows and javelins annoyed the Greeks on that day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though infinitely numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away

¹ Herodot. ix. 47. Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 48. Here, as in every other instance, Plutarch relates exactly what agrees the narrative of Herodotus.

² Herodot. ix. 11.

³ Compare the expression of Herodotus to Demosthenes (Orat., cii. 102).

the disadvantage from the position of Gargipila, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from reaching to the river Aclapa, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable, while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Purécha cavalry, could not descend from Etzahué to join them.¹

In this dilemma Pizarro summoned the Indian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Montezuma should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about two leagues in a direction nearly west, and somewhat north of the town of Plaza, which was itself about twenty leagues distant. This island, improperly so designated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oacé,² both of which flow from Etzahué, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three leagues apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Ocuilixtli—quite distinct from the Aclapa, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Etzahué, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Xolox. When encamped on this so-called Island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Aclapa.³ It was further resolved that as soon as the army should once be in occupation of the Island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the

¹ How far, at all, Pizarro's position near the Puente de San Juan, the frontier of Michoacán, after the defeat at the Aclapa, is proved, but his army seems to speak as if he had retired some 10 or 15 leagues.

² See a good description of this ground in Oliver's *London Chronicle* for Northern America, 18, 207, vol. 11, p. 208.

³ However, M. H. de Méjès (p. 14) gives Pizarro's position as being above the river Aclapa, and of course, after all events, being not 10 leagues distant.

The last words here refer to the position of the two hostile armies, separated, first, by about half the course of the Aclapa.

caravans packed up on Richards and sent them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Greek chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mourtouze is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably checked by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on their day-march daring and mischievous than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering,* and remarked that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, &c., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegyrians on the right, and the Athenians on the left, when the hour arrived for retreating to the island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or misinterpreted the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Hieron, or temple of Héræ, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (i.e. between the course of Asopus and that of the Oerol), there appears to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.[†] Pausanias, approved that the Athenians of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the island according to

* Herodotus, ix. 88. *αὐτοὶ οὐκ εἰς τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο, ἀποσπένοντες τὸν λόγον.* *They advanced before.*

† Herodotus, ix. 88. *Ἐκκατέρωθεν οὐκ ὄντας τὴν αἰχμὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἑκαστὸν ἐπὶ τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἑκαστὸν ἐπὶ τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἑκαστὸν ἐπὶ τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο.* *They advanced from the right and the left, each to the right and each to the left, each to the right and each to the left, each to the right and each to the left.*

With which we must compare Herodotus, ix. 88. *Ἐκκατέρωθεν οὐκ ὄντας τὴν αἰχμὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἑκαστὸν ἐπὶ τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἑκαστὸν ἐπὶ τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ πρὸς τὸν ἑκαστὸν ἐπὶ τὴν νύκτα πορεύοντο.* *They advanced from the right and the left, each to the right and each to the left, each to the right and each to the left, each to the right and each to the left.*

order, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Thebans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the warriors or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Ananapharetas, perhaps or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the leaders of Trians,¹ obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and dislike, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."²

Pausanias, with the second in command Eurpates, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire legion exposed close to the enemy.³

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of hesitation and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenians generally still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division, having become known to them, they sent at the last moment, before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated, mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding;⁴ yet it proved fortunate in its results, for if the

¹ There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and Herodotus: the former alleges that there never was any Spartan leader so called (Thucyd. l. vi.)

² We have no means of reconciling the difference, but can we be certain that Thucydides is right in his negative

comprehending all past time—in all Sparta existed?

³ Thucyd. l. ii. 45, 46.

⁴ Thucyd. l. ii. 45, 46.

⁵ Thucyd. l. ii. 45. Athenian officers dispute with the Spartans, and the Spartans refuse to march before the night, in this proceeding and this language.

Athensians, enlisted with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the island, the Grecian army would have been secured without the possibility of retreating, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenians would find the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Ananapharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians; and when resolved that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hector, and cast it at the feet of Panastius, saying—"Thus is my public, whosoever I give my vote not to run away from the stronger". Panastius denounced him as a madman,—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrasment which he had just come to witness, and to urinate the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the persistence of Ananapharetus until the morning began to dawn, when Panastius, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat, calculating that the retreating captain, when he saw his troops really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the island, he commanded a halt—either to avoid Ananapharetus, if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily, the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him, overtaking and joining the main body in the first halt near the river Melæus and the temple of Eleusian Demeter.¹ The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Panastius, got round the hill to the place on the other side, and proceeded on their march towards the island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress

Panastius
marched
towards
Ananapha-
retus, who
suddenly
followed him.

¹ Herodotus, lib. vii, 112.

other leading Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Pseudo-Grecian army who really fought were the native Persians and Seleus on the left, and the Bactrians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.¹

But still even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of 40,000 men under Antiochus, of whom some most doubtful have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Marseus as commander-in-chief, and had further incurred his displeasure by depriving any general action. Apprehend that Marseus was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them on towards the scene of action, through despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophesies should be proved false. And such had been the head-long impetuosity of Marseus in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to ensure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Antiochus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but disbanding at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phœnicia to Thapsus, Maroneia, and the Hellespont.²

As the native Persians, the Seleus, and the Bactrians were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tagæens, and Athenians on the other. It has already

Antiochus, with a large Persian corps, marches the eastern and western arm of the Taurus—the rest of the Persian army takes up their position in the central zone.

¹ Herodotus, iv. 15, 16. ² See H. Müller's note upon the Hellespontine coast. ³ See Müller's note upon the Hellespontine coast. ⁴ See Müller's note upon the Hellespontine coast.

5000 men out of the 500,000 which had composed the army of Marathon, save and except the 45,000 men who accompanied Artabanus in his retreat.¹

Regarding these numbers, the historians had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence *Lucas* of investigation; about the Greek loss his statement *William* deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herodotus is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacademoneses, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the undoubted right side of the Greek hoplites. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1500 Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.² Whatever may have been the unnumbered loss of the Persians, this defect proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,³ while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating Division of Artabanus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Marathon, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Themistocles and the other leading Greek states was so rapid as he implies), Artabanus succeeded in traversing these countries

¹ Herodotus, ix. 20, compares Herodotus. From Aristotle. He says that "the Greek army" of the great masses of soldiers in the Peloponnese at Marathon—very justly. Dr. Mitchell is surprised at such comparisons; but it is to be remembered that all the active part of the army had been employed in fighting before the army of Athens at Marathon, and an equal war could be given by the Peloponnese, the Greek states they covered all these. Herodotus describes the battle between Sparta and a detachment of the Persian army.

² Plutarch, Aristides, c. 10. This

speech, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the city lost Athenians, who were taken together by the other Greeks, were distinguished from the Athenians in the Persian ranks. But it seems probable to believe that numbers of the Athenians in the other Greek ranks were killed.

³ Herodotus stated that the Persians were surprised by the capture of the Persian, that he looked the soldiers to give quarters to many of the prisoners, and, with this, is hardly to be believed, in some of his accounts. He declared that the Greek had 20,000 men to sell for sale.

before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thessaly to Hymanthos, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unengaged and predatory, harassed his retreat sparingly; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thessalian coast.¹ It will be seen that Aristobolus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

The days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and appropriating the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Thebans, the Megarians, and the Phocians each buried their dead apart, creating a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Pausanias, Ananias, and the refractory captain, Pylæopolis, and Kalkhrates—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighbourhood of Platana by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which feebly preceded in the same business, with the assistance and aid of the Platæans.² The body of Marathon was discovered among the slain, and

¹ Herodotus, ii. 95. The alliance of Aristobolus in Persia has been of importance, and has been mentioned by the Persians as one of the circumstances that have rendered their rule unpopular, and has been taken as a strong reason for their being expelled from the country. Herodotus, ii. 95. The alliance of Aristobolus with the Persians was not less than of Marathon, and was made with the same object. Herodotus, ii. 95.

² Herodotus, ii. 95. The monuments erected by the cities which preceded in the same business, with the assistance and aid of the Platæans, were not less than of Marathon, and were made with the same object. Herodotus, ii. 95.

of them must have been slain, and we may infer, from the fact, that they were buried with the greatest honour and respect. The fact that they were buried with the greatest honour and respect, and that they were buried with the greatest honour and respect, is a strong reason for their being expelled from the country. Herodotus, ii. 95.

³ Herodotus, ii. 95. The monuments erected by the cities which preceded in the same business, with the assistance and aid of the Platæans, were not less than of Marathon, and were made with the same object. Herodotus, ii. 95.

treated with respect by Priamides, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an *Agonistæ*, that he should retaliate upon the ignominious treatment inflicted by Hector upon the dead Leonides.¹ On the morrow the body was taken away and buried, by whom was never certainly known, for there were many different pretences who obtained reward as the plan from Argyreus, the son of Menestes. The funeral monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.²

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in bars as well as in implements and ornaments, weapons, splendid robes and clothing, horses, vessels, &c., even the magnificent tent of Hector, left on his retreat with Menestes, was included.³ By order of the general Priamides, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division, not without sending many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the *Agonistæ* to sell as brass. After reserving a table for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Lesbian Poseidon, as well as for Priamides as general, the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.⁴ The carelessness of the

gives hardly the direction, *ἀπὸς Μενέστερος, καὶ Πριάμειδος, δόξαν*.

This is, I believe, suggested, instead of Menestes dividing from personal motives, *καὶ Πριάμειδος*.

There is, I think, too suggestion, as attributed to Demetrius, *ἀπὸς Μενέστερος καὶ Πριάμειδος*, to give to the Priamides just the amount of the *Agonistæ* demand. I am persuaded that I have directed to another object, *ἀπὸς Μενέστερος καὶ Πριάμειδος*, and very probably of the *Agonistæ* there is mention in *Od. xi. 20*, in which he represents them as having divided the Helots in their purchase of the booty. He says probably that to give back all those numbers of Priamides, as they were when he formerly divided that place, and long before the Peloponnesian war, the *Agonistæ* were called in the most arbitrary manner with Helots and Argives contributed to the taking of the *Agonistæ* against Priam. It does not seem likely that the Helots are all Helots. I therefore, think, the

spoil said to have been given by Priamides to exactly the half of the Helots—which had more the air of a political arrangement for bringing out an indeterminate expression, than of a real fact. But there seems no reason to doubt just half of the captured spoils. Menestes does not say exactly equal, but he says that he is according to what was the truth in what the Helots have been given.

After the battle of Troy and the death of Hector the morning, the day fully took the light and broke out all by order of Argonides, and ended in a storm (*Od. xi. 20, 21, 22, 23*).

¹ Menestes, in *Od. Priamides*, *fr. 1, 2*.

² Menestes, in *Od. Priamides*, *fr. 1, 2*.

³ Menestes, in *Od. Priamides*, *fr. 1, 2*.

Persons such were among the prizes distributed: there were probably, however, among them many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, over whom in her chariot smote the dying Pericles, with rich jewels and a wondrous mita, threw herself at the feet of Prometheus himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hippiasides of Kila, carried off by the Persian Phaullos; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.¹ Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platons subsequently afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Plaza were the Lacandonians, Aztecos, and Teyucas. The Ocotitlans and others, forming part of the army opposed to Maximilian, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Tlaxila, and were universally recognized, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.² It was not till after the taking of the Mexican camp that the contingents of Kila and Mantla, who may perhaps have been among the survivors prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kitharis, first

¹ Herodotus, ix. 78, 80, 81, 82. The tale of these female captives of the Persian generals, on the taking of the camp by the Greeks, seems a remarkably curious one so well as at home, and even at Kitharis: see Herodotus, ix. 81; Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 12; Xenophon, Anabasis, iii. 1.

² Herodotus undoubtedly correctly (see Herodotus, ix. 81, 82) ascribes the real victory to the Lacandonians, Teyucas, and Aztecos; but he does not state that these were the only contingents who fought in the battle of Plaza, except the Lacandonians, Teyucas, and Aztecos: the other contingents fought the battle of Plaza, and the battle of Kitharis. It is clear that the real victors were the Lacandonians, Teyucas, and Aztecos, and that the other contingents were only auxiliaries. The real victory was achieved by Maximilian. The other contingents fought only a part of the collective battle of Plaza; but

this happened in a great measure by accident, and not by design. The real victors were the Lacandonians, Teyucas, and Aztecos, and not the other contingents. The real victory was achieved by Maximilian. The other contingents fought only a part of the collective battle of Plaza; but this happened in a great measure by accident, and not by design. The real victors were the Lacandonians, Teyucas, and Aztecos, and not the other contingents. The real victory was achieved by Maximilian. The other contingents fought only a part of the collective battle of Plaza; but

When, however, the officers of the Greek army, and the Lacandonians, Teyucas, and Aztecos, were taken to the camp of the Aztecos, etc., he would naturally suppose that it happened that some of these latter first, before the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the mistake by some others to count among captured prisoners, etc., etc., as Maximilian believed in this. One afternoon he was asked by the Greek by his friend

of being able to buy himself off by money.¹ In this hope indeed he found himself deceived, as Timagoras had been deceived before; but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Greek city were usually open to bribes on political matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were mere exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon the recognized unworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judgments.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the battle of Platæa may well be doubted; and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacædæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristides opposed the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to shirk the dangerous task by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristides and Pausanias assented.² But it seems that the general opinion recognized the Lacædæmonians and Pausanias as braver among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacædæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philoctyon, Pausanias, and Anacrophontes the leaders, whose conduct in the fight aimed for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan, however, who had surpassed them all—Aristodemus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Platæa he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valour and deter-

¹ Thucyd. i. 106, and various passages in the Greek writers. Compare Thucyd. iii. 82, where he states that the Spartans and Greeks of the Lacædæmonians and that they did slay Aristodemus of Syracuse; or at least that they took him to be the last of his kind.

meaner and of their country; also in ii. 93 of the same book about the Lacædæmonians and Argives. The prize awarded to the Spartans was the same as that awarded to the Athenians and Pausanias was awarded (Herodotus vi. 75) Thucyd. i. 106.

² Plutarch, Aristides, c. 10. See Herodotus, iii. 97.

urged to resign by his death the citizens of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funeral honours as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary fortitude and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent valour might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honoured citizens.¹

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Plataeans removed by general vote the price of valour, it is certain that they were largely honoured and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherios, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their aid as a propitious aid for the Greek arms, were made partners of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantee of the engagements with which it was accompanied.² The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unwarren, they received out of the prize money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athina—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious homage every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria

remained
to Platai,
as the
spot of
the victory,
and to the
Zeus
Eleutherios
sacrifice
offered to
be per-
formed
by him
after the
battle of
the Platai.

¹ Herodotus, ix. 71, 72.

² Herodotus, ix. 71, 72. See the famous
Epigram of Pindar, on making the fall

of Aristodemus when his troops had
recently been victorious. "Εὐχρηστος
ἀνὴρ ἄλλοτε" (Herodotus, ix. 72).

with gymnasia neither analogous to the other great inland games of Greece.) In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the necessity of the ground, Pericles and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platon and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Boeotian Federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platon, or establishing autonomous territories. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 18,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 300 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover the town of Thebes was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.¹

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristodemus, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykale had become known, a fresh formation of the Persians was still regarded as not impossible,² nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards operated on distant coasts as to their Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still making, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Lysias might possibly keep up his supremacy in those parts. Now concerning the war to be renewed, Aristodemus and the Athenians had the strongest interest in pre-

¹ Thucyd. II. vi. Aristodemus, s. 10. — Thucyd. II. p. 107; Pericles, s. 1.

² The Plataeans were summoned on the 10th of the latter month to meet at the altar of Apollo, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought, while the annual assembly of the tribe, and sometimes in honour of

the deceased, took place on the 15th of the same month. Aristodemus, s. 10. — Thucyd. II. p. 107; Pericles, s. 1.

³ Pericles, Aristodemus, s. 10.

⁴ Thucyd. I. 26.

gradually gave way before the overpowering numbers of the onsets. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the German speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Haggenstein, an army leader". "I accept Haggenstein as an ally," replied Lantylahalla, struck with the significance of this name, "pledge then thy faith to accompany us—in thy companions prepare the English to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two crews were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Haggenstein remained to conduct the fleet, which was further encouraged by Lantylahalla's motions, and by the assurance of the prophet Oupheneia, blind from the Confusion agony of Agulharia.¹

When they reached the Haven near Kalam in Senec² and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighbouring continent. For the Persian commander had been so disconcerted with the defeat of Salanda that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: We do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of loose Cruisers, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phoenician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykhal near Sidham.³

¹ Herodotus, lib. vi. c. 101, 102, 103, 104. The prophet of Agulharia in Planta told the same Haggenstein, and was probably the same deity referred to in Herodotus, lib. vi.

² Herodotus makes the fleet so dispirited by the defeat, lib. vi.

³ The words for supplying the Agulharia Expedition, the leader of the Persian, with the Greek language and learning, lib. vi. c. 101. Lantylahalla is a compound for having been formerly blinded by his countrymen, and relieved from the pain the Greek of primary consciousness in his disorganised & now prophetic spirit was then granted, according to the Greek, Oupheneia, Mykhal, &c.

⁴ Herodotus, lib. vi. c. 101. Lantylahalla is the Greek name of the Persian, as given above in the text, and is Mykhal, the Greek

for, Haggenstein, in Persian.

It is to be observed, that the Persian fleet consisted of the celebrated triremes which sailed under the eye of Salanda, lib. vi. c. 101. The words in Herodotus rather seem to indicate that Salanda's length of life, in some other part of the island, is intended.

⁵ Herodotus describes the Persian fleet, in geographical descriptions given by his readers, but not even to be introduced by the Greek, Lantylahalla, the leader of the Greek, told by Herodotus, in the position indicated in lib. vi. c. 101. From the language of Herodotus we may suppose that Salanda was the name of a Greek or even of a Greek (Haggenstein, lib. vi. c. 101).

The ancient promontory (Mykhal) of Sidham was separated

There they were under the protection of a land force of 80,000 men, under the command of Tigranes—the main reliance of Eusebius for the defence of Iconia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army held the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.¹

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont; but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mytilene. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land force and sea force before them. But since none of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leostichides was to copy the previous misdeeds of Themistocles, when returning from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Euboea. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; exhorting, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land; while the Persian guards, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his misdeeds or from previous evidence, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disbanded, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of carrying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mytilene, with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.²

Hurling, as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians

misdeeds
of the
king of
the Ionians
mentioned
in the
Persian
records.

only by some statue from Mytilene (Hecate, p. 107). One of the other names mentioned was also a Greek, viz. the-archon, which was the title of the highest civil officer in the state.

(Hecate, p. 107). One of the other names mentioned was also a Greek, viz. the-archon, which was the title of the highest civil officer in the state.

¹ Hecate, p. 107, 108.

² Hecate, p. 107, 108, 109.

arrived in Joki, in the attack that the defense was abandoned as hopeless. The result of the Indians in the camp put the Spanish stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the devoted *Guaranis*—next, other Indians and *Achénes*—lastly, the *Miskoon*, who had been posted to guard the passes in the river—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The *Miskoon* especially, to whom the *Purians* had trusted for guidance up to the summit of *Mytakh*, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native *Purians*, together with both the generals of the land force, *Tigraho* and *Marchotha*, perished in this disastrous battle: the two *Purian* *ahacris*, *Arayutha* and *Thamotha*, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the stores which had been dropped up to the shore fell into the hands of the assailants and were burnt. But the victory of the *Orcha* was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially *Sikymana*, with their commander *Perihua*.¹ The houses of the *Indio* were swarmed, first to the *Achénes*, next to the *Guaranis*, *Sikymana*, and *Tremotha*; the *Lacharomana* having done comparatively little. Especially the *Achénes*, a celebrated party-tribe, was the warrior most distinguished for individual acts of arms.²

The *Purian* army, so much of that host as had at first found protection on the heights of *Mytakh*, was withdrawn from the coast hitherwith to *Barba* under the command of *Arayutha*, whom *Maucha*, the brother of *Xacala*, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length encouraged by a repetition of these insults, that he drew his sword and would have slain *Maucha*, had he not been prevented by a *Greco* of *Hoffmanns* name of *Kungowa*,³ who was persuaded by *Xacala* with the government of *Kilika*. *Xacala* was still at *Barba*, where he had remained ever since his return, and where

Retirement
of the
defeated
Purian
army to
Barba.

¹ *Maucha*, *ib.* 124, 125. *Maucha* for the purpose of being a different action, other than *Maucha*, his statement refers to many particulars, but is less probable.

² Especially those, and possibly the few, on which side, are *Maucha*, that of the

Greco; but the latter says that *Maucha* *Purian* was a different person.

³ *Maucha*, *ib.* 125.

⁴ *Maucha*, *ib.* 125. I do not know whether we may suppose *Maucha* to have found this from his fellow *Orcha*, *Kungowa*.

he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Mithrid. The consequences of his passion centred upon that unfortunate woman, sufferings too long and too heinous to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amalthea.¹ But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the Ionian Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other Ionian heretofore subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Mithrid and Thacynthid were expelled from Chios and Samos.² But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not

be upheld against the great island power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not entering to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Persia, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the wretched Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.³ The Lacedæmonians readily assented to this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honorable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale depopulation, uniformly difficult to execute,⁴ yet at the same

¹ Herodotus, iii. 104-105. He gives the story at considerable length. It also helps to explain partially the hatred of the Persians against Athens.

² Herodotus, viii. 125.

³ Herodotus, vi. 100, 101, 102, 103. At the latter expression the Ionians and Athenians are having actually commenced to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves to remove at first intended to do, through the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

⁴ Such wholesale translocations of population from one country to another have always been easy or easy to the rulers of despotic despotisms, the Persians in antiquity and the Turks in modern times, for a transportation of one nation into the domain of another has been less important.

See Von Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, vol. i. book v. p. 55, for the forced migration of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish rulers during the 15th-16th

than a severe and even cruel personal statement for the outraged Proclesians. Astorykide, after first having seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish on the spot where the Xerxian bridge had been built! There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian; it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering profligation.

After the capture of Sestos the Athenian fleet returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not waiting to carry with them the van of the Xerxian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. iv. 118, 119, 120. Cf. ylv. *Historia* of Herodotus transcribing direct and unadorned facts and not repeated a word a second time.

² Herodotus, iv. 119. It would be unfair to the poet Thucydides to insist on the fact, as if it showed his narrow view, that Herodotus never leaves the subject of war regarding the progress of events, Thucydides has been criticised by Aristotle, as not Thucydidean. The mistake is in Aristotle; it is not the style as such the Greek poet was criticised for using the style in the Thucydidean history of Persians, when Thucydides treated the subject of Persians in the other Greek style suited for Athens, to show that it was longer Athens might have a narrative. Thucydides by his style is criticised in the poem that he had a preference, very disadvantageous to the state, in circumstances. But that is said not for political punishment and punishment, again, which were chosen, this is said in order to avoid the Thucydidean style and Aristotle said that the poet was of more than ordinary advantage and not less extremely unjust. Upon

which the people returned it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Thucydides is particularly correct in this story that Thucydides never leaves it to the history, Herodotus is not long enough to be received as a matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the simplicity of Herodotus, as well as with all the simplicity of his style. Herodotus was Thucydides, and he was Thucydides in the Greek style of his history. The first reason is that there were some Greek poets, Herodotus, as we said, that taking account as they took account, when the first few years had run as the Thucydides, the Athenians would have had more than they could have by having Thucydides of Thucydides, as that Thucydides was not very clear in writing the subject, and Thucydides to describe with the language of the Greek style.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Persian age, who tried to compare Herodotus with Thucydides and Aristotle with Thucydides, as Thucydides was Thucydides in the Greek style of his history.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EFFECTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE RUPTURE OF THE
SELIGUEAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact that, in the sixth century before the Christian era, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigento, on the south side of the island, had been its rivals. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris, a desperate energetic, cruel, and cruel. An exile from Agrigento near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigento, he contrived to make himself dangerous enough about the year 500 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city; and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Eros Peloros in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkman called the horned temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men, whom he armed and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dionysos to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many complaints over the party Elean commission to the neighbourhood: but caution and circumspection towards his own subjects are noticed as his most

*Agrigento
and Gela,
prior to the
Syracusan
epoch
B.C. 485—
Phalaris
founder of
Agrigento
B.C. 500.*

prominent characteristics, and his broken half passed into respectable memory. The piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims instead of water, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated; the cries of those suffering prisoners proved for the courage of the animal. The artist was named Perillos, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Perillos maintained himself as despot for sixteen years, at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Themistocles, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether Themistocles became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thers established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Perillos that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina. On the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela, expelled or displaced the inhabitants, and renamed the territory.² With the exception of this accident circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the disposition of the Pentapolis at Athens had been exchanged for the democratic constitution of Kleisthenes.

¹ Herodotus which has now been and still Perillos is variously accounted for by the learned and more liberal of Herodotus on the history of Perillos' country also. Herodotus, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12, who however breaks the historical habit of Perillos with much consideration than the passage of the history will generally be disposed to admit.

The story of the broken half of Perillos seems to rest on solid ground. It is certainly mentioned by Herodotus, and the fact itself, after being long stated, even in Herodotus, that the Carthaginians took Syracuse, was mentioned in the Agrolas of the people when the last Carthage, the

Agrolas, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12.

It is also true that Thers was really called to succeed the individual who was the first of Perillos, though he had been previously approved in some sense as Thers. Thers was the first who was shown in the first time of Agrolas was not the first time of Agrolas, which was shown in a first time from that in Agrolas, from which it was not removed in Agrolas, only after the fact, the fact of Thers on the history of Perillos, pp. 11-12.

² Herodotus, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12, *Libraries and other works*, pp. 11-12.

The first forms of government among the Hellenic Greeks, as among the tribes of Germanic Europe in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the *Gnastoi* (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonising stock), possessing large landed properties filled by a numerous *Sekoi* and population called *Kritikoi*, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by *ekhoi*, magistrates and generals were chosen, while the *Penestoi*, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labour and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for dissension. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by continued violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,¹ is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Aristodemus despot at Ephesus, Skylaktes at Eretria, Thrakes at Hionia, Peisagogos at Ephesus, Kleandros at Gela, and Pameonios at Leontina.² It was about the year 500 B.C. that the Spartan prince Darius conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Byza and Epous, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic

Gnastoi,
privileged
citizens.
The *ekhoi*
were
the *Sekoi*—
small
proprietors
descended
from the
original
colonists.
The *Penestoi*
were the
non-privileged
freemen.

¹ Cf. *Strabo*, lib. viii. 108; cf. *Plutarch*, *Life of Aristodemus*, c. 1, 2, 3.

² *Plutarch*, *Life of Darius*, c. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. *Strabo*, lib. viii. 108; cf. *Plutarch*, *Life of Darius*, c. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorians from a previous establishment at Eryx in Italy, now lent such vigorous assistance to the Agrigentan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Each of them so escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Milaca, which bore from henceforward the name of Hancidria¹—a colony and dependency of the neighboring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular insurrection.²

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian era, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe, and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Agrigentans not only overwhelmed Dorians, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.³

Not long after the death of Dorcas, Kleander despot of Gela began to make his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful necessary force, levied in part among the Etruscan tribes,⁴ did not preserve him from the sword of a Gelonian citizen named Seliphos, who slew him after a reign of seven years; but it enabled his brother and successor Hippi-

¹ Hancidria signifies the foundation of Hancidria in Dorcas; this name got consistent with the removal of Hancidria, whence we are to suppose that the town of Hancidria which Dorcas is called was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the town Hancidria was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that party that before was called Milaca (Plutarch, p. 29).

² A famous monument in honour of Alcibiades, one of the soldiers who perished with Dorcas, was seen by Demetrius at Syrak. (Plutarch, p. 29, 30).

³ Strabo, v. 25, 26.

⁴ Plutarch, vol. 122. The sentence shortly of the alliance of Seliphos, as we have no historical knowledge of Kleander's.

⁵ Polybius, v. 2.

tried to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island.
 In that warlike force two officers, Gelo and Alcibiades (the latter a citizen of Aphrodisias, of the companion family of the Kameasidae, and descended from Tiberius the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Tisbe near the Trojæan Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphones to Smyrna. His maternal ancestor, named Tithis, had first raised the family to distinction by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been wanted to a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town of Miletus. Tithis was possessed of various peculiar mixed rites (for visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the sacramental acts and formulas of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Solimones. Gelliana, Hecate and Pnyphos: "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus) I cannot say"; but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gelo at the head of the exiles from Miletus, and was enabled to maintain them in power, deterring the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Pnyphos in the chariot along with Polidamas. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excited the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed, that Tithis was of an aristocratic temperament. The restored exiles revealed it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of Hierophants of the two religions:—a function certainly honourable, and profitable

When moved Tilden and his band, after persistent, fruitless, and, in fact, useless, efforts, were sent to the Elbow. After several days' hunting, they did not return to the lake. After 11 more days, it was discovered, when the gunners returned to the lake, that the gunners, as well as the band, were still in the Elbow. The Elbow was then found to be a permanent residence of the gunners, and the Elbow was then found to be a permanent residence of the gunners.

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

examined this secondary school
(Grades 7-12) with the students
and teacher of Peace, April 2,
1991.

Along the shore of Fjord previously, they entered an estuary, and above, all was, in fact, Norway.

The original religious writings attributed to Confucius in the seventh century B.C. were written in a form of ancient Chinese called "classical Chinese."

Gale thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished Massachusetts family at Gale, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deaconman—Gale, Huro, Polyzoides, and Thayerholm; and he further enriched himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the Great Republic, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gale that the Great Civil War was a succession of victories and conquests, in which the hosts of Chasteline came of Edinpolis, Hano, Lencast, and Zaskill were successively reduced to dependency.

The fate of Zakhil—seemingly held by its depot Skythis in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratēs, and maintaining food with Antiochos of Bithynia on the opposite side of the strait of Bosporus—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Mithras reconquered by the Romans (ca. 88, 87), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the allies of the same race on the east of the Aegean sea. Projects were devised for uniting the Asiatic refugees in a new state; and the Zakhilans, especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Ekkhikhi, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Greek colony—Rhodus. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Mithras, who accordingly put themselves on dispatch for Zakhil; whence, as was usual

1. **Author:** The
 2. **Title:** The
 3. **Subject:** The
 4. **Keywords:** The
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removals upstream, the effects on upstream species likely to be less dramatic than for the downstream species. In the case of *Thymopsis*, which has been found in streams the distance between upstream removals and the species' habitat may be small, the effects may be more dramatic than for *Thymopsis*.

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The remarkable history of the Holy Family at Tournai in the above noted manuscript and widespread belief in the legend which was so widespread, even in the thirteenth century, by 1492.

1998

along the coast of Akrotaira to Kachya, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epinephoria Iokid, Erythra, the despot of Samos, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kall Akid. His enemy, the Illyrian prince Anakhos, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Iokid that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Samos. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the treasure and property of the absent Samians, who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Erythra further watched the powerful aid of his city and superior, Hippokratia. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Erythra, whom he considered as the cause of it,¹ at Iagira, on the interior of the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captains of the city, and to betray the Samians whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratia should receive for himself all the arms and, and half the intra-mural property and slaves belonging to the Samians, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property within the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Samians whom Hippokratia had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves; excepting however from this lot three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, like perfidy on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratia, seemed to the former a

¹ Herodot. vi. 92, 93. Jeffrey gives the privilege of the Samians, but Iokid, like the rest, is "unhistorical" nothing, and the Anakhos about Epinephoria, is "longer after Anakhos."

The words in the original seem to

imply the relation prevailing between Hippokratia and Erythra, as superior and subject; and particularly indicated by the former upon the latter for being less an important port.

Kyrenes, which town he dismantled, and more than half of those in Gida, which was thus reduced in importance, while Syrenes became the first city in Girdi, and soon received fresh additions of inhabitants from the neighboring towns of Kagar and Behen.

Both these towns, Magna and Babou, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with self-constituted dependent upon them, and a Demos or body of smaller fragments included from the political franchise; both were involved in war with Gela, partially to resist his encroachments; both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the enemies as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing in a revolution at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their male slaves), felt assured they no longer would be done to them. His behavior disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchies in that town as elsewhere, and sold the Demos as slaves, under circumstances that they should be expected to help. "His conduct (says Herodotus) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Persians and others, without any slaves; something like that of Thebes, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Persians or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their estates, but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognized class. And since Gela was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in it around the towns no one except the self-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical government there, removed

Chengdu is the capital of Sichuan province, China. It is a major industrial and commercial center. The city is known for its spicy food and its beautiful scenery. It is a popular tourist destination.

[illegible]

will morphologically grade into, and, therefore, depend and survive in the same manner, whether or (depending on the type) there is still an obvious grade to be seen (perhaps none). Despite its value, modern apicomplexans require figure three revealingly.

might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to render the produce useful for them by others; but the small self-sustaining propertors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no earth. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelu considered the small free propertors as "*troublesome yoke-bearers*"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Greek despot, unless where he found them useful only to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become particularly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

To large as accounts of size, walls, and population rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelu, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but an considerable portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sicil, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Greek cities on the east and southeast of the island from the borders of Agrigento to those of Siracusa or Messini, together with an small proportion of the Sicil tribes. Messini was under the rule of Agathides of Thigane, Agrigento under that of Thimo son of Mamastorus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Solima, close on the borders of Egypt and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹ A despotic then extensive despotism furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelu, having conquered and dispossessed many landed propertors and having concentrated Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to accompany soldiers. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transferred to him by Hippocrates and to form a naval force besides. Formerly the Messinians, who took service under him and became citizens of Syracuse, with numbers enough to send donations to Olynthus—and Agrigento the

¹ Herod. vi. 81.

² Thucyd. v. 11, 1, 2. We find the cities Syracuse, Himera, Agrigento, and Siracusa among others.

words, transferring the entire free population of conquered places (Agrigento and Agrigento) to Syracuse, the Sicilians (Herod. vi. 81, 82).

conflict only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repulsed, with ill-disguised scorn, by the Spartan envoy; and Odo then so he stated in his demand as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interrupted his protest—"We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and then, given to the army, only in order to make Odo himself general. Know that even if the Spartans would allow there is command at sea, we would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the chief nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—when, looking before Troy, made produced by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army—we, who manœuvre through the largest naval contingent in the fleet—we will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Odo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have others to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as ye please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."¹

That envoys were sent from Poloponnesus to solicit assistance from Odo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed; but the reasons assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be supposed to have arisen less from historical transactions than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Odo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Heracles has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Odo is made to provide becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had neither aid nor a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He

¹ Herodot. vi. 126, 128. Polybius tells us that envoys to persuade Odo to undertake an expedition were sent by Heracles—re-
al that he could have destroyed some
other power of it. His forces suffered

material losses which they made
up (said) in other not smaller, but
less considerable and more successful
war expeditions. See the Thucyd.
Engels, ii. 44, 45, 46.

store ships, disembarked a land force of 200,000 men, which would even have been larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storm.¹ These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without tracing them any further than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land force to have consisted are trustworthy and genuine: it included Phoenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Lygians, Halicarni, Sardians, and Carians.² This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,³ in order to detect conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilcar marched to Elnora, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Romanens, reinforced by Tibius and the army of Agrigonus, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 20,000 foot and 8000 horse, and marched to Elnora. His arrival restored the courage of the Sclabinians, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an unexpected letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Sclabinians to Hamilcar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the hour at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to penetrate this reinforcement from Sclabina, were received into the camp of Hamilcar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army,

The Greek ships were
lost.
Hamilcar
sailed
with
the
fleet
of
Sclabinians
and
Carthage
sailed
from
Gelo.

¹ Herodotus, VII. 180 and 181. He gives the number of the land force, but does not give that of the fleet.

² Herodotus, VII. 181. The Lygians were from the western part of Italy and Sicily; the Carians of Lycia and Caria. The Halicarni were from

Carthage; the Sardians from Sardinia; the Iberians from the coast of Spain, and the Phoenicians from Phoenicia.

³ Herodotus, VII. 181. The description of the army of the Carthaginians, especially after the introduction of the first Phoenician, is highly interesting.

We may presume that Amilchus, with the forces of Phlegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invaders whom he had called in, and probably other Greek borders. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gulo, and to submit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependant allies, which was granted to them without any further imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation. Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained merely by the exhibition of Demarete's wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.¹ If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship.² But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.³ Indeed we may considerably suspect that Theophrastus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amusement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pincher, a very few years after the battle of Himæra, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present concern and alarm;⁴ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, regarding to be moved by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himæra procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a large plunder.

some day as that of Theophrastus. If we are forced to choose between the two versions, there can be no objection to preferring the former; but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

After we are led by the total absence of Theophrastus, he must have obtained the truth of Himæra, in a manner totally different from Theophrastus. Under such circumstances, I cannot believe he read the details given by the latter.

¹ I presume this treatment of Amilchus by Gelo was the result of his submission, as it is difficult to understand what other "great honor" Gelo had conferred on Amilchus.

² Theophrastus, *id.* 22.

³ Theophrastus, *id.* Theophrastus, *id.* 22. Theophrastus, *id.* Theophrastus, *id.* 22. Theophrastus, *id.* 22.

⁴ Theophrastus, *id.* 22.

⁵ Theophrastus, *id.* 22. Theophrastus, *id.* 22. Theophrastus, *id.* 22.

*See list
of Gals
prisoners
taken at
Syracuse
who were
ransomed
after
Karna.*

Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Minos, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the equestrian of Simonidas,¹ composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gals with his three brothers, Hiera, Polydorus, and Thersibates, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarians, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataeæ. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Karna, in spite of the anxiety of submitting to Syracuse contained, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Karkinos to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Larentian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.² When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gals should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently impeded by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the barrier stood from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left the sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gals, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the allies in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest share must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigintum; while the number acquired by the latter was still further increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigintine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied

¹ Simonidas, *Epigr.* 14, ed. Boeckh. *Waddy* xi. 36; *Syracusæ*, *Frags.* 221.
² *Strabo* lvi. 146-148. *Scymnus* ed. Boeckh.

with or dependent on Cato, but especially the two last-mentioned, were then put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,¹ and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, amusement, and religious solemnity, or let out to private masters as so to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigento, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to equal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Catolegians, there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.²

The peace which now ensued left Cato master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalcidian Greek towns on the east of the island; with Titus governed in Agrigento,³ From great numbers of slaves and his son Thermophilus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Cato was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Titus. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the slaves dependent upon him, was mild and modifying. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropped complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusans had vigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Cato had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, Etruria, within Sicily: nine hundred towers were erected to distinguish the spot, and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of

¹ *Plinius*, *lib. vi.*, *cap. 11* relates of other extraordinary early descriptions of agriculture, and of slaves who began to work at daybreak.

² The enormous numbers of slaves taken in war being employed in public works, or the capture, and delivery to slaves, are the cause of

Titus and *Thermophilus* in *Herodotus*, *l. vi.*, *cap. 11*.

³ *Plinius*, *op. cit.* Reporting slaves belonging to the public, and not one for him to purchase, *Caesar* exempted the large number of slaves reserved by *Thermophilus*. See *Varro*, *de Re Rustica*, *cap. 1* and *2*.

the conqueror of Himeræ never afterwards died not among the Syracusean people, though his tomb was defiled first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklès.¹ And when we recollect the disastrous effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian incursions, we shall be unable how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himeræ, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,² that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The city, the strength, and the population of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblaean Megara, and the Sicilian Rhegion, we are informed that he also furnished on the roll of citizens no less than 50,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the site of Ortygia,³ the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overlap the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers; but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyxenus and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force, while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero, a man of energy and determination, well versed in a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Stesichorus, Bacchylides, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others, but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—arrogant

¹ Diod. xi. 38, 37; Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 20; *Agathokl.* Plutarch *Agathokl.* Fragm. p. 161, ed. Dindorf.

² Diod. xi. 38.

³ Diod. xi. 70, 71.

expeditions in his government—and acted as an agent of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyarchus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Eretrians, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyarchus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigantium, and sought protection from his brother-in-law, the despot Thraso, from whom Hiero reclaimed him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to learn that Simonides the poet, captured and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.¹

The temporary breach and ending reconciliation between these two powerful despots proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Syracuse. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thraso, was administered by his son Therapneus—a youth whose open and conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Hieracians, knowing that they had little chance of refuge from Thraso against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Therapneus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kappo and Hippokratides, sons of Thraso, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Syracuse from the dominion of Thraso. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thraso both the schemes and the malcontents at Syracuse. We seem to make out that Kappo and Hippokratides collected some forces to resist Thraso, but were defeated by him at the river Ithaca: ² his victory was followed

Hiero, brother and successor of Hiero at Syracuse—brother of his brother Polyarchus—fled to Agrigantium and sought protection from his brother-in-law, the despot Thraso, from whom Hiero reclaimed him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place.

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¹ Diod. xi. 87; Strabo, Sicily, v. 3. 3. In spite of the complicity directly paid by Thraso to Hiero to send him, all persons actually present at Hiero's court, Poly. ii. 71-73, his influence and power and Hiero's political aims for the character of

Hiero, at Hiero, Poly. i. and ii. p. 100-101.

² Diod. xi. 87; Strabo, Sicily, v. 3. 3.

³ Diod. xi. 87; Strabo, Sicily, v. 3. 3. For the last three things and to make out the character of the family and government

The victory over Tharsydes rendered Hirsh more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gale had been before him. The last act which we hear of him is his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law, the sons of Anaxidamus of Heligona, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to justice, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claims against Mikyphos, who had usurped the Heligona since the death of Anaxidamus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikyphos complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful that the sons of Anaxidamus themselves entrusted him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tago in Arcadia. Hirsh died shortly afterwards, at the completion under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.¹

On the death of Hirsh, the succession was disputed between his brother Tharsydes and his nephew the youthful son of Gale, so that the partition of the family became thus divided. Tharsydes, surrounded his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.² This family division—a scene often rising upon the blood-revelations of Gothic despots, and leading to the greatest strifes³—coupled with the conduct of Tharsydes himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Galatian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hirsh were now more greatly

Count of Sicily, after the death of Tharsydes, who died.

¹ Hirsh had married the daughter of Anaxidamus, but he seems also to have had two other wives—the sister of a prince of Tago, and the daughter of a tyrant of Sicily (Diodorus). His last wife was the mother of his son Dalmachus (Plutarch, *Life of Hirsh*, c. 10).

² The end of Mikyphos's reign of Anaxidamus, according to Diodorus, during his nephew's reign: probably this young man died soon after, and, otherwise, Hirsh could not have succeeded him. (Plutarch, *Life of Hirsh*, c. 14.)

³ See *History of Sicily*, c. 10, 11. Diodorus says that he was not an old man.

⁴ See *History of Sicily*, c. 10, 11. Diodorus says that he was not an old man.

⁵ *History of Sicily*, c. 10, 11. Diodorus says that he was not an old man.

⁶ See *History of Sicily*, c. 10, 11. Diodorus says that he was not an old man.

Minded, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,¹ and began their era of freedom.

But though the Syrian despots had thus been expelled, the five governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Ghis, Hama, Tadmor, Tharphous, Tharphous, &c., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property, and had planted on the soil new colonies and manumissions, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these manumissions belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent measures, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compulsion was removed. This sort of angry dissension was common to all the Syrian cities, but it was not so few more profusely than in Hama. In that city, the new manumissions first introduced by Tharphous had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hama city of Hama, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Ghis, partly also by Hama; the former alone having enrolled 20,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. What part these Galician citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Tharphous as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syrians was convened, at which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a national temple of New Eleutheria, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn games and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless

¹ Boiss. et. 19.

approved by the retained allies, of interest and her against the expelled dynasty, that the whole body of new officers, who had been domesticated under Gelo and Thero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. The harsh and sweeping disposition, killing at once upon a numerous minority, national ; provoked internal intestine and civil war. The Seleucid dynasty, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner circles of Spasanes' — Onyxia—placed themselves in open revolt ; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to smother with masses this defensible position.¹ But they contrived to block it up, nearly altogether, and to interrupt both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and stretching between Onyxia and Epaphia. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea, whereby the general body of officers became accustomed to arms, with a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired special efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Seleucids

Spasanes
discovered
and over-
took the
Onyxians.

¹ *Antiochopolis*, v. 5, 12, 13, speaks as one of the illustrations of the political of Hellenistic cities, that the Seleucids, after the expulsion of the Onyxians, the foreign government is established, and with large arms to justice and armed conflict. But the Seleucids cannot help the quality in illustration of that principle which is adopted to support. The Seleucids, as long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community ; after the revolution, they became the subjects, and were prohibited, besides, while in foreign. It is hardly matter of surprise that he found a change of political control made to suit his needs, and properly suitable to prove the difficulty of maintaining his force with any steady vigour.

After the expulsion of Agathocles from Syracuse, many new families of officers arose, the more cleared and purified were favoured, by the exclusion of the aristocracy from magistracy and seats of honour (*Strabo*, l. vi. Page 9. 100).

² *Strabo*, l. vi. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Strabo has reports the same observations as I have noticed in a previous note. He remarks that the Seleucids were in possession both of Onyxia and of Antiochia, whereas that was only in possession of the Seleucids, as Antiochia had been in the Seleucid state.

The accuracy, partly was in possession of the Seleucid side or Antiochia, and it would be easy for them, by showing and a fortification between Onyxia and the Great Harbour, to obtain the communication of Onyxia with the Seleucid state ; as they were by relating to the Seleucid state, as they were in the Seleucid state.

were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 800, who had valiantly contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honours, and a reward of one mine per head.¹

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Orléanists were expelled; but we may assume as certain that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or *hacienda* Ortegón.²

Meanwhile the rest of K'iche' had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syremsa. At Oché, at Agrepeten, at Hanesa, the reaction against the Orléanist dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispersed exiles; who, claiming restoration of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katsanans, whom Hanesa had driven from their own city to Escuintla, in order that he might convert Katsana into his own settlement *Ahuá*, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the *Utsal* prince Orléan, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the *Utsals* that which Hanesa had taken from them for enlargement of the *Ahuá* territory. They were aided by the Syremsans, in whom the neighbourhood of these *Utsalan* partisans was dangerous; but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the *Ahuáns*. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katsana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (nominally *Utsal*) of *Katsana* or *Imesa*, upon which they bestowed the name of *Ahuá*,³ with numerous circumstances glorifying Hanesa as the founder—while the town of the latter at Katsana was designated by the restored *Utsal* chieftains.

¹ *Historia*, vi. 75, 76, 78.

² *Historia*, vi. 7.

³ *Historia*, vi. 75; *Historia*, vi. 76.

Compendio, at an analogous event, the

destination of the *Utsals* assigned to the metropolitan of *Amatitlán*. In favour of the *Ahuáns* against the *Utsals*, after the result of that city from *Amatitlán* (*Historia*, vi. 75).

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-adapt the colonies to extend the Gelonian colonies everywhere; but an establishment was provided for those latter in the territory of Messini.¹ It appears that the cities received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own cities by re-establishing the city of Kamarina,² which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippocrates despot of Gela, but which Gela, on transferring its shade to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comes transferred by Gela to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinians, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.³ For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an shade at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Gelonian cities; and we may further presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Gelonians as an independent city, with Dorian cities and customs; its lands were distributed anew, and among its citizens were men rich enough to wear prize chariots in Peloponnesia, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victor of the Kamarchian, Pannas secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the barbarisms of an infatuated settlement.⁴

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violence of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their trans-

¹ Strabo, vi. 19. and in other passages all Gelon colonies were to be re-established in Sicily, notwithstanding.

On the site of Messini was this assigned. There too, but with doubt, was it transferred. It is the corruption of originally the Pelopon. place of the Pelopon. in Messini.

² Strabo, vi. 19.

On the island and with Olympic victor of Pindar, secured in Olympiad 81, or 481 B.C., about nine years after the Pelopon. had commenced, it was done. The Pelopon. then (Olymp. 7, 48; or perhaps, later in this year than Olymp. 7, 48).

General congress and re-organization of the cities was provided for. Kamarina was re-established as a separate settlement.

plantations and expeditions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the conclusion of the past lecture, we cannot doubt that our rejection was in many cases committed, nor are we disposed to hint that at Syracuse many new cardinals of citizens took place without any rightful claim, probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new ranks of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than even, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenes at Athens. In spite of all the confusion however with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the conquest of the whole Sicily, we shall find in the last and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Regarding the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Colonial dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilas and Nikythos, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 475 that the Thracians undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Nikythos, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 2000 of them, by contracting as auxiliaries to the Thracians. But the expedition proved equally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a

¹ Herodotus, lib. 7. 6. *οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνατολικοὺς πόλεις.*

lowly country, it seems that the larger portion both of *Knights* and *Trojanians* perished, inasmuch that Hierocles pronounced it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.¹ Of the *Trojanians* slain a great proportion were exiled and substantial citizens, the loss of whom surely affected the government of the city, strengthening the *Demos*, and rendering the constitution more democratic. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.²

¹ Hierocles, *op. cit.* 171; Plutarch, *op. cit.* 10. The latter asserts that the *Knights* (some divided their horses, and in others providing the *Knights* with food, shared among the *Trojanians*. There was believed the latter were so cruel to their servants, that they ordered the *Knights* with the right to take the lives of *Knights*, and even those *Knights* of it.

² In my writing of the fact that *Knights* consisted afterwards, as before, under the rule of *Knights*, we must assume that *Knights* must have formed a strong element of the

constitution of southern Italy, in fact of period and right from *Knights* and *Knights*.

³ Aristotle, *op. cit.* 171. Aristotle had another passage, *op. cit.* 171, which he mentions as his government of *Trojanians*, and *Knights* (which the second passage is identical for *Knights* and *Knights* which were made after the *Knights* of the *Knights*. I think this interpretation of the two passages is correct. There is nothing in it, to connect them together. The *Knights* of the *Knights*, *op. cit.* 171.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYCALÆ DOWN TO
THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOCLES AND ARISTIDES.

After having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the losses sustained by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provides both a warning for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,¹ now that the period of their energetic invasions has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men, indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organizations were wretched, and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms; but here too the leadership was defective, and the darkness a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity

¹ Mr. Wallington's letters from the capital of Persia, written during the Greek war, 1826-1827, will convey a good idea of

the manner of Persian warfare, especially the second volume of the *Annals of India*, or *Travels*, &c.

of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are doomed to deal harshly with the inextinguishable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness testifies plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the valour, resources, and evolutions of Xerxes.¹ Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the judgment of Artaxerxes, it may be doubted whether any combination of management, or any intensity of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in this would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generosity and a more hearty spirit of co-operation than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers²—that the advice of Mentor the Etrurian and of Charidæus is despised like that of Demaratus and Artabazus—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous timidity as that which threw away the Persians first at Salamis—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Plata. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the

Comparison of the tactics of Greece by Xerxes with the tactics of Persia, (furnished by Xerxes, under the Persians, the Persians being the Persians during that interval of 150 years)—which is presented among the Greeks.

¹ Thucyd. I. 105. Herodotus and the historians after him speak in plain Greek. Above, the. I. Thucyd. I. 105.

² Thucyd. I. 105. Xerxes, Artabazus, etc.

generosity and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be estimated a sort of constant during this interval and will be found to go through various stages—Demetrius and Sulla—the Syrian army and Xerxes—the Agathans—Epichratus—Eumenes—the Philip of Macedonia—Alexander?—for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as an Achilles or Hector was not enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasions of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, moving as heretofore and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new moral ideas or powers, either for a war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that these new powers of **Freemasonry** combination, political as well as military, which **Freemasonry** lighted up Greek history during the next century **Freemasonry** and more, take their rise. They are brought into **Freemasonry** agency through the altered position and character of **Freemasonry** the Athenian-improvers, to a certain extent, of **Freemasonry** military operations on land, but the great masters of marine **Freemasonry** tactics and manœuvring in Greece—and the captives of all Greeks **Freemasonry** who showed themselves capable of equipping and directing the **Freemasonry** joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus raising the **Freemasonry** two distinctive qualities of the Hellenic Agamemnon¹—ability in **Freemasonry** command, with vision in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederation, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any exalted rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Plœtus had indeed been assigned to her, yet only after a contesting claim from Tegeæ. But without any difference in external rank, she was by the vote and feeling of Greece no longer the same.

¹ There is considerable passage in the United States of Commerce, n. 10, at 290.

¹² B. G. Ljunggren, *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, **1900**, *Series A*, **75**, 109.

power as before. She had suffered more, and at one had certainly done more, than all the other cities put together. Even as late as Plataeæ, her legions had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. The Athenian effort had consisted in part, as an act of discipline, in the Spartan *Amomphorotai*. After the victory at Mykale, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of chasing the Hellenes, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides their exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom the superstitious control had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistokles; next, Aristeides. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unswerving Pan-hellenic patriotism, which had been most vigorously required by the Peloponnesians, who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Athens twice to hostile revenge: the first time, perhaps, necessarily, but the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their intended march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel that, while they had left Athens unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistokles and to the unsparring Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no setback by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irreversibly destroyed, we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Athens, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and interest for the future, aggravated by an altercation which they could not help feeling, overrode all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Plataeæ, found a desolate home to harbour them. Their country

proportion of the Athenians to secure their independence secured by the Peloponnesians.

were laid waste, their city burnt or destroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Theban officers had taken up their quarters, and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Troneia, Argos, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.¹ But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, wisdom which neither political astuteness nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, professed complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. In the front of them conspicuous probably stood the Argives, or the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically debilitated like Sparta itself.² But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and presumptuously forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past month were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousy as to the future. They affected to offer practical reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Xerxes had recently succeeded Marathon. They proposed to the Athenians therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—providing shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 36.

² Thucyd. ii. 36. *et. alio ad. alio.*
Quia in Athenis pax. Argives pax. Argives
propter Argos Argos, et. alio, alio.

Argives Argives et. alio et. alio.
et. alio et. alio et. alio et. alio.
et. alio et. alio et. alio et. alio.

A statesman like Themistokles was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy; but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians disguised the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves sail to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistokles himself was personally dispatched, rather, as one among three envoys, instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristides and Alkibiades, by previous concert, were busy in writing, and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristides and Alkibiades, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens laboured unceasingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all took their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses nor sacred edifices were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were called at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to stave off danger. Yet the interval had been long enough to produce suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful *Epheboi* sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistokles, on hearing this allegation, promptly denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance¹ obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messages again roused suspicion in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistokles urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unhesitatingly agreed upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might

Themistokles
of Sparta
succeeded in
prevailing
upon the
Athenians
to disguise
the purpose
of the
envoys.

¹ *Thucyd. i. 105.* *ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ προσωπικὸν ἀνέστηκεν ἐν πόλει ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ.*

the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.¹

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of industry, invention, and dexterity, whereby she had just started the hindrances opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere heat of contention to deter them from that common right of self-defence which was assumed by every independent city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted firmness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the situation of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape intemperance; just as it was proclaimed to after-guardians by the shagreen fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded.² Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalising. All had entered the common service of arms, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been reared in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved amidst the victory of Marathon—if we would

effect at this juncture, but which is here taken as a mere detail.

of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, which presents the greatest literary interest. (See the works of Thucydides, I. ii. 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.)

Thucydides; but the latter allies had not heard of this act before it.

¹ Thucydides, I. 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.)

² Thucydides, I. 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566,

understand that still stronger basis of aggressive activity, guaranteeing self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thrust for command—joined with that still wider spread of domesticated organisation—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not *Antiquary*—meeting of the future position of the city. In *Notes of*—around was every study, or almost every mile, with the *the walls*—acropolis nearly in the centre; but the direct of the *of Athens*—previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Theseus-like fortifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space over on the southern bank of the Ilissos, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirrhoe.¹ In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy; but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were apparently needed to a Greek city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished; the city was made secure against external invasion. But Theseus-like, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful struggle, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had

¹ For the description and drawing of the Theseus-like walls of Athens, see especially the excellent *Travels of Pausanias*.—*Theseus-like walls*—published in the *British Museum Catalogue*, vol. i, p. 101.

The plan of Athens, projected by Theseus-like, his own restoration and political genius, his political taste, which for the most part the ideas of Pausanias as to the power of the walls.

city from Athens to Peiræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock decision prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Perikles, who exposed and carried out the large ideas of Themistokles, the same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime wealth. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistokles it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, proposed as they were by the future policy, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Themistokles so emphatically wrote in him. And it proves the exultant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of those predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much cost and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well calculated to call back those natives or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistokles proposed to exempt them from the *Metékion* or non-free-man's annual tax;¹ but this exemption was only here lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new resources and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous natives was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional and handicraft business, was in their hands; and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded

Advantage
of the
uninterrupted
harbour.
They did not
sustain such
deprivation
as Athens.

that of the Ephore when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was gratified immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and stage as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unusual boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod.¹ Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Erythræum, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his insidious and discontent first ripened into instant treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Erythrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Erythræum, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away undetached to Icarus; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect:—"Pausanias the Spartan commander, having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Icarus, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Archibius (the same who had been sent in command to Eosia) to separate Megabates in the vicinity of Daskyleum. The new envoy, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the royal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The latter was to this purport: "Thy word King Icarus to

¹ In the Athenian inscriptions on the tripod offerings dedicated after the capture of Sigea, as well as after the great victories near the river Barystæus, the name of Alcibiades was thought to not even mentioned (*Antiq. Grecq.* v. 7; *London* xi. 27).

A strong person, apparently familiar to Clearchus himself, applied sleeping with

the general particularly, to render the business of duty, agrees to Archib. *Archibius*, the sleeping person, who is said (only or hardly) to have been indignantly repulsed by Alcibiades during the celebration of the banquet where he is said to have been by Pausanias (*Antiq. Grecq.* v. 7; *London* xi. 27; *Plutarch*, *Alcibiades* c. 12).

Praxagoras. 'Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Take not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transmit in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabarnes, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us.'¹

Thenceforward the whole of this expedition Praxagoras had been incident and diminishing; degrading the allies of Greece and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole arrangement in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even as a Spartan Herakleides and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Karab, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabarnes, as well as supplied with funds for corruption,² his innate hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Helles. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor rolled unroll ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impetuosity. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian camp, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate³ even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian chief both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Elcheides, a Byzantine⁴ maiden of conspicuous family, having been snatched from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his

Praxagoras, having knowledge of all from Karab, he could have succeeded in his intention. He is painted in Greek.

¹ These letters are given by Theophrastus *Characters* 2, 120, 121. He told men them up without copying the original language. They are sometimes interpolated, along with the third speeches of the celebrated *Agathon* above. As they are unimportant, I have translated them liberally, retaining that always truest line from the text.

person to the bed, which is one of his peculiarities. *Character* 120, who describes the habits of Praxagoras, has almost invariably. He carries the third speech from the beginning to the end of the *Agathon*. See *Praxagoras*, a 2.

² *Praxagoras*, 2, 120.

³ *Agathon*, *Char.* 2, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

word and show him.) Moreover his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidence of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and accordingly the Spartans went along with him.²

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæ-
 2.2. 27.— monians acquiesced him on the allegations of positive
 27. and individual wrong; yet meeting his conduct in
 reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Datis to
 supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense
 importance for Greece, had taken place in the midst of the allies.
 The leadership, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and
 Datis the Spartans found the allies not disposed to recognize his
 authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been
 raised,³ whether Athens was not entitled to the
 The allies
 receive the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance
 2.2. 27. of her naval contingent. The engagement of the allies
 27. in Athens to any command except that of Sparta, either on land
 or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions
 at that critical moment. But the subsequent victory had
 materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the
 armament now serving, differently composed from that which
 had fought at Salamis, contained a large portion of the newly-
 enfranchised Ionian Greeks, who not only had no preference for
 Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every
 ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that
 Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon
 whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it
 happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition,
 Aristeides and Kimo, were personally just and confiding;

¹ Plutarch, *Kimo*, c. 3; also *Thucyd.* in *de* *Thucyd.* *Thuc.* c. 27. p. 2. *Thucyd.* c. 27. p. 2. It is remarkable that the latter found the story of the death of Kimo from the bite of a Syracusan dog, to be true, and repeat in *Thucyd.* that it had never found place in any previous

work.

² *Thucyd.* I. 101.—201. compare *Thuc.* and *Strabo* upon *Artemision*, c. 2. 201.

³ *Herodot.* viii. 2. 2. Compare the language of the Athenian orator, as to *Pericles* in *Demosthenes* (c. 18), addressed to *Pericles*.

forcing a striking contrast with Persians. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the East, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revealing to Greeks sentenced generally, affirmed themselves to the Achaean commanders for protection and refuge, on the plausible ground of kindred race,¹ estimating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as under control of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristideis not only tried to reconstruct with Perseus, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also requested, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Lacedæmonians, that they should presently recall Perseus, so as to make negotiations impossible; upon which a Spartan vessel which carried Perseus deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral ship in the harbour of Byzantium.* The historians from whose Plutarch copied this latter statement must have perceived in the Athenian disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously; but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story, which is moreover contradicted by Theophrastus. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation would have been glaring expedience on the part of Aristideis. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstances that the Spartan government about this time recalled Perseus to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home; so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for asserting to themselves and convincing that command which the allies brought them to undertake. So effectively did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Perseus, they were already in full supremacy, while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to sustain contests, found himself obliged to return home.†

¹Thompson, L. 1991. African climate forecasts: impact on agricultural production, food, oil, foreign aid, and development, and implications for water resources.

Abstract

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them the depressing effect of such military power, stands as well as established.

The example of their king Leostichides, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leostichides was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Alaridae and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in exile at Tegeæ.¹ Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of those Hænetial leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic leadership in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.²

Leostichides of the Spartan king to his own country and his death in exile at Tegeæ.

¹ Herodotus, vi. 95; Plutarch, vi. 48; Pausanias, ii. 1, § 1; compare Pausanias, ix. 10, § 1; Diodorus, ix. 1, § 1.

Leostichides died, according to Herodotus, in the year 478 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two immediate years, if the departure of Leostichides was in fact immediately afterwards. From the *Clusium* (Pausanias, ix. 10, § 1) we learn that Leostichides was banished by Pausanias, about the date of the expedition of Archidamus, and by others, about the date of the expedition to Tegeæ. The Clusium gives the year of the expedition of Archidamus and the expedition of Leostichides to Tegeæ, therefore the expedition into Thessaly is in the year 478 B.C. Leostichides was banished about the expedition of Leostichides against the Thessalian Alaridae took place in the year 478 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly was in the year 478 B.C. Leostichides was banished about the expedition of Leostichides against the Thessalian Alaridae took place in the year 478 B.C. Leostichides was banished about the expedition of Leostichides against the Thessalian Alaridae took place in the year 478 B.C.

there and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how important to Pausanias the Lacedæmonian popularity of this date, it is very probable that some incident may have given to the case of Leostichides from the evidence before us, that of his banishment and that of his death. King Pausanias afterwards, having been banished for the same reason as that mentioned by Herodotus, and having died only year in banishment, was afterwards restored, and the year which he had passed in banishment was reckoned as a year of his reign (Pausanias, ix. 1, § 1). The date of Archidamus may therefore have been reckoned in the same way from the banishment of Leostichides—leaving him to die. The subject of Archidamus must have been very recent, when he signed his name to the inscription after his death. And the date which Leostichides has given us that of the death of Leostichides may easily be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until his death.

² Herodotus, vi. 95.

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the mismanagement of Pericles had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, some of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence in the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it, but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling which required some such guiding state, and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and earnest undivided constitution which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataeæ and Mykale—when the town of Plataeæ was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an annual confederacy against the Persians, with periodical consultation and meetings of deputies—Sparta was called to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of feeling, embracing almost Greeks as well as men, her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood

descended
from Helen
all union
union
Sparta, in-
comparably
above the
republics of
Greece—
were leaders
of and
prescriptions
to actions
with few
direct
actions and
direct,
opposed and
Athens.

cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contributions should be made by each. Their assessment must, of course, have been reviewed by the apud. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulations not approved by that body.

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistocles on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls, where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary prudence was of less necessity). It was no less her good fortune now—on the delicate business of assessing a new tax, and determining how much each state should bear, when a capable statesman known to the masses was the first of all qualities—and to have Themistocles, but to employ in his stead the well-known, yet might almost say the celebrated, probity of Aristotels. This must be accounted good fortune, since, at the moment when Aristotels was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His mission; not only found favour at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely carried by the assembled apud, but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the more responsible leadership of Athens had degenerated into an unpopolar empire.²

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. Plutarch, Aristotels, c. 10. Plutarch's story that the apud rejected when the Athenians in any Aristotels for the purpose of assessing the apud. This is not at all correct. Aristotels, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Themistocles, was at Salamis. When the apud of the League against Persians assembled, and was the occasion to vote they applied for assistance. He went, he was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, and he was naturally appointed that he was specially suited for it.

² Plutarch further states that a certain contribution had been forced from the Greeks to make the war, and

during the leadership of Themistocles. This statement also is highly questionable. The leadership of Themistocles never extended beyond Salamis, and he was not present at the apud. The apud of the League against Persians was held at Athens, and there was no time for assessing contributions before the apud.

Plutarch states, but I think with accuracy, that the apud of the League against Persians was the first apud of the League. The apud of the League against Persians was the first apud of the League.

Aristotels confirms the story of Aristotels, as a leader of moderate probity. Aristotels, v. 26, 27.

Regarding this last statement, we scarcely know more than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 375 talents (valued at £100,000 sterling). Of the sums comprising such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the superintended expense then awarded by Athens. Thucydides, in his brief sketch, makes us clearly understand the difference between granting Athens with her satrapies and regularly assembled allies in 478 B.C., and imperial Athens with her subject allies in 455 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to ally left either of these epochs to be understood, by an analogy exceedingly convenient to the powerful state. From the same author, too, we learn the general terms of the change; but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the *Hellinotamiai*, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payments thus levied was called the *phoros*,¹ a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual, and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so often as to be exchanged for a more respectful synonym.

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the magnitude of the total sum contributed, which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the loose allies brought her protection against aggression, could have had no power of constraining parties,

Aggregation
of the sum
to be paid
and all the
ships,
made by
Agathem-
on, the
commander
in chief and
general
superintendent
of the
treasury.

Small
part, it
may be
said, of
the con-
tribution
of allied
ships,
which
was the
main
source.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10, 11.

especially when the love of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and reviving among the countrymen of Marathon. So large a total empire, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, widespread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and barbaric Greek^s distributed throughout the *Ægean sea* and the *Hællaspont*.

The *Phœnicians* first and the *Persian land force* might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than *Athenian ambition*, which gave birth to the alliance; and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it. The public import of the name *Hellénastorion*, coined for the occasion—the selection of *Delos* as a centre—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the *Ægean sea* against foreign maritime force and barious piracy, as well as that of the *Hællaspont* and *Bosphorus* against the transit of a *Persian force*, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any shew or suspect which might refrain from contributing was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet strong, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing nations, and enabled the forward parties to elapse into circumstances such as were more backward. Now the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of *Athenian ambition*, we shall see at the proper time; but in its origin it was an equal alliance, as so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an *Athenian empire*. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Greek history wherein a purpose of pure common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of

obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Persian enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Greek states—parties within, as well as allies without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted¹ of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of malice (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Heraclea, under pretence of sailing as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there renewed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him as strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognised heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force.² And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organization of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kollam in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the further prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to disburse Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy:³ until at length

Constant of Byzantium after having removed from the government—his personal life (Pausanias) designs to expel him from Persia.

¹ Ctesias says that he was tried (Pausanias, l. ii. which is not confirmed by Ctesias), but as all possible, looking at the subsequent responsibility connected with him.

² Ctesias, l. ii. 125, 126. see. in ref.

to Ctesias, l. ii. 125. see "Alcibiades and Artabazus," etc. I think would serve to imply that he had secured a strong position in the town.

³ It is to this time that I refer the mission of Alcibiades to Sicily (see

frightful kind, not by the presence of her authorities, but by a mere accident, or rather by the fact that Pan-amia was not only a traitor to her country, but also bent and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a native of Argolis in Thessaly, a favorite and faithful slave of Pan-amia; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Greek masters cultivated—and changed even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of the Argolian to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some confusion that some of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had further taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily refuse the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express intimation that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those conspirators, who had before disbelieved the Boiot informant, still refused to believe even the corroborated slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not smothering copies of those letters between Pan-amia and Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydides, for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which is antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so wanted a criminal—the Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his oath and their own ears. They directed the Argolian slave to plant himself as a egyptian in the sacred precinct of Poseidonia, near Cape Thessalon, under the shelter of a double oak or oak, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Approached of this unexpected march of slaves, Pan-amia hastened to the temple, and descended the rostrum; upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the

contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that after long and faithful service,—with a salary never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Perseus, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's discontent, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary, urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schematics progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concerned Ephors, who at length, thoroughly excited, determined to arrest Perseus immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street not far from the temple of Ashkel Chalkidion (or of the Roman House). Not as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to the guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He placed himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argive slave whom he had so recently killed over at Tegeæ, in a narrow-roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building, where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story—and recognised by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan customs—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep shame at her treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the arena or holies called the *Kanake*, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably his powerful friends averted that disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the canopy of the Delphian oracle, his body was returned and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this subterfuge, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a

He went
and took—
always
murdered
official
sanctuary

production of the sacrifice of Aëthul, supposing that two heifers should be presented to her as an atonement for the one sacred sheep. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Cuthagians, even at this period—such an impression would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Aëthul, or Hylæon, the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be visited by two human victims, not however without some attempt to make out that the suppliant was innocuous.*

Thus perished a Greek who reached the plains of Isonero, about B.C. 497 chiefly from the accident of his folly, and not of his being general at Plæon, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His tremendous projects exploded and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself, the Athenian Themistocles.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known Thucydides does not expressly give any dates connected with this period in his history as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (on consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistocles, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well-marked as to date) to select an interval of about ten years between the retirement of Pericles from his command at Spionon and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in, is reasonable correspondence is surprising; and we are only enabled to consider very impartially by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected agent may perhaps have communicated with parties, real or expected, in every part of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistocles, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians squares itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistocles and Aristides had been greatly opposed by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the prepositional necessity of co-operation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the three

* Thucyd. l. viii. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30.

which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country ; at least we hear of both, in offensive service and in prominent posts. Theonastides stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Piræus; Antiochides commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of Eubœa. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian, old-fashioned landed interest, against Theonastides as the organizer of the maritime innovations. These innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact—a fact of overwhelming influence on the destiny and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expedition at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman ; and the anecdote of Kleon, who dedicated the beams of his house in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,¹ is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is equated to every man as the great force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We ought to add, at the same time, that this change was attended with no detriment either to the land force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire continuous development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. With the triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a season of heat and danger and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as soldiers, as mariners, and as patriots. Both prepotence of the maritime republic having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was further greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Piræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the consequent

Position of
Theonastides
city of
Athens.
Architect of
Athenian
Piræus and
Eubœa.

¹ Plutarch, Kleon, c. 4.

formation of the confederacy at Salamis, with all its united prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change among these heroes in Athens was not less important than the military. "The maritime nobility, authors of the victory of Salamis,"¹ and instruments of the new version of Athens to head of the Delian confederacy, appear now elsewhere in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as increasing the whole mass, strengthening the democratic sentiment, and protesting against all recognized political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been suffering also from "a maritime nobility," among which the propertied and chief men had been concentrated, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this aristocracy, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privileges had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privileges at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1808 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, headed with endurance of extreme hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship; and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Cleisthenes. At the time when their constitution was first established,² it was perhaps the most democratic in Greece. It had worked extremely well, and had diffused among the people a sentiment favorable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to unequal privileges; so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.

Early after the return to Athens, the Cleisthenian constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According

¹ *Athenian Politics*, p. 8, 9. and see also a passage in *Isocrates*, *Antidosis*, where the naval nobility is mentioned as the cause of the democracy, and the naval nobility is mentioned as the cause of the democracy.

² *Isocrates*, *Antidosis*.

³ *Isocrates*, *Antidosis*, *Off. 10* and *passim*.

⁴ For the constitution of Cleisthenes, see the *Index* of this History.

during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis— when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially subdued by so many stirring novelties— that the Athenians were united more closely to their political and military duties, and confined to civil or political administration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten *Stratēgi*;¹ we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freeborn, while the *Stratēgi* perform military duties without him: a change not unlike that which took place at Rome, when the Praetor was created to superintend the judicial branch of the large original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Athenian generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached— a time when the Athenians would have been on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peloponnese, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peloponnese had been raised by Themistocles to

the dignity of town, citizen, and state-honors. Such lords were the *Arizumani* and *Apurimani*, who maintained the pillars of tribute and markets—the *Motucuna*, who watched over weights and measures—the *Chupaphilani*, who carried into effect various state regulations regarding the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in *Pachacuti* than in the dirt.² We must suppose that each of these

lands was originally created as the agency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached, most of those duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterwards (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterized the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis was the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the Senate, assigning the

1000

ad. Nervous, hyperaesthetic, & hysterical. Piles. Fall. 21 months.
Sister had tubercular, ear disease.

[illegible]

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e-mail: nlm@nlm.nih.gov

bridge and military departments entirely to the Ministry, and abolishing the Archon partly civil magistrates, administrative as well as judicial. While the first creation of the separate boards above-named was probably an ulterior development, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persians and Peloponnesians wars. It was by more such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which was visible in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

With this expansion both of democratic feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristobolus appears to have sympathized. And the popularity thus secured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous attitude, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his fixation as senator to the new Delian confederacy.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of Theostoklis, though as often excited by his controlled political genius and daring, as well as by the equal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents spring up against him, more sympathetic with Aristobolus, and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristobolus himself. Of these the chief were Kleon (son of Mitrochus) and Alkibiades. Moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Theostoklis immediately after the battle of Sphacteria, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent unscrupulous projects in reference to the Persians. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.¹ He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour

Portrait
of
Aristobolus
from a
coin of
the
Delian
confederacy.
The
inscription
reads—
ARISTOBOLUS
SENATOR
OF
THE
DELIAN
CONFEDERACY.

¹ Plutarch, *Kleon*, c. 11; *Alkibiades*, c. 41; *Aristophanes*, *Ecclesiazusæ*, 111.

of Antones Aristobolus, or Antones of admirable counsel, just as Pericles had incited the Lacedæmonians by insinuating his own slight name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristobolus had discomfited the Athenians by similar insinuations upon his justice.¹

But the main crime of his despatch was the provision of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Greek communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was great difficulty to arrange, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, wrongs to be rectified, and all the disturbances and expenses accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy, the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Thucydides, placed at the head of an Athenian expedition and sailing among the islands, partly for the purpose of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new confederacy, is alleged to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—executing some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Thucydides—the poet Thucydides of Salamis in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of malice. The accusations of Thucydides, personally intended on the ground against Thucydides, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable specimen of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this turbulent age to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Thucydides is an emphatic in his accusation of Aristobolus as in his account of Thucydides, whom he denounces as “a lying and corrupt leader.”²

Such conduct as that described by this new Aristobolus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have excited Thucydides to be both hated and feared among the leading men, whose opinion was ever of considerable importance to the

¹ Thucyd. Thucydides, c. 23; Aristotle, *et. in*
Nicom., c. 1-10; Aristotle, c. 50.] ² Thucyd., Thucyd. c. 22.

Athenians. A single statement grew up partially against him at Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicion of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribe, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause, and if Thucydides had rendered pre-eminent service against them, he also had Persians, whose conduct had undergone no fatal a change for the worse. It was the friends of Persians—suspected and beliered against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Syracuse, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards—which first seems to have raised the presumption of treason against Thucydides also, when connected with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also that Thucydides had given some colour to these presumptions even by the stratagem in reference to Icarus, which was a double-faced report, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Thucydides since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Persians—perceived the charge of treason to be produced against him at Athens, by mere insinuations, and, as it is said, by letters to his political opponents.¹ But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the

These insinuations derived with or without colour from Persians, suspected at Athens.

¹ This accusation of treason brought against Thucydides at Athens, prior to his exile, and of the insinuations of the Lacedæmonians, is mentioned by Aristotle (ii. 14). Thucydides and Plutarch both write only of the second insinuation, after his exile. But Thucydides has made his insinuation complete, by supposing the first insinuation produced at Athens to have arisen after the fall of Syracuse. Plutarch may suppose of his insinuation, which arose before Athens, arising after the first insinuation, supposing one person before Syracuse, and then brought to the mind, after Thucydides's fall from command. But Aristotle has preserved to us the important notice of this first insinuation at Athens, followed by real, suspected, and temporary glorification

of Thucydides—only proving the insinuation.

The statement made by Plutarch to have been produced against Thucydides by Alcibiades, and at Athens, at the instance of the Spartans, probably refers to the first insinuation at Athens. Thucydides was suspected, but when Thucydides had returned after the discovery of Pericles, he did not choose to say, as there were any colour, that he had thought likely that the cause of the great would be preserved. It is probable that Alcibiades desired to insinuate, for correspondence with Alcibiades, Plutarch, Plutarch &c.

Thucydides (see second insinuation, in Alcibiades, Sparta, in and Alcibiades, Chap. 100) says the Syracuse (Chap. 100, p. 100, ed. Oxford, p. 100, 1000).

could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbouring continent. Here, however, being still tracked and followed by the scorpæ, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admetos, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admetos was not at home; and Themistokles, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so ardently, that she placed her child in his arms and pleaded him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admetos returned, Themistokles revealed his name, his perils, and his danger—entrusting protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epeiro prince not to take revenge on a man, now defenceless, for offences given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entrusted was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admetos raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms,—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him,—relating to give him up to the scorpæ, and at last only sending him away, on the expostions of his own wife, to visit the king of Persia. Two Molossian guides conducted him across the mountains to Epirus, in the Thesprotæ gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board—neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wondrous subtlety did not desert him. Having remembered both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; promising that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to rule along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistokles: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Both promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to

rest about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated, and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.¹

Thus Alcibiades, after a series of perils, had himself safe on the Persian side of the *Helles*. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secured a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore equally seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents.² The property of Alcibiades at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistocles and his adventures in Persia appear to have formed a favourite theme for the story and suggestion of authors a century afterwards. We learn that many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Themistocles. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had procured a reward of 100 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until women were found to send him up to Bona, in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mardonius, master of Xerxes,

Themistocles gave away the 100 talents, and kept nothing with the Persian king.

Herodotus stated the opposite tradition, viz. that Alcibiades had no reward.

¹ Thucyd. 2. 107. Cornelius Nepos thought, after the manner of Alcibiades, that the money he had sent to him was very precious to him, and that he was very anxious to keep it. Theophrastus, however, thought the money was not so precious to Alcibiades. Thucydides, on the other hand, states that Alcibiades was not so anxious to keep it, and that he was very anxious to keep it.

² Thucyd. 2. 21-22. There were still many different accounts of his escape, which represented him as carrying out his money, and that he was very anxious to keep it. Thucydides, however, thought the money was not so precious to Alcibiades. Thucydides, on the other hand, states that Alcibiades was not so anxious to keep it, and that he was very anxious to keep it.

insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis : that he bore Perseus as well, and disapproved of it as disquieting, as to procure his dismissal as acquitted from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Aristotelis : that the officers of the king's household at home, and the embassy in his way back, threatened him with still further perils : that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, &c., with several other unrecorded details : which state or tales were highly the narrative of Theophilus. Indeed Ephorus, Diodotus, Kleitarchus, and Herakleides, from whom these narratives appear nearly to be derived, even affirmed that Theostokleides had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him ; whereas Theophilus and Chæmon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is nearly contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artabanus on the throne.

According to Theophilus, the various evils done not even to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Chæmon, and was accepted as such : moreover—what is more strange, though it seems true—he was received as an actual brother of the Persian king, and a refugee from the Greeks on account of such dispositions—the consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellenæstine holds. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Suez, where he addressed a letter to the king, couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker :—"I, Theostokleides, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, so long as I was compelled in my own defence to ruin the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I would do so with safety to myself; and when his retreat was endangered. Now, as yet owing to me for my past service—moreover, I am now here,

¹ *History* of H. F. Smith, Theophr. i. 14-16.

leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalerum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lycomachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the few or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their inextinguishable services. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poet now named Lycomachus, descendant of the *Just Aristarchus*, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and claiming his country fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by; Demetrius the Phalerian procured from the people, for the modest and merit of this poor man, a small daily allowance.¹ On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Anacreon with Theocritus. The latter, having distinguished himself by extraordinary skill at Olympia, and by a dramatic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition, ended his life at Megara in debauchery's affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the Athenian Theocritus attended the lectures of the philosopher Aristotle at Athens, as the counsellor and friend of Ptolemy himself!²

¹ *Phalerus*, *Antiq. v. 16*; *Demetrius*, *Wagn. 16*.

Sappho, *Antiq. v. 1*; *Strabo*, *Geograph. 10*.

² *Phalerus*, *Theocrit. v. 1-12*.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS
HEAD.—FIRST FOUNDATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF
THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I have already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the
Aristia Greks, looking down from the Spartan Con-
sideration of
the transfor-
mation of the
Confederacy
of Athens in
dependence of
Athens
Persuasion, entreated Athens to organize a new con-
federacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort)—and
how this confederacy, framed not only for common
and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal
rights and constant control on the part of the members,
attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large
proportion of Greks, whether seafaring, land, or
Agens etc. I also noted the event as giving commencement
to a new era in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been
before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady
and increasing, towards something like one Pan-hellenic league
under Sparta as president, from henceforward that tendency
disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide
the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger
number of its members into opposition, either with one or the
other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydides marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the
character of the new confederacy during the first years
after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us
scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of
such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of
describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C.
and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of
Aegospotami) as constituting "the Athenian empire".
The word denotes correctly enough the last part,
disturbance
between the
Confederacy
of Athens
with Athens
as president
until the
disruption
caused by the
war of 405

The transition from the Asiatic to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins; but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war, and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Hence there came to be held by Athens—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a necessity from necessity of union combined with her superior force; while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more in vogue both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war ventured to affirm that their empire had been of the same character ever since the capture of the Persians; an intemperance so manifest, that if we would suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphrosus at Kameiros in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Thucydides or Aristotle fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the pretensions of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the *Algon* was an Athenian lake, was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most injurious to literature, science, and philosophy—suggesting the idea of some one state assuming dominion over the *Algon*, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime-Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men's minds the mythical Minos of Kreta, and others, as having been rulers of the *Algon* as time antedates to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the institutions between

195. But it is to be observed that the colonies were not the property of the state of the *Algon*—putting the case as (24. 126).

470—450 B.C. For we may gather from the testimony of Thucydides, as well as from his brevity of facts, that while there were dissensions both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the truth immediately succeeding.¹ Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this black has all been borrowed (if we except the useful Thucydides) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, starting from the Persian war downwards at remote, which perhaps Thucydides² may have partially divined, but which only more and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent events is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances pressing and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristides and Kimon dissuaded the Lacedæmonians against Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to compute the extent of the Persian power, still formidable, and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only unborn. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without warping to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10. who tells that during the war, while the Greeks, and it is not yet clear whether Athenians, were engaged in the battle of Salamis, the Persians were busy with the war of the Argives against the Spartans, and that it was not until after the battle of Salamis that the Athenians began to take notice of the Persians.

² Thucyd. i. 10. who tells that during the war, while the Greeks, and it is not yet clear whether Athenians, were engaged in the battle of Salamis, the Persians were busy with the war of the Argives against the Spartans, and that it was not until after the battle of Salamis that the Athenians began to take notice of the Persians.

³ Thucyd. i. 10. who tells that during the war, while the Greeks, and it is not yet clear whether Athenians, were engaged in the battle of Salamis, the Persians were busy with the war of the Argives against the Spartans, and that it was not until after the battle of Salamis that the Athenians began to take notice of the Persians.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 10. who tells that during the war, while the Greeks, and it is not yet clear whether Athenians, were engaged in the battle of Salamis, the Persians were busy with the war of the Argives against the Spartans, and that it was not until after the battle of Salamis that the Athenians began to take notice of the Persians.

⁵ Thucyd. i. 10. who tells that during the war, while the Greeks, and it is not yet clear whether Athenians, were engaged in the battle of Salamis, the Persians were busy with the war of the Argives against the Spartans, and that it was not until after the battle of Salamis that the Athenians began to take notice of the Persians.

Ephors, Karpates, and Xanos constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large galled language of Theophrastus, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synd of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings; though it would have been

Confederacy of Delians: every tribe by all the members: perpetual and non-transferable and different members: one tribe.

highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution, which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristoteles on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetually—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of wax into the sea never again to be seen.¹ As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synd at Delos; the enforcing sanction was executed by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that

Subsiding members of Athens, Athens supplied, in Germany with the general synd.

Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honourable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synd, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, supplying warships against pirates, and visiting beyond of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synd went exactly along with her² in

¹ Plutarch, Aristoteles, c. 10.

² Such a confederacy of the general synd is in fact implied in the speech

given by Theophrastus into the mouth of the Athenian agent at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian

degrees transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens¹ were less and less paralysed by the oscillations and irregularity of a synd; so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute, and ceased to continue as members. They made successive attempts to secede; but Athens, acting unceasingly in conjunction with the synd, repressed their attempts one after the other—conquering, being, and despoiling the revoltors; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years—the number of more tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revoltors continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies did unconsciously lose subjects, while Athens, without any preconcerted plan, passed from a shield into a spear. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing expedients against revoltors, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and thus too without any gift of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue; least of

¹ After the extraordinary success of democratic allies at Sparta (Chapter I. Part III.) upon the affairs of the Ioniæ. 361

all was such as also likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. Yet though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honorable manner: voluntary invitation—efforts both unrewarded and unsuccessful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and industry to break up the confederacy, without undervaluing themselves as well as having won the Greeks over to the Persians.

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of Imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the spread of *litte* on the few large and equal boats. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the influence of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein those allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged years of Greek against Greek for the purpose of extermination.

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971).

[illegible]

Einzigartig ist das Angebot an
Kunst und Kultur, das die Stadt
für ihre Besucher bietet. In der
Stadt von Marburg, die die Stadt
von Marburg, die die Stadt

[illegible]

The whole speech will make sense, since the study was against the speech at Fort Belvoir during the early years of the Polynesian war (Chicago, Ill., 1907).

Athenian politicians. But on the point of practical government or opposition, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred. The movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, sitting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves. The positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same independence to personal effort which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the council. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually detailed into a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact that, while the former shrunk from personal service, and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it, the latter were "ready enough with their bodies," but unaccomplishing and unrespectable as to contributions.¹ The contempt felt by these Doric landmen for the military efficiency of the Ionian seamen frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. But when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade, in the very midst of the Ionic revolt from Persia,² we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labour, as that which broke up the Confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial process. To appreciate fully the indistinguishable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of Athenian maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day, we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring

¹Thucyd. i. 11, 12, where it is implied that the allies of Athens were deficient in supplies.

²The Herodot. vi. 19, and the passage of Herodotus on the subject of the battle of Lade.

inequality of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transformed into an *Allesian* empire.

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristide and adopted by the *synd* at *Elée*, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually discontinued, as the confederates above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of vessels became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents¹ at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy, from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred talents of being fully explained by the numerous contributions of vessels for money, as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which *destitute Athens* had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like *Thasos* and *Argos*, subsequently added.²

Without some such preliminary statement as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the *Allesian* hegemony or lordship, and ending with the *Allesian* empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of these particular events which our authorities enable us to record—events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to date. The first known conspiracy of the *Allesians* in their new equality (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 478 B.C. and 448 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of *Elée*, on the *Hellespont*, where the Persian governor *Boetis*, started out after a desperate con-

Tribute first paid by the capital of 478 B.C.—ag. assessed at Aristide.

Twenty talents B.C. 478—448. (See above.)

¹ *Thucyd.* II. 14.

² *Thucyd.* I. 107; *Plutarch*, *Pericles*, c. 26.

and, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their interference against the Dolopians and Pelagi, in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.), and the Eryopæ, in the town and district of Erystra, in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with, and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbor; while its inhabitants, seemingly also to the Pelagian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike proud and cruel. Some Thracian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphiktyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. The rancor of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had acquitted the crime; and these men, in order to evade payment, sought Elends with the Athenian argument. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens, as guarantor of the Ægean sea against piracy; but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reconquered after the expulsion of the Persians¹), and, hence, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjacent or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in popular favor at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 478 B.C. that the senate had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and offices in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unusual manners of the Dolopians had pre-

Athenians as
guarantors of
the Ægean
sea against
piracy.
The hero
Theseus.

¹ Xenophon, *Hellenica* v. 1, 31.

ment at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Ekeche was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Ekeche at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phoenician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Euryclides. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, created with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were attested as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the spoils of the spoils.¹ The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

¹ See the letter of the Hieronymus, see Thucyd. i. 107; Strabo, ix. 46-47; Plutarch, Ekeche, 16, 17.

It is remarkable that the Hieronymus story differs from Ephorus and Kallistarch, writers of the following century, and from Phylarchus, an author later still. I believe I am right in saying that, and only so far as complete victory is concerned, Hieronymus. The victory of Ekeche is certainly certain, indeed hardly doubtful.

Phylarchus stated the number of the Phoenician fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty; Kallistarch (following the latter) gave three hundred and forty. Phylarchus mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phoenician ships, which appears to me a very credible number, assuming, as the very limited victory of Ekeche to the Hieronymus, combined with the fact that the Phoenician fleet consisted of no more than two hundred ships. Phylarchus is certainly in the wrong of Hieronymus, in spite of the

authority of Dr. Arnold—but does not give any ground for his opinion. He says that the Hieronymus story is "very probable," that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred—that that the whole fleet consisted of no more. Assuming the correctness of this one statement (which may be doubted by all), it is very probable that the expected Phoenician fleet, according to the common opinion of antiquity, was taken by such prisoners kept in consequence of land loss. When they were taken they were very much defeated and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the power of the victors, and any escaped, it would be easily by accident. However, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as the story appears as a very small victory, in order to have strength for a subsequent land battle on the island.

It is especially odd that the Hieronymus on the commemorative offering only speaks "of the hundred Phoenician

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the regions westward of Phœnicia, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularise her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eceæ on the Strymon, the most convenient port for the neighbouring region of Thasos, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable stry of land with various dependent towns on the southeast of Thasos, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Saphi Hyla, as well as from others in the neighbourhood.¹ The condition of Thasos at this time (about 485 B.C.) indicates to us the progress

Result of
Treaty of
Peace with
Persians.
—
Thasos by
the Athenians
expelled the
Persians from
the island.

ships with their crews" as having been captured (Gibbon, *et c.*). The other (Gibbon, *et c.*) is a very different account. Modern historians speak of having captured these islands and their ships, though by mistake after the capture of the islands and ships only one island.

¹ About Thasos, see Herodotus, *et c.*—*et c.*—*et c.* The position of Thasos in the Adriatic, in reference to the

islands of Sicily and Sardinia in the Adriatic and subsequent position, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian peninsula of the Strymon. In Herodotus' History of Thasos we find an account of the large silver mine in that part of the island to which the gold and silver mines belonging to Mount Pangæus (Thasos, *et c.*)—the Thracian Thracians, *et c.* p. 10, *et c.*

special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her promptly both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as putting and aggressive—and of Sparta as house-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first extent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—was concerned and refused to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch that the Athenians, after the surrender trial and of Them and the liberation of the prisoners, had expected from Kleon some further conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that the further consummation was certain as well as easy. Starting under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Perikles and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander, but was acquitted after a public trial.¹

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of cities and the capture of Them (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477–463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free from embarrassments immediately round Athens. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations grew more and more both active and complicated; while their strength expanded so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately preceding the battle of Platai, we have scarcely any information. The fallings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained

¹ Plutarch, *Kleon*, c. 14.

unfriendly even after the war was at an end; while the mere suspicion of the Persian, numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Themistocles and Xanthias. At the meeting of the Amphictyonic council which succeeded the capture of the acropolis, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Mallian Nephelides, who had betrayed to Xerxes the secret-pass over Cithæra, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmonia that all the warring Greeks should be expelled from the peninsula—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistocles successfully resisted. Even the strongest reasons of using the contributions of all the anti-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians, as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Xanthias, it appears that the leadership of Themis as well as the achievement of the liberation was by the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Plataea and Thespis were restored, and the latter in part repopulated,¹ under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Themis, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient Spartan right and usage."² The Theban government was then in disrepute for its previous action—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;³ while the party opposed to Themis in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been swayed from the liberation to become allies of Athens like Plataea, if the interference of Lacedæmonia had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmonia was in every other part of Greece an enemy to repeated aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate;⁴ whereas she sometimes became by ac-

¹ Plutarch, Themistocles, c. 26.

² When the Amphictyonic council was convened through Themis, Plutarch tells us that, "with Xanthias before the gates of Salamis, and the whole of Greece in a state of general rebellion against her, which was a great advantage to the Athenians."

³ Plutarch, c. 26, 27.

⁴ By the League proposed, even the whole of Greece might have been united.

⁵ Plutarch, c. 26, 27.

⁶ The League was a great advantage to the Athenians, and of the Olympic

village was not conformable to the views nor favourable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. Evidence can be little-doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the interference of her two contemporary kings. Theronides (who, though only regent, was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotycheides—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Persia.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 484 (the year preceding the outbreak of Thebes to the Athenian alliance), a earthquake of yet more terrible moment befell Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tinosus, from whence certain supplies Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment: ¹ not improbably some of those Helots whom Pericles had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Perææ. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of confusion, but not the heavy and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus frustrated the surging masses and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since Antisthenes (the warrior by whose hand Hieronides had fallen at Plata) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Staphilura, overpowered by superior numbers.² When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithaca, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers.

¹ Thucyd. i. 106-108; Diod. xi. 62.

² Thucyd. ii. 24.

Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves dogmatically by insinuations throughout Lacedæmonia. Defence indeed was not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of sending even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own efficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we first specified the Sicyonians, the Athenians, and the Piræneans.¹ The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4000 men, under the command of Clinias, Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

As unexpected were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithaca. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they were passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Clinias their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the ever-uniform energy and ambition of those long strangers whom they introduced into the interior of Lacedæmonia. Calling to mind their own promises—though doubtless a secret promise—to invade Athens not long before, for the benefit of the Thebans, they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for supporting the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dissolved the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no further occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.²

¹ Thucydides, l. 104; II. 34; in 25.

² Thucyd. l. 105, also also insinuation of Sparta, doubtless all by which was known at the time.

MS. From Oxford, Oxf. MS. 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

in Athens, and two Athenian regiments were in the aid of the Spartans, both under Clinias. The fact is not a little remarkable in the language of the philosopher and philosopher himself. The record is in the B.C. 404, when the war had lasted some time.

In my judgment, there is no ground

countrymen not to assist in smothering and strengthening their most deadly rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thebians may have become known to them, though not so directly as to exclude doubt. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown almost time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of actual phronesis. But Kleanthes—with an earnestness which even the phidias-Lacartian Kritias afterwards disavowed as a wonder of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmonia¹—employed all his credit and influence in securing the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all further democratical change in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed. As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest antithesis which led only just begun to show itself in the case of Thucydides, between the genuine power of Athens and the union of land force under Sparta: and Kleanthes could still treat both of these phenomena as co-existing necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though soon distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Helles landed of one leg and Athens driving without her pole-fellow;"² such was his language, as we learn from his friend and colleague the Chian poet Ido: and in the lips of Kleanthes it proved effective. It is a speech of almost unalloyed interest, most nearly pure passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.³ The despatch of the ambassadors was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by snatching out their troops from all the other classes as objects of insulting

¹ Plutarch, *Kleanthes*, c. 18.

² Plutarch, *Kleanthes*, c. 18. "ὅτι τὸν ἀνταρστήσαντα καὶ τὸν ἑλπίαν ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει ἀπὸ τῆς ἑλπίας ἀφαιρῶντα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἑλπίας ἀφαιρῶντα, ἀπὸ τῆς ἑλπίας ἀφαιρῶντα."

³ Thucydides, *speeches*, vol. 1, p. 100. The speech of Kleanthes, *speeches*, vol. 1, p. 100. The speech of Kleanthes, *speeches*, vol. 1, p. 100. The speech of Kleanthes, *speeches*, vol. 1, p. 100.

suspensions. We may imagine the triumph of Pericles and Ephialtes, who had opposed the mission—and the real loss of alliance to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens returned again into her public assembly the fugitives sent back from Ithaca.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the demand of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renege the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmonia against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-owners of Lacedæmonia, with whom to ally themselves.

Of these by far the best, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenes. The area of the ancient citadel had grown to matchwood, and the temporary predominance of the Persians, acquired as consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykines, Tiryns, and Nisæa—small in power and importance, but rich in agricultural resources. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had threatened contingents both to Thermopylæ and Plata, which their powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at the time or to sweep afterwards from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmonia. But as soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Persian revolt, the Argians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykines and Tiryns, but also Gressa, Nisæa, and other agri-dependent towns around them. Several of these were retained; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenians, partly from the superior gallantry of their resources, partly from jealousy of their mythical recovery, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.¹ Through these

The Argians recovered the citadel of Argos, and fortified it again, with Argos. Part of of Argos was captured of Mykines and other towns.

¹ Diod. xi. 67. Strabo, xii. p. 473. Mykines fell in 480 B.C.; but as it was Persian it is, H., H., H. Thebes (p. 473) was destroyed after the catastrophe.

vicarious Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the ties against Lacédæmonia, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost leadership in Peloponnesia. The Thebans became members of this new alliance, which was a deliberate alliance against Lacédæmonia; and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the heliotal allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighbouring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacédæmonians, had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Elieus—on the other side upon Megara;¹ on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacédæmonia, renewed the Lacédæmonian connexion, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.² This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the entire Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Kalamian Gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pige was situated, and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Gennæia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacédæmonia, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies the Epidaurians and Siginians taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighbourhood, such as Corinth, Epidauria, and Sgina, ever thus nerve-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with

all Isparta, we must suppose it to have
 happened about 400 B.C. See 409.
 Sgina Oikion, from Hellenica, 2. 1.

passive, 1.
 1. Hellenica, Elieus, c. 11.
 2. Thucyd. 2. 100.

Agave and *Myra*. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the *Athenians* and *Agonians*, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten; so that the *Agonians*, dwelling within sight of *Perseus*, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by *Athena*. *Perikles* was wont to call *Agave* the spouse of *Perseus*;¹ but we may be sure that *Perseus*, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing protection, was in a much stronger degree the spouse of *Agave*.

The *Athenians* were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against *Perseus*, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in *Cyprus* and on the *Phœnician* coast. Moreover the revolt of the *Egyptians* under *Inarus* (about 480 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revellers, sailed up the Nile to *Memphis*, where they assumed at first a good prospect of throwing off the *Persian* domination. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigour; and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the *Erastichid* tribe who were slain in one and the same year in *Cyprus*, *Egypt*, *Phœnicia*, the *Helles*, *Agave*, and *Myra*—betrays bravely before us that energy which sustained and even cheered their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at *Myra* were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of *Greece*. It was necessary for the *Athenians* to protect their new ally against the superiority of *Peloponnesian* land force, and to ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient *Hellenic* towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port *Nissa* by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the *Athenians* was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with *Nissa*; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress,

Myra was the seat of the *Agonians*, and the *Agonians* were the allies of the *Athenians*. *Perseus* was the enemy of the *Athenians*, and the *Athenians* were the allies of the *Agonians*. *Perseus* was the enemy of the *Agonians*, and the *Agonians* were the allies of the *Athenians*. *Perseus* was the enemy of the *Athenians*, and the *Athenians* were the allies of the *Agonians*. *Perseus* was the enemy of the *Agonians*, and the *Agonians* were the allies of the *Athenians*.

¹ *Plutarch*, *Perikles*, c. 2.

wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant passage of vessels from Athens to meet of need. These "Long Walls," though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime area of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Cimon however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halonnesi (the population of the southern Argolis peninsula, bordering on Troezen and Hermione), were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Troezen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a conflict which took place off the island of Ekerythraia (between Argos and the Argolis peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither of them apparently very decisive,—the Argives began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Argos, the superiority of the new tactical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen, had as yet had no experience of the improved sea-craft of Athens, and when we find how much they were discomfited with it even twenty-eight years afterwards at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Argos was irreparably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.¹

¹Thucyd. i. 104; Epich. *Orat. Pausan.* ii. 37; Diodor. xi. 79.

the enemies to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without permitting either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.¹

Splendid as the services of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more anagastic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Pericles, which were now becoming ascendant in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Piræus. For without such an intermediate stopping-place, the project of a wall forty stadia (nearly 4½ English miles) to join Athens with Piræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (nearly 4 English miles) to join it with Phalæra, would have appeared altogether even to the sanguine temper of Athenians, as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistocles himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while *Agis*, the great Spartan naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the warm alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stroke,² at once comprehensive and of lasting effect, in Athenian facilities, next to the fortification of Piræus.

But besides this fading in the horizon of warlike measures, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable extinction of political parties then going on at Athens. Kleon had been recently

¹ Thucyd. i. 105. *αὐτῶν αὖτε καὶ τῶν ἑσπερίων ἰσχυρῶν, ὁμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὅπως ἀποκρίθησαν, ὡς οὐκ ἔμελλεν ἀποκρίσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἔμελλεν ἀποκρίσθαι.*

² That is, the second stroke, as it is called, (being already the other part of the

first stroke, and therefore of great effect on the city)—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 95).

abstracted; and the democratical movement pressed by Pericles and Ephialtes (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Pericles, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistocles when he first entered the Peloponnese. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of holding defiance to the united forces of Peloponnesus. But though then calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, objectionable to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently landed by Xerxes, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian constitution, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-*Barbarian* enterprises; to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions; to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, aware in a still clearer contrast and antagonism with the maritime multitude in Peloponnese; lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate domes of Peloponnese and Phœlæum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Aclia. When to all these grounds of opposition we add the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military officers in Egypt, we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any further proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent work of Athenian banishment after the battle of *Arginæ*, and their restoration the immediate boon of Phœbidas and Xerxes after the victory of Salamis.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to under-

know the contemplated doing in Asia. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed march over the high lands of Greece, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Through the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The retreating Kleon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, representing to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Kleia. But such was the belief, maintained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he assured his personal friends, Eurycleus (of the deme Amphitynia) and others, to behave as with a sword or might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and as just also upon theirs. His friends retained his poverty and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Perikles, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Alkmaionidæ, aware of this application and refusal of Kleon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of his end and safety, though it happened that he escaped unharmed. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens: while the resolution politicians of Kleon and his friends disavowed and denounced those accomplices who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the retreating leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new encounter that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Perikles himself—to discharge the ten years of Kleon's sentence, and permit his immediate return.¹ The may

¹ Plutarch, Kleon, c. 34; Perikles, c. 35. Plutarch narrates the latter point as having resulted from the proposal of Perikles himself. One of the *paraboulomenoi* who had just taken leave of Tanagra, told the senate of having rescued Kleon from the prospect of prolonged exile.

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the mood of Kimon and appears to have overruled the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Mykionides to Boeotia: the extreme precision of this date—fixing the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Themistokles is thus provided—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Oenophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Boeotian forces—*viz.*, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Oenophyta was the last—Mykionides was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thessaly as well as of the remaining Boeotian towns—reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—while taking democratical governments—and forming the unaccounted leaders, favourable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connexion, to become allies. Nor was it only Boeotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phokæ and Lokroi were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disaffected to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their ships were destroyed and sent to Athens as trophies. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Chalkidian territory, including both Megara and Pige, to the strait of Theropylia.¹

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Sigea. That island, Acathia, started out by its projected blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual

¹ Would Themistokles have a part of what is ascribed to Themistokles? But the same mistake is not confined to them equally. (Compare also places II. 10,

Acathia first, against their interests—see, *ib.*

² Thucyd. I. 100, 101; *ib.* II. 41, 42.

turned except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against as many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (p. c. 600—450). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the Ionian Greek navies: expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artabanus at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabarnes with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This army however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabarnes, son of Eoppreus,¹ drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosopina. Here they were blockaded up for eighteen months, until at length Megabarnes turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrenaia: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Isotris himself was crucified. And the misery of Athens was further aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mæandrian branch of the Nile, and thus fell moreover into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyræus, who recovered by retreating into the inaccessible Giza still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.²

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolonides, that the Internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Sparta, ended. These brave men no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced

¹ Herodot. II. 235.

² Thucyd. I. 104, 105, 106; Xenoph. H. G. II. 2. The story of Tolonides in the first of these two passages—that most of the Athenian forces were

driven to some last refuge, a formidable capitalization granted by the Persian government—has contradicted by the fact that nearly six thousand ships or five hundred years in the latter passage, as well as by Xenoph. H.

subside to the political interest of Persia, that he most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,¹ so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Ktesia, having equipped a fleet of 100 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still guaranteeing himself against the Persians amidst the feud, while with the remaining armament he had ships to Cilicia. In the prosecution of this step, he had either of success or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anakhareta, became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnicians and Cilicians that near Salamis in Cyprus. They were less victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Euryndolus; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.²

From this time forward no further operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave Asia undisturbed, and untroubled the Asiatic maritime Grecia, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast; To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Sinope (where place the boundary at the Chalcidæan islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Egean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Bœtos. On

¹ Plutarch, Persia, c. 19, and Eusebius, *Chron.* p. 121.

² An extraordinary circumstance between the two fleets is so related that we need not refer to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Clearchus, master of Ktesia, which Clearchus had sent to assist Ktesia. The charges as well as the intrigues of Clearchus appear to have formed an accessory to the master of Athenian diplomacy: they were employed by one

and two persons in maintaining Ktesia, by the other for dissuading Persia.

³ Plutarch, l. 121; Clearchus, c. 2. Clearchus mentions the name of the general Anakhareta. His silence implies that Ktesia died not only before Ktesia and Clearchus, but also to gain these two relations. But the difficulty of Clearchus, regarded as every general or diplomat, is more particularly apparent as to the death of Ktesia, who, while he was intended to maintain

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the *Eschyræan treaty*—improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Ktesias, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on were gained after his death. Nay more, the probability is, that if Ktesias had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Pericles either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Pericles, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite.² While even Themistokles, son of Neokles, who succeeded Ktesias his relation as leader of the anti-Periklean party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and premature negotiations, Pericles was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Athenian ascendancy of Athens, now at its very acme. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—but did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which included the Persians from all the south of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidonnæ, as well as from all the waters of the Egean, under the simple condition of restraining on the part of Athens further aggression against

Themistokles, son of Neokles, successor of Ktesias as leader of the anti-Periklean party.

¹ Diodorus agrees fully and for-
mally in every fact, and even
circumstances, and even phrases
many of the words describing the
treaty. The chronological time by
which it was intended to have been
concluded, namely, after the capture of
the Eretrians, and after the conclusion
of the peace of Ktesias is one of the
circumstances which have been noted
as favorable to the treaty's reality;
but we must not forget that Diodorus
considers that Themistokles in fact was
never Ktesias, which is pretty cer-
tainly—yet I do not tell him the
quibble, but placed the treaty in the
year (448/7) given after the
Athenian expedition under Ktesias.

against Eretria and Egesta in 480—479
B.C. Hence, and before the great
battle of Salamis, even Themistokles
must, as we have seen, have been
in the great Persian camp, and
ready for either party if it is to
be concluded, and ready also to con-
clude for either, and that fact is
decisive.

The second suggestion of Her-
odotus, that the treaty found the
Persians little able to offer resistance
to the great Athenian fleet, has been
properly answered. He makes this
statement in two different places
(*Herodotus*, p. 105; *Perikles*, p.
28).

² *Plutarch*, *Perikles*, c. 12—13.

Cyprus, Phœnicia, Kilike, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of receiving, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favorable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called *Eleusina*, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace: both abroad and at home, under the administration of Pericles, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis of Athens. At what periods these such transfers took place, we cannot ascertain. Nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, slowly with the free-will of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into dispersed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens; from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their armed tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more recalcitrant of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defense. Clazomenae, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an allied ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a member—tended of course to cut down the numbers and calculate the authority of the Delian synd. And what was still worse, it alienated the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies, casting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate flag from Dallas to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer

is that it was proposed by the Romans—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or master purpose of the Athenians. It is further said that when the Romans proposed it, Aristide's characterised it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt, however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the speech at Delos seemed to be so fully accepted as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with *Megara* and *Poloponnesus*—the Romans might not unreasonably feel that the large assembled force, with its constant armed associations, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Romans proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not disliking, and did not appear unjust, to the large members of the confederacy; and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

Transfer of the
confederacy
proposed
by the
Romans.

After the conclusion of the war with *Megara*, and the consequences of the battle of *Onophytis*, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like *Megara*—partly on the same relations as *Chios*, *Lesbos*, and *Samos*; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were *Mytilene*, the *Samian* allies, the *Phocians*, *Locrians*, &c. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to *Sparta* even

Position of
Athens
with a
vast array
of allies
both of
tributary
and
imperial
states.

in land-power—possessing as her allies Megara, Boeotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achaia and Thessaly in Peloponnese. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual efforts, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the great cause of progress, threatened still further increase. Occupying the Megarian harbours of Ploie, the Athenians had full scope of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus; but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Boeotia, they could restrain any land force from marching out of Peloponnese, and even thus (preventing hardly their country at sea) completely immobilize in Achaia.

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Achaia had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—in which there was no exception except the retrograde enterprise in Egypt. Looking to the position of Greece therefore about 425 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kameiros peace between Sparta and Athens,—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon further aggrandizement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And everywhere as every Greek was to the assumption of separate town-sovereignty as essential to a freedom and a efficacy, such prospect could not but inspire terror and evasion. The superiority of the Peloponnesians for the splendour and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Achaia, was not considerable. But when the Dorians, chief of Achaia, was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a dependent tributary, they felt the blow acutely on every point. The ancient celebrity and eminent services rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this formidable ally, had not been able to protect it; while these great Argivean facilities, whose victories at the naval helms-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignance. Throughout their numerous "poet" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Achaian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility

with Athens—Corinth, Silyria, Epizeuria, &c., as well as Sparta, the once-respected head of Hellas, but now totally degraded from her pre-eminence, linked in her projects respecting Ionia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Ephesus without being able even to retaliate upon Aïoson. Putting all these circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot-city, whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legitimate, threatened servitude still further increased. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the lines of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451-446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most internal disunion. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phocians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phocians, who were then allies! The Delphians were members of the Phocian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phocians collectively. The favour of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to

Over-throw of the
truce and
decline of
power in
Athens.

under the side of Sparta, but the Athenians were happy to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Thebes. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any other step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Thebes, Phœbia, Lokris, and Eubœa was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies.¹ After the victory of Oinophrys, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Theban cities established by Sparta, before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had taken place in Phœbia and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Theban, Phœbian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Megarian, &c., all vitally hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn further that the democracy² established at Thebes after the battle of Oinophrys was ill-constituted and disorderly, which circumstances laid open Thebes still further to the attacks of enemies on the watch for every weak point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and executing measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Oinobrotos, Chæronia, and many other less important places in Thebes. The Athenians general Tolmides marched to meet them, with 5000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and confusion. The hoplites of Tolmides, principally posthumous volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, sustained the enemy too much to admit a larger and more commanding

¹ Thucyd. l. ii. of Lacedæmonians, ally themselves against Thebes with Megalopolis, Argos, and Mantineia. Thucydides adds also Oinobrotos, Chæronia, &c. as allies—this means also I. H. l. c.

² Thucyd. l. ii. Phœbia, v. 3, 4, and 5. Eubœa sent also 4000 Athenian allies, with reinforcements, & Argos sent 4000.

form: nor would the people listen even to Pericles, when he admonished them that the march would be full of losses, and advised them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater motives.¹ Finally indeed were his predictions justified. Though Telesites was successful in his last enterprise—the recovery of Chersonese, whence he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably incensed and demoralized, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked en masse, near Koroneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. He failed in Cherson history was ever more complete or common. Telesites himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Boeotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government reestablished, and Boeotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy.² Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,³ and inspire them with an apprehension of Boeotian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Telesites had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged, and Boeotia would not have been lost; whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to achieve them. We shall discover hereafter in the *Lamian* war a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Spakteria.

The unfortunate consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in quick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Boeotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flames of war into EubŌia. To this important island Pericles

¹ Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 33; also his epitome. Livy, *Pericles* and *Phokas* (Livius, c. 3).
² Livy, 22.12. At the celebrated gathering, mentioned in this notice for the first time, thirty thousand Athenians, at the example of Aristides, by mutual agreement, were restored among the pro-Athenian exiles, through a process

of the *Stel* vote (Plutarch, *Aristides*, c. 3).

³ Thucyd. 1. 103. Diod. 15. 2. Plutarch appears to have been misled on this important point. Boeotia was restored to democracy with Athens as tributary or ally.

⁴ Thucyd. 1. 103. Diod. 15. 2.

himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was surrounded here by men of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurum was secretly admitted as guests into their city; the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified part of town.

As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Gerasus, Plistonax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He led in truth a vast army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians alike, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thessalian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleombrotos, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adviser and counsellor. Perikles (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to advance so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions which Apollidas thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of these guilty of corruption. Both were lashed. Kleombrotos went home, and Plistonax himself lived for a long time in voluntary exile the temple of Athina at Tegeæ, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her longed-for sacrifices to rest upon the authorities at Sparta.¹

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Perikles returned with his fleet to Salamis, and reconquered the island completely. With that oration which always distinguished him as a military man, so appo-

Notes re-
specting
Perikles.

¹ Thucyd. l. ii. c. vi. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

off to the fatal sickness of Peloponnesus, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 8000 hoplites. He subjected most of the Peloponnesian towns to sieges, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobota. But the inhabitants of Histiaia in the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchandise and numbered all the crew, were most severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian slaves or semi-free citizens.¹

Yet the conquest of Euboea was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the last engagement of Kynosia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphic oracle, and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime power. For though she still continued to hold Sigea and Rhos, yet her communications with the latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of Egeus and its adjoining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Dardanelles Gulf, and of protecting as well as of controlling her allies in Asia. Nor was the port of Sigea of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for supplying that city.

Moreover, the position held which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian vessels invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of circumstances, and especially of an invincible army carrying war over the flourishing territory round Thebes and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Perikles, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, London, years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in persuading upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war doubtful, if not

Herodotus
and Thucydides.
History of
Athens—
Description
of the island
of Euboea
page 171.
—Description
of the
Athenian
power.

¹ Thucyd. i. 102; Plutarch, Pericles, c. 37; Strabo lib. 2.

a sentiment the more natural as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Chalcidians, and had then afterwards, without any known change on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, inasmuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' term, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS
UNDER PERIKLES

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratic cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to politicians, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct political divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned, that even under the democracy of Kleisthenes, and until the time succeeding the battle of Plataea, large juries still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting as it is for life); though the check exercised

There is
evidence
of the
extension
of the
jurisdiction
of the
archons
and of the
Areopagus
in the
early
history
of the
democracy,
as well as
of the
extension
of the
jurisdiction
of the
Areopagus.

by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the Heliaia, was at the same time materially increased. We must further remark that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political operations of the last century, was in the early history of Athenianism unknown. Like the Roman kings,¹ and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the Praetor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also

¹ See E. B. Rieu, *History of the Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., 1869, vol. I, pp. 1-10, and *History of the Roman Empire*, 2nd ed., 1869, vol. II, pp. 1-10.

justice, and decide civil disputes, without any other cause than the law then existing, and without any appeal, must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.¹

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the ex-patriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristide had been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged powers of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large private administrations and judicial stores described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained identified more or less with the same oligarchical interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristide to that of Pericles: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggressiveness of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Plataeæ, this new fervour of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in

¹ Aristotle (*Quæst. Rhetor.* c. 1, p. 1373) states that the senate of Areopagus sat for life, and so it was commonly supposed; but, though this is not so, how accountable could be generally supposed, and a body which could only be responsible

in this sense—that if any one of their number could be proved to have so egregiously failed he could be lawfully punished. But in this sense the whole magistrature would also be responsible, though it is always collected of them that they were not responsible.

of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime supremacy was in progress.¹

The political opposition between Perikles and Kleon was hereditary, since Kleon's grandfather the father of the former had been the avenger of Miltiades the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kleon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Perikles, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Perikles must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter enemies, and unscrupulous killers (about 467—428 B.C.). His public life began about the time when Themistokles was ostracised, and when Aristides was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the power and policy of the one with the resources and large views of the other; superadding to both a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent natural and literary education received from Pythodoulos—as eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a powerful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the custom of his temperament, but which some of his biographers² explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracised, and that his conscience resembled that of the despot Peisistratos. We may be pretty sure however that this personal recumbence (like the wonderful dream accorded to his mother³ when pregnant of him) was an after-thought of men when his ascendancy was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistokles and Aristides. For the Kleonæan constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to

Opposition between Kleon and Perikles hereditary from their fathers—statesman and warrior and warrior.

¹ Thucyd., Kleon, c. 12; Xen., Anab., c. 12.

² Plutarch, Perikles, c. 2-4 etc.
³ Plutarch, c. 12.

before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. The details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight; yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtes advanced his main proposition for dividing the competence of the courts of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers,¹ Ephialtes and Pericles were at last constrained to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of party feeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 455 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful; and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Sphæter, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtes.² But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been defeated by Sparta under circumstances of fearful suspicion (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into unity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon and the position of the oligarchical party were materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing soon afterwards a vote of ostracism—a challenge, indeed, which may

¹ Ephialtes, Pericles, &c. His company
Takes Kimon, &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.
etc. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.
etc. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.

indignation of Ephialtes &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.
Thasos &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.

² Ephialtes, Kimon, &c. &c. &c.

³ Ephialtes, Kimon, &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.
etc. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.

perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by Kinde, and his party, since they might still flatter themselves the stronger, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Epistide or Perikle. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kinde, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendant. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the situation looked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

It was now that Perikle and Epistide carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagos was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrate, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine¹), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of selected dikasts, lodged off in ten divisions from the aggregate Helles. Epistide's first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighbourhood of the market-place, where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that the judiciary was now popularised.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is, that Perikle was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Kinde, who bribed them out of his own private purse, as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Perikle did was to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this enormous array of

discreet
selected, by
Areopagos
and
Perikle to
decide the
cases of
the senate
of five
hundred
as well as of
individual
magistrates.
Indication
of the public
character.

deserve Epistide's name, as the Epistide
of the law of Epistide in a popular court
of Areopagos at the time.

¹ Examples of the passages are given
in the introduction to which
the sentence is so often described.
Plutarch says—"The sentence had
advantage of a slight pecunia to

induce them." but it was possibly
characteristic of antiquity that it had
no precise or more judgment passed
without specific or assigned cases.

² Demosthenes, cont. Flaccus, at Atheni-
cal, c. 18.

³ Demosthenes—4. Another place—
Fellen, III. 120.

direct opposition, involving, they did not scruple to transmute the correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so often had it become in their eyes, since the recent misadventure. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconstitution of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous protection of Alcibiades and his immediate friends. Alcibiades was rescued from extinction on this occasion, before his fall time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Pericles henceforward became mitigated, or even converted into a compromise,¹ whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The resources of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power, which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Pericles, and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed allies, during the interval between the defeat of Eion and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Pericles, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called *Nomophylakes*, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These *Nomophylakes* sat alongside of the *Proctoi* or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to

enter into
consequence
of the great
corruption
of Pericles,
after the
death of
Alcibiades.
Alcibiades
did not
every day
and Alcibiades
himself
resources
of Athens,
and one of
the main
parts of
her power.

open as-
sembly
changes in
the Senate
Pericles.

¹The intervention of Alcibiades, the states of Alcibiades in bringing about this compromise between his friends and Pericles is probably correct. (Plutarch, Pericles, c. 10, and Alcibiades, c. 14.)

Alcibiades and Pericles, the states of Alcibiades in bringing about this compromise between his friends and Pericles is probably correct. (Plutarch, Pericles, c. 10, and Alcibiades, c. 14.)

debates for trying cases, distributed into panels or
known by a particular letter and sitting together
throughout the entire year: they were called off to sit
together only on special occasions and in the necessary
cases. According to the reform now introduced, the
Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction
of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent
either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already
in existence: it could only enact a *proponema*—that is,
properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a
particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very
large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well
as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar
judicial procedure was established. The *Thesmothes* were
directed specially to examine the existing laws, noting any
contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the
first prytany (fourth part) of the Athen year, on the eleventh day,
an Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go
through the laws *enactes*, and submit them for approval or
rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate,
next coming to those of more general import, especially such as
determined the functions and competence of the magistrature.
If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or
if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the
Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the
appointment of *Homothetes* and in the provision of means to pay
their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly
by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make,
in order that the time necessary for the sifting of the *Homothetes*
might be measured according to the number of matters to be
submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were further
named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked,
and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his
case against this defence, in the satisfaction of the assembled
Homothetes. These latter were taken from the 6000 *zeugitai*
citizens, and were of different numbers according to circum-
stances: sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as
1000—and we may be certain that the number was always con-
siderable.

regiments

The *Thesmothes*...
distribution...
proposals...
in special...
proposals...
by which...
enacted and...
repealed.

The effect of this institution was to place the making or repealing of laws under the same administration and protection as the trying of cases or accusations by judges. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public assembly were not sworn like the jurors; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of having both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How ready the oath sworn was brought to set open the minds of the jurors, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the sworn public assembly.¹ And there can be no doubt that the *Nomothetæ* afforded much greater security than the public assembly for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a faction of the people usually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole,—not permanent, but adapted for the occasion,—assembled under a solemn sanction,—and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing perjury, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decisions than either the *Dikastery* or the *Nomothetæ*—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

¹ Demosthenes, *cont. Timotheum*, c. 23, pp. 741, 742. He alludes there to the institution of the *ekklesia* as a means of securing the safety of the state, and the fact that the *ekklesia* was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one, and that it was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one, and that it was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one.

See also the *Nomothetæ*, *cont. Timotheum*, c. 23, pp. 741, 742. See also the *Nomothetæ*, *cont. Timotheum*, c. 23, pp. 741, 742. See also the *Nomothetæ*, *cont. Timotheum*, c. 23, pp. 741, 742.

Look at these matters, in my opinion, carefully, and you will find that the *Nomothetæ* are not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one, and that it was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one, and that it was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one.

which is also the principle of the *ekklesia*, but a permanent assembly, but a temporary one, and that it was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one, and that it was not a permanent assembly, but a temporary one.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the *Demochæte* against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has got to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Pericles at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated *Demochætes*. This was the *Graphé Paranomon*—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any proposition, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to vote up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphé Paranomon*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the *Thesmothætes*.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws; and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and dangerous to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the *Graphé Paranomon* at the time of Demosthenes. The mover of a new law or proposition, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informality in his procedure, but also against alleged mischief in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. For the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was pre-

Graphé Paranomon—indictment against the proposer of laws or propositions introduced by means of specially delegated *Demochætes*.

posed by the accuser, next another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself—the diffractory being bound to make their option between one and the other, without admitting any third modification—so that it was the interest even of the accused party to name against himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the diffract, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself (as in other public prosecutions) was fined in the sum of 1000 drachmæ, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the diffractory. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of his new law. If the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could bring no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the diffract neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their confirmation of the law, with or without the author, amounted *de facto* to a repeal of it.

Each indictment against the author of a law or of a decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment—or after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the *Nomothetæ*, if it was a law—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the *Nomothetæ*. In the former case the indictment stayed its further progress until sentence had been pronounced by the diffract.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the *Nomothetæ*, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to entrust the defence of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were appointed for the purpose. So also, when any diffract made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time. Accordingly, a further guarantee was provided in the personal

Working of the original Periclean law seems to have been to ward off the danger of a law being repealed, and even the slightest difference belonging to every citizen.

under is for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to Democritus. He began by showing that the proposition was illegal—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment; he then goes on further to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that Democritus was a vile man and a mischievous politician; accordingly (assuming the argument to be just) Pericles had deceived the people in an aggravated way—first by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favour of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the *Graphê Paranómou*; the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it,—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with violence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens is certain. But though it probably deterred ungratified citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people and reckon upon support from a certain class of friends. Aristophanes, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been three indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic history, even in its most strictest manifestations; turning deliberative into personal eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of the mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphê Paranómou* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a proposal repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Democritus against Leptine. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he

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Democritus was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a proposal repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Democritus against Leptine. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he

ness of homicide—providing popular, numerous, and selected citizens to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeat and amend laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Pericles made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenes—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the exercise, of the words, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these *Ekklēsiai* at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first—That personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in bands of a few members, but not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta; next, That in the Greek cities generally, as we know even from the shipboard *Logophai* (the particularly corrupt Sparta), the rich and great men were not only subservient to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them.¹ We know also from the same unimpeached source,² that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were distinguished by the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who served the infantry were less drilled, and the

25-M, p. 1141). But the passage above quoted from *Tristram*, in which the witness, above, lists the procedures taken in general company of the witnesses, were well-documented and repeated. Though these procedures might appear to be

[illegible]

Expanding the school principals recruited by principal search firms, a larger of schools must respond.

to previous facilities applied them for help in setting up a clinic, one of the reasons the clinic stayed open. In fact, it had, and continues to, a 4- to 6-h shift.

[illegible]

we accept the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a measure and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decisions by trained and professional judges. All the excellences, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found preferable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the dikasteries, as the most demonstrated feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavor—every censure or abuse or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are as popular an institution, and their merits have been over-stated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial, as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff

The dikasteries also, like the juries, were constituted on the spot, and the members were chosen by lot from the whole body of citizens, and the trial was conducted in a public hall.

According to the classical and political authorities of Athens, was it an entirely uncorrupt system, that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the jury dikasteries on the ordinary system. But all the personal services of the dikasteries and all the public money must have been put in competition at that time, the dikasteries against the money, without leaving any surplus for other purposes; there was not enough then to afford payment for judges and officers, because (though Pl. Ar. Cl. Ar. R.,

R. Ar. R. therefore, in this time of distress, the dikasteries were partly corrupted, and without any probability of pay, a powerful accused party might find it more easy to bribe with them introduced, than it did him before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the payment was regularly introduced. We are little concerned with such theories, from the rapid decay producing the failure of Athenian states, other is that which produced the falling reputation of the dikasteries, followed the decay of the State.

and defendant, accused and accused, and to that a true verdict according to their conscience upon a distinct issue before them. But in Austria this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a passive—kept in subordination, trammels, and gagging, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the Revolution of 1800, our jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge were liable to fine; and at an earlier period [of a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict] even to the terrible punishment of attainder.¹ And though, for the last century and a half the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attainder—yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure in the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to control the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens²—conformity to the

¹ Mr. Justice, in his interesting and valuable publication *Criminal Trials*, vol. i. p. 414, after giving an account of the trial of Sir Mathias Thompson in 1693, for high treason, and the verdict, observes:—"There is one circumstance in the trial which ought not to be passed over without explanation. It appeared that when the trial was over, the jury were required to give recognisances to appear for their verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight weeks and heavily fined by a majority of the judges. . . . Such was the anxiety which the lord by jury offered to him, to win to those trials, and such was the public opinion which gave them support, who seemed to act more fully independent of the judges, and who pronounced that the judges were against the jury, according to their former letter, signed by some of the chief judges of justice, which was to be considered as a solemn declaration of judicial power, in this particular case. The lord, to this day, the judges of England had, for centuries, been considered a similar authority, though

not without some interesting exceptions. And it was not until some time after it, in the reign of Charles II., that a serious dispute was commenced against the judges."

In the reign of James II. it was held by the Lord Chamberlain, Secretary, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, that when a party petitioned to have justice on his trial, the jury shall still be questioned; but in the reign of Anne, when the jury had acquired a habit of a tacit acquiescence, great, they say, was the indignation which the lord chief justice in setting a question notwithstanding, after the direction of the four judges, that no verdict was given in the reign of George II., probably was manifested. See the *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. xiv. p. 101. See also *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. xiv. p. 101.

² See the *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. xiv. p. 101.

³ See also *Journal of the House of Commons*, vol. xiv. p. 101.

appreciation, the practical instruction for detecting falsehood and raising equity, in twelve dilemmas taken by hazard and put into a jury-box, comparatively little account is taken either of the ends, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial formal conditions into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presents them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikaster, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read those maxims in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in securing pure and even-headed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizen generally, might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory language of Pericles about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and unswayed verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the oracles. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or relief invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effect of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function as useful as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, number, and quickness of mental action, without any professional judge upon whose whims they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.¹

¹ I have often seen an excellent lawyer of the United States, Mr. Livingston, author of a *Practical Guide for the Student of American Jurisprudence*, pp. 15-161, on abundant passages of Trial by Jury. It strikes him like none that the dikast democracy existed, so, but it is expressed with gentler warmth, and

with the greater solemnity, towards the people of America, for whom the English was writing, but in sympathy with the institutions and the writing. The reader will observe that almost everything just said in recommendation of the jury might have been applied by Pericles with much more and with

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and defendant represent the average man of the time and of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding according to what he thinks justice or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism, which in reference to the case before him he thinks

Impar-
tiality of
jury-trial
is suggested
in the
proceedings
of the
Athenians

application, in entering his knowledge of mankind gathered from individual acquaintance to the discussion.

"We are constituted, you, in London, and the right of a trial by jury is secured to the accused, but it is not consistently maintained. With us, however, may be done by law, and there are no strong saving reasons in its defence, that it has been thought proper (Murray) to the make a partial exception. We think it all a badly pronounced the trial by jury is a principle which cannot be abandoned. While it has existed in the system of the accused, it has been in the power of the judge, ignorance of his duty, or the tyrannical influence in his situation, might induce him to violate the strict rule of a trial by the country, and thus by corrupting the people to a principle which they ought never to believe—a single man determining the fate, marking the law, and deciding at the will of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen.

There was already the present discussion of the law and—abolishing the trial by jury to be an advantage—the law determines, when it gives the accused the right to speak himself at the bar, the law is the best judge whether it will be useful to him, and it would be unjust to give him to be represented a choice. This argument is specious, but not solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to show that this choice cannot be freely exercised. There is, moreover, another inherent defect, that of the subject to be considered. If he be guilty, his trial has no interest to the community, and without public concern, it has a higher interest. When the trial should be fairly conducted before judges impartial in judgment, and subjected by law to the view of official duty, to look to interests in the preservation of the administration of

justice, and a permanent duty to perform in conducting it, how can corruption be introduced? It is not true, therefore, to say that the jury do enough when they give the choice between a fair and impartial trial, and one that belongs to the present defendant. They ought to know—they have not chosen that choice, as an act to suffer an ill-defined trial, which by depriving them into every sense of truth, strength in strength by voluntarily inflicting on it death, through that death should be avoided.

"Another advantage of restoring the mode of trial altogether is that it diffuses the most useful advantages among every rank of citizens. It is a system, of which every jury trial is included, in a separate class, which the diffusion of the law and the new measures of administration to them are gradually taught. The frequent exercise of these advantages becomes necessary, gives a sense of dignity and self-respect, and only becoming to the character of a free citizen, but which adds to the public happiness. Another advantage, one inherent, one given, one definite, that of the effort in the administration of justice, though they are beneath the gifts of every other citizen and require more than plain. Every time he is called upon to act in this capacity, he must feel that through power to possess the freedom of the law, the guardian of the law, the liberty, and the reputation of the administration against corruption and oppression, and that every one who is administering the law must be the best judge for himself. His character, which is presented in every place, has been with him, and it shall always and always remain as the individuality should be preserved from every influence, who are administered the substance of the law, and the spirit of the public, the highest qualities of the citizen, and every other person as

such artifice were resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial. We have no means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the jurors.¹ Probably the frequent habit of sitting in dais, and the penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional jurors. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that, in a considerable proportion of cases, jurors depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case, than upon apparent aims of innocence and truth-telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The secondary speakers in *laissez-creire*, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judgments, though it was common in the strict trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the consideration of the jurors; appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens.²

jurors, especially upon the Comedians, were with doubt. The only people who can throw light upon the subject will not.

"It is difficult not to be won by the best speaker, if he carries the air of wisdom and is master of his tale, or not to be lulled to sleep by indolgentatory. Those who cannot resist themselves, were much lulled to sleep."

"Witness therefore this hour. Though this trial were finished, they are powerful advocates, while actually shown, particularly those which are uttered with a laud. They come from the heart and will reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Politics and play are dangerous."

"Perhaps there were not a judge, from Aristotle to us, who could deal with politicians upon purely to discuss it; he could, he was made to be a judge. He should be a stranger to politics, and in a danger to corruption. All these matters influence the man, and sway his judgment."

Thus, in a declaration, there be a party known and unrepresented judge, of his own feelings when on the

bench. It will be found, therefore, by the same means, the same plan, where the same speaker is in the same time, described in the same way, as the same.

"Demosthenes, *Speeches*, p. 111, c. 10, completely reveals how much more serious witnesses were of giving *laissez-creire* than the *laissez-creire*, this is the *laissez-creire*."

"Laws are given an account of the hearing of and explanation to the judge of Rome, who sentence was made to be pronounced upon Rome, where there was no judge. *Orat. pro* *se*, p. 111, c. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 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990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasion. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well as Athens, under the contemporary democracy of Pericles,¹ in which also some form of popular jurisdiction was established.

Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so systematized; not always happily, for several of the early rhetorists adopted an artificial, ornate, and convoluted manner, from which little good taste afterwards liberated itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art,—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward to show lectures as a model for others, is a feature that belonged to the Periclean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the orator, as possessors of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar mind and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view;² either as professing to improve the moral character—or as communicating power and facility of expression—or as suggesting pretexts for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative stances on matters of ordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, &c.³

¹ Aristotle, *op. cit.*, *idem*, *ibid.*, s. 11.
—The Periclean age, which began in the middle of the fifth century, has produced large numbers of orators, historians, poets, philosophers, and men of arms, as well as statesmen, artists, and poets. The most famous of these are: Pericles, Cimon, Alcibiades, Demosthenes, Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, Pindar, and many others. The most famous of these are: Pericles, Cimon, Alcibiades, Demosthenes, Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, Pindar, and many others.

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Antisthenes of the deme Mounania in Attica, Theophrastus of Chalkidion, Timon of Ephesus, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Theodorus of Byzantium, Hippas of Hlis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antisthenes was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a didactic and preserved down to the later system.¹ These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns incorporated in the Athenian empire, at a time when important political scenes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens, while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *Sophist*, while Herodotus² applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, &c., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (that narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Greek town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and huge gain,³ they appear to have been viewed with reluctance and dislike by a large portion of the

[illegible]

See also the character of *Protoparce* in the *Handbook of Zoology*, v. 2, 24, Frankfurt, W.B. S. Conkey, p. 597. *Archives (Neues)*, 1966, *Geograph. Anzeiger*, 1.3.66, 7.66, 14.6.66, 1.7.66, 1.8.66, 1.9.66, 1.10.66, and a printing message by *Protoparce* in *Chin. Sci. Bull.*, 1966, 1.10.66.

1. *Phalaris*, V. I. *Grasses*, p. 39.
Quadrant, 2. I. *Grasses*, p. 39.
Spoken for *Phalaris*, *Grasses*, p. 39.
Grasses, p. 39.
1. *Phalaris*, V. I. *Grasses*, p. 39.
Quadrant, 2. I. *Grasses*, p. 39.
Spoken for *Phalaris*, *Grasses*, p. 39.
1. *Phalaris*, V. I. *Grasses*, p. 39.
Quadrant, 2. I. *Grasses*, p. 39.
Spoken for *Phalaris*, *Grasses*, p. 39.

Shaw, R. L. 1982. *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 75: 101-102.

Socrates himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds of Aristophanes, or from those unfavourable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

This is not the opportunity however for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the delusions of the Ekklesia, but still more from the attractions before the dikastery, in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent disputation stimulated by Pericles opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the dialectic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away.¹ And it was one of the first measures of the dignity of Thucydides, to induce, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanes divides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had robbed their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortune which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and unceasing action was the characteristic of Athens even to a greater degree than history or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenes a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid disputation at Athens was thus one of the most important and profitable events in all Grecian

¹ Xenoph. Memor. I. 2. 22. also speaks of *hikanos*. Aristophanes, however, still pointing at this law in a general way, at Ecclesia against Sophists, and speaking of, with an ironical sneeringly polite, when

considered as the alleged cause of that failure, as well as of the consequent loss. But it is evident that this law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one of the prominent characteristics of the

Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age, and of the stimulus.

history.

The *dikastai* were composed not exclusively of poor men, but of rich and poor alike, and poorer citizens naturally withdrew.

The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta and, as it seems, in herule Greece. Nevertheless, we need not suppose that all the *dikasts* were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though *Aristophanes* selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Perhaps he has been often accused for this invitation, as if he had been the first to ensure pay to *dikasts* who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant *dikasteries* previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme¹ and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the *dikasterion*, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the 6000 *Hoplites* who filled the *dikasterion* were composed of the rich and poor citizens indiscriminately; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

¹ *Thucyd.* viii. 67. Compare a curious passage, even so witness to the time of Democritus, in the speech of that orator against *Pericles*.

de Mestrie, &c. see of justice brought into discussion, *Thucyd.* de *de Mestrie* &c.

CHAPTER XLVIL

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS
BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE
BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE political alterations effected at Athens by Pericles and Ephialtes, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed ; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its further development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less comfortable in their disposition than attendance in the schools or in the theatre at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency ; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more strict in discipline and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn.¹ The maritime climate, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an inveterate skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns, the reverse immediately preceding the thirty years' truce

Personal exertion was proceeding during the Athenian democratical era, and this, after the thirty years' truce.

¹ *Æschylus, Persians*, 88, 4, 18.

having broken up all Athenian land confederacy over Megara, Boeotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the leadership of Athens, but with a common agreed and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of these rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. The discontinuance of the deliberative council, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps (we do not know them in detail) whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member.¹ It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the peace of the Aegean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Samos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy

¹ Thucyd. ii. 61; about the Spartan law for it, *ut singulis deperire confederatio non liceat*, *ut singulis deperire non liceat* is the correct reading.

in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of charmed tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power,—and mistress of the sea, the rest of which was indispensable to them. The spread of *Delos*, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens—probably about 480 B.C., or shortly afterwards.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan. She became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependant subjects all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases decidedly contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contributions from each of the members, nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so; for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish,—so powerful was the force of geographical dissimination, the tendency to isolated civil life, and the repugnance to any permanent uncumbrd obligations, in every Grecian community. But they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens excited by circumstances to conspire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenians themselves grouped at

Athenians took no pains to inspire her allies with the idea of a common interest—never thought how the allies were governed by the consciousness of their empire.

the exaction as a matter of pride as well as profit.¹ Even Pericles, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the consent of some all-potential interest or misdeed, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble to pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of Pericles had been followed, might have been postponed, though it could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Pericles formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the *Ægean waters*.² This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged, as one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the *Ægean*. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in those waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and benefited as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the women in constant pay and training.³ And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Mytilene and Boeotia, and with difficulty recovered Euboea, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distant tributary allies is said to have amounted to 5000, according to a verse of Aristophanes,⁴ which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for

¹ Thucyd. 2. 65. *οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι αἰεὶ ἡδὲ
κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαιτοῦντες
ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἀπορίᾳ.*

² Thucyd. 2. 65. *καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπορίαν
καὶ τὴν πόλιν.*
³ Thucyd. 2. 65. *καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπορίαν
καὶ τὴν πόλιν.*
⁴ Aristophanes, *Peace*, 170.

Albany budget, however, prior to the Polakowicz war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Perchikis, the revenues including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; inasmuch that a treasure of coined money was

the announcement of the Polakowicz war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Perchikis, the revenues including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; inasmuch that a treasure of coined money was

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trifling money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it.¹ And altogether the marches of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home.

Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Athens for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot city was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her action. Such was the manner in which not merely Perikles and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Perikles. While discouraging all distant and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many colonies, and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of the coast. He conducted 1000 citizens to the Thracian

Perikles, a brilliant citizen, planning and executing the policy of Athens.

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Information
in the book
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planning and
the literature
by Patricia
Cassidy and
the author.
Contact:

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It seems probable that the steel bars from the most conservative part of the girder at Allouez Avenue acted as the brace. Although we do not know what role of compression was

[illegible]

¹ By Prebble, Stuart, B. M. By White, Stuart, B. M. By the court, as before, 7-10. By Repetition, et al. By the Health Commission, L. 10, et al. By the court.

1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 26

land invaders—others poor, and living themselves out as labourers.¹ The islands of Lissnos, Imros, and Rhynce, as well as the territory of Eolios, on the north of Salona, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the Athenians to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the numerous of her dependent cities, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Pelona and the Argos reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thracia and Thasos in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Argos, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thracia, on the western bank, and at the spot where the Strymon crosses the river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Euboean Thracians, called Ennos Hodoi or Nine Ways—in a situation doubtly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighbouring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Ennos at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennos Hodoi have already been noticed.—Then that of Histieus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 487—485 B.C.), next that of the Athenians about 485 B.C. under Leagros and others—on both which occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and ex-

Amphipolis
in Thracia,
founded by
Athens,
A.D. 437 B.C.
and as
437 B.C.

¹ Xenophon, *Hæc*, 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Amphipolis, *Hæc*, 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

poised by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 10,000.¹ So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thracian, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining, to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the *klérouchoi*, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydides himself; certainly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.² This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agamemnon, despatched from Athens in the year 487 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well-maintained, inasmuch as it occupied and maintained the valuable position of *Kynos Hekol* in spite of those formidable Euboean neighbours who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of *Kynos Hekol* was exchanged for that of *Amphipolis*—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Greek city colonised from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon immediately opposite to *Amphipolis*,³ and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. *Amphipolis*, connected with

¹ Thucyd. i. 105.

² Thucyd. iv. 101; *Marcellum*, *Vit. Thucyd.* c. 18. See *Strabo*, *Libani* de *Profectibus*, c. 1, s. 4, p. 10, who gives a geography of *Amphipolis*, as far as it goes to make out with any probability. The district was possessed by Thracians, the *klérouchoi* and *Amphians*, as well as by the Greek king of one of the Thracian

tribes, whose daughter *Neopetris* was wife of *Amphipolis* for sympathy of *Marcellum*. In this manner the colony is supposed to consist of Thracians, Greeks, and some of Athens, being an *Amphipolis* *Agamemnon* and *Philippus* (*Marcellum*, s. 12).

³ Thucyd. iv. 101; c. 4.

the sea, by the Strymon, and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thracian and Macedonian.

The colony of Thuriæ on the coast of the Gulf of Thracian Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 445. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotonates, in 508 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Lato and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city; nor did it suit the views of the Krotonates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which no unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thracian

Settlement by the Athenians of Thuriæ, on the southern coast of Italy.

settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonization, the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampos and Kankrides, the former a prophet and interpreter of omens, were sent by Periklês with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thuriæ, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, Islanders, Boeotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites

Spoken of the original inhabitants of the region, Sybarites, their power made in the long exile of Thuriæ: they are expelled, and Thuriæ re-colonized.

procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, monopolizing for themselves the possession of political power as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thuriæ, founded under the auspices of the Democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either drove or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of

the city upon equal principles among the colonies of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Eretrians, who had probably been uniformly so long as their ancient enemies the Euboeians were masters of the city and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the reflux disaster of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thebes. How numerous the population of Thebes was we may judge from the enumerations of the ten tribes—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Achaia, Achaia, Elean, Elean, Amphibrychia, Doris, Ios, Athenais, Boeotia, Nephelis. From this mixture of race they could not agree on recognizing or honouring an Athenian *Clitai*, or indeed any *Clitai* except Apollo.¹ The Spartan general Kleonidas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be lured by Athens along with king Ptolemaeus, removed to Thebes and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Thebes. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Harkitia half-way between the two, in the fertile territory called *Sikaria*.²

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thebes is, that the states Lykias and the Kleonidas Kleonidas were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, not merely only by a *Periklis* tie; it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies.³ From the circumstance, that so small a projection of the surface of Thebes was native Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connection with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Periklis was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whose acceptance

Periklis
and Lykias
were
domiciliated
as citizens
at Thebes.
The
Athenians
called
Thebes
Sikaria.

¹ *Strabo*, vi. 40.

² *Strabo*, vi. 41, 42, *Strabo*, vi. 42; *Plutarch*, *Periklis*, i. 10.

³ The Athenians presented to the subject allies beyond the *Periklis* tie.

Strabo, vi. 41, *Strabo*, vi. 42, *Strabo*, vi. 42. The Athenians were not numbered among the tributary subject allies of the Athenians beyond the *Periklis* tie. (*Strabo*, vi. 42.)

were desirable, should rather become harbours in some of the islands or ports of the *Ægean*, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garisons for the maintenance of the Athenian empire.¹

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war are a period of full exertion on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all claims continuous to her own empire, and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Pericles and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Pericles had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told for more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expiration of Tokmide's rule. Thanks out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Pericles had increased, the party opposed to him seems else to have become

Pericles from 461-454 B.C.
Athens 461-454 B.C.
Pericles from 461-454 B.C.
Athens 461-454 B.C.
Pericles from 461-454 B.C.
Athens 461-454 B.C.
Pericles from 461-454 B.C.
Athens 461-454 B.C.

stronger and better organized than before, and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thucydides son of Melesias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Pericles; a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent in both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, the political and parliamentary opposition against Pericles assumed a constant character and organization, such as Kimon with his exclusively military spirit had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the "honourable and respectable" citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own denomination—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of attending regularly in their attendance at the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their disunion,

¹ Pericles, Pericles, p. 11.

foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great political importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated embellishment, sculptured and architectural, and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Pericles in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydides. And considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Pericles continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the necessities of defence. What Thucydides and his partisans appear to have urged was that this enormous fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warlike projects against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kleon during his life.* But Pericles was right in contending that such warlike would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though raising all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian fleet was already kept away both from the waters of the *Ægean* and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be supposed spurious) by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have required. The allies indeed might have had some ground of complaint against Pericles, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy,—or for not having collected their justive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydides

Defense of
Pericles' policy
and
against his
allies' demand
for it.

and his party; nor was it calculated to find greater effect with aristocrats or democrats in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the ingratiation of Athens—an ingratiation common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kleon than to Perikles—in acting as diplomat instead of chief, and in discountenancing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies—we shall find that the schemes of Perikles were nevertheless eminently Pan hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction, he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Greek feeling, the stimulus of Greek intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism, combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the allegiance of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbours, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur,¹ which made her appear even much stronger than she really was, and which had the further effect of entering to the minds of her subjects the beautiful sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full license of criticism—of elegant private occasionally followed—and of a love for knowledge without reservation of character. Such were the views of Perikles in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration pronounced in the first year of that war—an exposition for ever memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter however was the opposition made by Thucydides and his party to that projected expenditure—so violent and pointed did the criticism of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal, which

¹ Thucyd. I. 86.

the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism we are not informed; but we are clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Themistocles, in order to procure the banishment of Pericles, the more powerful person of the two and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Pericles and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Themistocles to ostracism.¹ And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Themistocles was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Pericles.

The ostracism of Themistocles apparently took place about two years² after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce (445—443 B.C.), and it is in the period immediately following that the great Periclean works began. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Xerxes from his Persian expedition; but the strand of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbour was the proposition of Pericles, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Salamis, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Piræus, another from Athens to Phaleron; the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Piræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Pericles now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Piræus, and within a short distance³ (scarcely more than one furlong) from it, to

After
restoration
of parties at
Athens—
vote of
ostracism—
Themis-
tocles is
ostracised.
—Plutarch,
vol. v. c.

new walls
intermediate
of a third
wall Long
wall.
From the
Piræus—
which is
nearly 500
yards in
length, by the
ancient
measure.

¹ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 11—13, other details see Thucydides viii. 42, 43, 44, 45, and Herodotus vii. 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

Themistocles and Themistocles also the last
restoration of Themistocles, Egypt the
last, vol. v. c. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
² Plutarch, Pericles, c. 10; the
restoration of them between 445 and 443.
³ Plutarch, Pericles, c. 10, with the same
Plutarch, Pericles, c. 10, with the same
Plutarch, Pericles, c. 10, with the same

that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Pnyxian wall. It was accordingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Piræus, alleged by Isokritos to have cost 3000 talents, were constructed;¹ while the town itself of Piræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets.² Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Piræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora.³ At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularized also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.⁴

The new scheme upon which the Piræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the moral grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Periclean age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenæic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of Athina, called the Parthenon, with all its marvellous decorations of sculpture, stucco, and relief; lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon

¹ Isokritos, *Stylion*, p. 375—383. See the map of Athens and its environs, at the top of the page.

² Isokritos, *Cont.* vii. 4; *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17.

³ See *Antiquities*, vii. 17. *Geography*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17.

All the other names are relating to

the Odeon. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17.

⁴ *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17. *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17.

⁵ *Antiquities*, p. 143, s. 17.

were both finished between 448 and 437 B.C.; the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 433 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began.¹ Progress was also made in restoring or re-constructing the Erechtheion, or eastern temple of Athena Polias, the patron goddess of the city, which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Minerva at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinia mysteries—that of Athena at Sounion, and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less remarkable than the architecture. Three statues of Athena, all by the hand of Phidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 67 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon²—a second, of bronze, called the Lemnian Athena—a third, of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athena Promachos, placed between the Propylæa and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigators approaching Pireus by sea.

It is not of course to Phidias that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. But the great sculpture and architecture, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in history, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Phidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have discharged themselves from that stiffness of imitation and adherence to a conventional type which marked the efforts of his predecessors.³ He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Pericles imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Ectone, Kallikrates, Korobos, Mnasilas, and others—worked under his instructions; and he

Phidias
created and
executed
—Phidias,
Ectone,
Kallikrates.

¹ See, *Geography of Athens*, App. vol. II, p. 161, 162, 163, 164.

² See *Geography of Athens*, App. vol. II, p. 161, 162, 163, 164.

³ Athena, by the hand of Phidias—four in the acropolis of Athens.

⁴ Phidias, *Phidias*, p. 10—12; *Phidias*, *Phidias*, p. 10—12; also *Phidias*, *Phidias*, p. 10—12.

had besides a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labours was confided. With all the great contributions which Phidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, created in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished.

In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been raised by the occupation of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first, the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peireus with its docks and magnificence—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, &c., in Greece¹—lastly the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Phidias as well as the paintings of the Theban painter Polygnotus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Porcile. Plutarch observes² that the splendor with which the walls were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and as it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and

¹ Thucyd. I. 10. and Polybius follow the former opinion, stating as they did, according to report and tradition, that

and that there still to-day are to be seen the walls of the city.

² Plutarch, Pericles, c. 12.

especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.¹ The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 8000 talents in the aggregate (about \$100,000).² The expenditure of so large a sum was of course a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, &c., concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athena, and ivory employed in its place.³ Even the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents.⁴ A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as given towards the gods, was at the same time imposing as evidence to Grecian looking, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and regarded with grateful deference the rich man who indulged in it. Pericles knew well that the visible splendor of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would even by great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged, influence—perhaps even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Pericles, apparently not long after the commencement of the Thirty years' truce, witness how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it

¹ Thucyd. i. 6.

² See Latta, *Topography of Athens*, printed in N. Y. 1846, vol. 40. George Francis Colburn leaves with much justice, contrary to the statement of 1843 already stated by the same author, and of Pericles as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be greatly exaggerated. Mr. Wallace (London, 1846) says expressly the same opinion, concluding that the statement of Thucide

from Pericles is a gross exaggeration, and on a desirable road.

³ See *Pericles*, by George Francis Colburn, N. Y. 1846. Pericles for the large sum expended upon the Propylæa, 11,000 talents, must be credited this amount. If he had been led to take the cost of them at 1000 talents.

⁴ See Thucyd. i. 6, 8.

⁵ Thucyd. ii. 13.

with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He persuaded upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek world, great and small, urging each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three periods were to be discussed at this intended congress. 1. The restoration of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The settlement of such vows as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all.

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the sanction of this congress at Athens—a Pan-hellenic congress for Pan-hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Boeotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, never amounting, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this school was quite sufficient to sustain the whole scheme.¹ It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been considered just as much as the allies perfectly autonomous; as that their friendly relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of conveying harmony and alliance for the dispersed fragments of the Greek world—a comprehensive benefit not likely to be entertained at Sparta even as a project, but which might perhaps have been realised under Athens, and seems in the end to have been sincerely aimed at by Pericles. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the Thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of unintermitted peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Sicily.

¹ Plutarch, *Pericles*, c. 15. Plutarch gives an account (c. 16, and c. 18) of the *Prothales*, viz. a. 40 years' truce, viz. for negotiation of a congress, before the first war between Sparta and Athens and the battle of Salamis—i.e. before 480 B.C. But this date seems to me impossible: Thucydides has not yet mentioned in person, nor had

Sparta as concerned from the crisis of her alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Persia himself seems to have been at that time in a position to conceive or bring a project, which, even in every respect, would be the last project, after the Thirty years' truce, and before the Peloponnesian war.

seven hundred necessary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame the Spartan democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pericles. They were further lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Linnæa their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Syracuse also joined. It seems remarkable, that though by such a proceeding they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to renew aggressive hostilities against Miletus,¹ whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was despatched to Sicily under ten generals, two of whom were Pericles himself and the poet Sophocles,² both seemingly included among the ten ordinary Strategæ of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly to accompany contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophocles went in person;³ partly in keeping watch off the coast of Eria for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Pericles had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate to march the Spartan fleet of seventy ships on his way back from Miletus, near the island of Troezen, and was victorious in the action. Presently he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Syracuse, where he overcame the Spartan land force and blocked up the harbour with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile the Sicilians had sent Dionysius with five ships to press the sailing of the Phoenician

¹ Thucyd. i. 124, 125.
² Thucyd. vi. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

gleaming and graceful in reality, but never dignified by lofty reality. Sophocles was at this time in middle life, and the subject of his tragedy *Antigonè* the year before the first discovery of these vessels discovered and described in Sophocles' *Antigonè* is the Antigonè, v. 1, 2.

voted for assisting the Spartans. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know; but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the treaty distinctly forbade compliance with the Spartan request, but also recognised the right of each confederacy to pursue its own course as might seem. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit in the eyes of Athens, as its chief authors.¹ Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnicians then would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Saronis, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would restore the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Saronis again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 418 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of Cleonæ or headed pretensions, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year.² As Saronis remained, during the interval between 426 B.C. and 418 B.C., untroubled, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens, and as it nevertheless either returned, or acquired, its oligarchical government, so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to demolish by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The constitution of Leucas at the time of its revolt (compare to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion.³

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Saronis, Pericles was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, soldiers and public slavesque were celebrated in the oration called *Koronothekos*. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the

Application of the
Spartan to
Athens for
aid against
Athens—as
indicated
above
shows the
Corinthians.

Reconquest
of Saronis
after the
revolt—
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated
—reinstated

¹ Thucyd. i. 90, et.

² Thucyd. viii. 35.

³ Compare Macdonald, *Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, vol. III, sec. 12, p. 26.

Persian war,¹ and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the
 patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker
 elected to deliver it was possessed of the personal
 dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Perikles.
 He was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the
 citizens: once after the Persian success, and a second
 time on the first year of the Peloponnesian war. The
 discourse on the first occasion has not reached us;² but the
 second has been fortunately preserved (in substance at least) by
 Thucydides, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony—
 describing the same on all occasions. The bones of the deceased
 warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony,
 in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of
 bringing offerings. They were then placed in coffins of cypress
 and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the
 Kerameikos; two coffins for each of the two tribes, and one empty
 coffin, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones
 had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of
 each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a
 numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. As soon as
 the bones had been assigned to the grave, some distinguished
 citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, mounted on an elevated
 stage and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse.
 Such was the effect produced by that of Perikles after the Persian
 expedition, that when he had concluded, the audience present
 testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women
 especially covered him with garlands like a victorious athlete.³
 Only Klistos, son of the deceased Kerkira, reminded him that

¹ The *Funerary Oration* described the
 funeral given to Athenians who
 fell in the Persian war. (Thucyd. ii. 34.
 D. 1, 2.)

Perikles is the funeral orator pro-
 vided by Thucydides (ii. 34-45, begins
 by saying—*οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν*—the orator
 addressed the funeral of the war-
 riors of the Persian expedition, &c.

The funeral and other ceremonies
 (ii. 34, 35) were and were common
 among the ancient Greeks. These
 people as he was celebrated was a
 man distinguished as the defender of
 his country in several battles. The
 funeral was held; Thucyd. ii. 34, 35.

Thucyd. ii. 34, 35. Thucydides
 describes the funeral of the Athenians
 who were killed in the Persian war.
 The orator was Perikles, and the
 funeral was held in the city of Athens.
 The orator was Perikles, and the
 funeral was held in the city of Athens.
 The orator was Perikles, and the
 funeral was held in the city of Athens.

² Some fragments of it may be
 found preserved in the lives of Aristides
 and the orator of the funeral, &c. (ii.
 34, 35.)

³ Thucydides (ii. 34, 35) describes the
 funeral of the Athenians who were
 killed in the Persian war. The
 funeral was held in the city of Athens.

the victories of her brother had been more fibrous, as gained over Persians and Phoenicians, and not over Greeks and Romans. And the contemporary poet Iliu, the friend of Kinka, reported what he thought an unusually honest of Penkila—in the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while he in nine months had reduced the Tro and most powerful of all the local communities.¹ But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honour of the exploit to Athena and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favour of comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host—not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this hotel, there can be no doubt that the result of the Boston war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril, but rendered it stronger than ever; while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened it still further. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any further tendencies to dissension among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian War. The feeling common among them towards Athens seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but steady and disinterested co-operation in her advancement.

Such amounts of positive discontent as really existed among these areas, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political injustice of the Greek state—desire of separate autonomy, which manifested itself in each city, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens, and was stimulated by the constant communication from the Greek communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, those latter gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent with itself among the subject allies.

1. **Abstract** (100-150 words): Summarize the purpose, methods, results, and conclusions of the study.

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1971, p. 489, et. al. Etymology, within the
context of, allows about the location
was, and the word, by which, is used
and, respectively, respectively, respectively,
Tone, 1971.

We shall find that in most of these cases of equal evils where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or resisted by a small number of oligarchical individuals, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested, indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylene² in the fourth year of the war, it was the oligarchical government which resolved, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favour of Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war—even after all the backships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse—was both proposed beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but against the inclination of their own people.³ In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously seduced by the Athenian Flaminio and his oligarchical confederates. So in *Abrothia*, in *Amphipolis*, in *Mende*, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas, we find the latter secretly introduced by a few conspirators. The bulk of the citizens do not join at once as a fellow-revolt, like the mob of Athenian democracy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demands, just as well as constituting, now gain their assent. But neither in *Abrothia* nor in *Amphipolis* would he have been admitted by the free democracy of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the hands without the walls.⁴ These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward to

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also, regarding the Tardieu signature found on the list of the parties destroyed by the American signature, comments that were then regarding the retention of the French name of

Affirm—that they immediately will be prosecuted for passing fake Affirm if they do not, either in person or by mail, the other is charged with the task of identifying and prosecuting anyone who does not do this by Feb. 10.

TOTAL REVENUE

as private, most harmonious among these wide-spread islands and assemblages of the *Epores*, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common sympathies. The synod of Etilon, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have been formed, of recognizing a sort of federal tribunal,—to decide presently how far each city had initially discharged its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other allies with their individual citizens separately, as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy also claimed was exercised.¹ Now from the beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire,—the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and decisions much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens

Protractive
claims
Greece
large, but
of present
interests of
citizenship
to the alle-
ges—
themselves.

(taking this somewhat statement of Aristophanes not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number), if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Etilon, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that all the private complaints and suits between allies and allies, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens; yet

¹ Of these particular examples when Aristophanes mentions of subjugation of allies by Athens, there is a more properly federal and judicial—and a more extensive—decided by Athenian empire.

² According to the principle laid down by the confederacy itself before the Philoponemian war—each member of the confederacy should not be judged

(*Alcibiades* L. 25—26).

The second instance, in referring their accusations of wrong against Thucydides, depended, that he should be tried in Sparta, before the common federal court which had the right to judge them, and of which Athens was then a member; that is, the Synod consisting of all allies, and which composed the *Magistracy* (*Alcibiades* L. 26).

we do not know distinctly how the law was drawn, between matters carried up thither and matters tried at home. The subject either appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens;² or that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called "the higher justice" generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizens against citizens, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, &c., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the exclusive object of sweeping the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied states with which they had relations—between each city itself, and a dependent government with surrounding political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common spread emanating from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more inclined to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a Duxarchy (or oligarchical council of two) among its allied citizens, together with a Spartan hermost or governor having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe the Spartan imperial empire that the arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. They served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta, without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the

² Aristotle, *de Civitate* (Macleay), v. 1, p. 116. It adds also Sparta, from "intention, justice, and duty." *Sparganum*.

immensely overpowered by the enormities of the Spartan barons and Dekarchoi, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as cleruchs, proprietors, or traders. Of course therefore disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same camp. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so contrived as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the barons or the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikastai, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the best redress which the contingency admitted. If a Theban citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Theophrastos, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thebes, he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikastai, in which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Theban. To a citizen of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sent before the courts at Athens; but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he would not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable (to the weaker at least) even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a baron and a partisan oligarchy. And we need anecdotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the grossest outrages committed by the barons or by private Spartans out of Lacedæmon. The two daughters of a Boeotian, named Ekheleus (of Leuktes in Boeotia) had been first

immense
affairs
citizens
spread over
the empire
—the allies
had no
redress
against
them,
except
through the
Athenian
dikastai.

from that epoch, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophanes himself.¹ It may be that the history was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-States,—and neither the latter had good reason to complain. But on the other hand we have no ground for ascribing it of deliberate or standing malice, or of any other defects then such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whenever might be the justice under truth.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war—before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens—before that approved Severance, restraint, contempt of obligations, and repulsive violence which Thucydides so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the force of an all-pervading contest.² There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Sicily. All had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed the same manifesting rigour as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mytilene, Miletus, and Minoa. The policy of Pericles, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, even to fearful extremeness of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that universal enmity in the allies by which all of them must have been pained—not without a

¹ Xenophanes, *Eclog.* Ath. l. vi. He makes it be one of the advantages of democracy, which preserved the laws, that he holds the universal sovereignty of the allies to Athens, for that that the physicians of the civil system, saying it, serve the law, because will quickly bring to remedy all the evil for the Athens dependencies and peace.

And in several parts of his treatise (ch. 4, 5, 6) he represents the advantage

of democracy as connected with political freedom, which serves that they could quickly get the law, because they have the law before them, and they could be brought to the law. It would hardly be the civil system, therefore, as a remedy, therefore, to remedy all the evil for the allies.

² See the well-known comparison to the millions at Antioch, in ch. 4.

conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydides the speech of the envoy from Mitylene¹ at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens—a speech inspiring aid and setting forth the strongest indictment against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish—we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical government and experience to urge against the imperial city. He does not dwell upon necessity of tribute, unparalled misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing suits for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally. He has nothing in any except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent; and in the case of Mitylene, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous city. Of course this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or each of them, could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity.² But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylene might be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the *Ægean*, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.³

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65-74.

² And the Athenian orator Diodorus points it in his speech denouncing the Lacedæmonian prohibition which he is reported to Mitylene—*de non Mitylenæis et de Atheniensibus Mitylenæis*—as a conspiracy for entire separation.

³ Thucyd. ii. 65-66.

⁴ It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially a government of dependence, Athens as its imperial state receiving annually 4000 talents from provinces. To maintain constant relations between

the subject-
cities of
Athens
dependent
provinces
is complete
the

consideration which had induced them to raise the temples of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Pison. For through their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against Athens was even now strong,¹ adding greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian allies, prejudice indicated that as a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only as a man of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian allies. But a conspiracy, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Sason, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the disposition of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forced instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Egea, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy.² What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgment implied, in addition to the hegemony dignity, we are not in a condition to say. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonies themselves found acceptable. To these suitable relations, however, the powerful Earkyes bore a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tribute of money and naval support. It was amidst such relations of isolated ill-will between Corinth and Earkyes, that a dispute grew up regarding the city of Epistemonæ (known afterwards in the Roman times as Dyrrhachium, and by the modern Darnass)—a colony founded by the Earkyans, on the coast of Egea in the Ionic Gulf, immediately to the north of their own island. So strong was the animosity of Egean customs in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Earkyans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the Egean (or Pæonian Chief) of Epistemonæ

¹ Thucyd. i. 90.

² Thucyd. i. 10. signifying relation and not direct interference.

questionable property, their eyes were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphic god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unanimous application at Korkyra—to induce Epicharmus to the Christianism as to its citizens and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin—and not contenting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Christians, who, looking upon Epicharmus as a joint ally from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake the scheme—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They quickly organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Cathartes, Iachthos, and Ankoliphos; which embarked early, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyran navy, was marched by land as far as Apollonia, and transported from thence by sea to Epicharmus.¹

The arrival of such a reinforcement raised the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyranes, who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were further inflamed by the Epicharmian shipwrecked sailors, who, coming to the island with petitions for aid, and appeals to the loyalty of their Korkyran ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five vessels, afterwards strengthened by a further reinforcement, which was sent to Epicharmus with the leading negotiation that they should be forthwith restored, and the newcomers from Corinth banished. His attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyranes commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land force of Hyrranie—making proclamation that any person within, either as not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this persuasion we do not know; but at least enough to convey to

The King
Korkyra
about Epicharmus—
about—
and would
any notice
to Corinth.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.

Coskate the news that their troops in Ephesus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately began the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the needs of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyrans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty thousand and three thousand hoplites of their own, they collected aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Felle in the island of Egea-lania, five by Ephesus, two by Tenedos, one by Thessalon, ten by Leontes, and eight by Amphibia, together with pecuniary contributions from Thiois, Phiois, and Mias. They further proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers in Ephesus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any one, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to secure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Coskate, though undertaken with intemperate hostility towards Korkyra, had not been prompted by any formal proposition, such as was customary among Grecian states—a looseness of feeling arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, unconnected either in the Adriatic or in the Ionian maritime spheres. The Korkyrans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by possible means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Argolis to accompany them to Corinth, where, while they regulated that the towns and settlers recently dispatched to Ephesus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Coskate to interfere in that colony, they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to enter it for

THE
GALLERY
OF
THE
KOR-
KYRANS
WITH
COSKATE
AND
THE
FLEET
PROCEEDING.

arbitration office to some impartial Polynesian city or to the English consuls; such arbiters to determine in which of the two cities Episkumau or a colony really belonged, and the decision to be stayed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if provided on, would drive them to a course of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Karkyuanu believing there was withdrawal from Episkumau. Whereupon the Karkyuanu rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new arbiters and the troops sent by Corinth were received at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Karkyuanu would acquiesce in the state quo on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.

Although the Karkyuanu had been unwearingly hard in rejecting the first application from Episkumau, yet in their propositions made at Corinth night and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to think of intending to arbitration.

Accordingly, as soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Episkumau, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Karkyuanu. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five warriors under Ariston, Kalikimale, and Tiamara, with 1000 hoplites under Archemon and Iarichileu, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the Ambrosius Gulf, it was met by a Karkyuanu herald in a little boat beseeching all further advance—a summons of course travelling, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Karkyuanu fleet. Out of the 150 warriors which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the ships of Episkumau, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service, the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Episkumau surrendered to their beseeching fleet, under agreement that the Dutchessons would

It should be held as proven, and that the other party must, should be said as shown. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyrians continued undisturbed masters of the neighbouring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimna, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the barbarous practice of Greek warfare, to kill all their prisoners—except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Lechia, burnt Kylitha the capital of Elio, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Lechia, Ambrakion, and Akrothitia. The Korkyrians first was again assembled near Cape Leukimna, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.¹

Deeply wroth, the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the disgusts of the action where they had brought together; and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epiknemus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purpose; and as afterwards, they went round, not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take in to their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts almost well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 160 sail:

¹ The Hellenic life, throughout its progress of war during the ancient periods, I conceive to be identical with the civil social history of Europe. It is exemplified in domestic usage during all its changes in literature, art, and the Greek and Roman ages under Greek or Barbarian, against the Turks.

² Again, when needed, more upon

great facts through the English and the French as well as the Greek. The general correspondence of the different histories, since the great political changes in antiquity, is the same. The same is the case with the Greek and Roman ages under Greek or Barbarian, against the Turks.

³ Thucyd. i. 25, 26.

twenty-seven, thirteen from Amphibia, twelve from Mages, ten from Eius, as many from Tachia, and one from Amphibolus. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Christianus Xanthos and four others were commanders-in-chief.²

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Karkyrenae, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command, and how extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet allied themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacemonia. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island: from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Aegean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Karkyren had been scarce in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacemonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy watched pernicious influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionian Gulf: she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amiable relations with the Dorian Karkyren. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there any thing to forbid it; for in the treaty between Athens and Sparta it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.³ While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances

² Thucyd. I. 10—12.

³ Thucyd. I. 19—20.

under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave consequences to all parties. The Eurytomæa envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens for the purpose of making it, more than with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be entrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people; and in point of fact they were so estimated, even under governments only partially democratical, much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Eurytomæa envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the Strategæ or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was to serve, for the Eurytomæans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, there present at Athens (Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests, public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government, and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Eurytomæan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thucydides has given us his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation, which was

Address of
the Eurytomæa
envoys to
the Athenian
public assembly.

Principal
features of
style of
speech, as
given in
Thucydides.

out of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides.

The Korkyraeans, after lamenting their previous imprudence, which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as champions for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common interests and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidaurea, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay: moreover they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organized under her auspices, including almost warriors hired even from the cities of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place rectify this misemployment of her own resources, and would at the same time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important reinforcement. For next to her own, the Korkyraean naval force was the next powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach. If by declining the present offer she permitted Korkyra to be over-run, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies; for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a alliance between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to win Korkyra along with her naval force.¹ The policy of Athens therefore imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyraeans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' treaty. And although some might counsel that, in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to

¹ Thucyd. i. 10. *οὐδὲ Κερκυραίων πολεῖν ἐν ἑσπερίᾳ ἐκπληρώσειαν, οὐδὲ τὴν Κερκυραίων ἀνδραγαθίαν ἐπὶ ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ τῶν ἑσπερίων πόλεων καὶ ἀνδραγαθίᾳ.*

Moreover this was in the strongest degree, the object of the Athenians, and which they had before in view.

had a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under constraints of amity with them, through the Thirty years' truce, but had also rendered material service to them by detaching the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissensions, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Greek international law, that each alliance was entitled to pursue its own subsidiary members. They now called upon Athens to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,¹ especially as the violation of it would react immediately upon Athens herself with her commerce dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain, and might possibly never come at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conclude Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would scarcely come if she refused such conditions, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the presumed naval co-operation of Korkyra would compensate.²

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the non-Attic speakers before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow; so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily Thucydides does not give us any of these Athenian discourses—not even that of Perikles, who determined the ultimate result.

Epikrates with its disputed question of metropolitan right occupied little the attention of the Athenian assembly. But the Korkyran naval force was indeed an immense item, even the question was whether it should stand on their side or against them—in them which nothing could counterbalance except the danger of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and crews in the service of the Peloponnesian league!" "We will not readily avoid it,

¹Thucyd. I. 24. *παρὰ τὴν ἀδελφείαν*—*παρὰ τὴν ἀδελφείαν*—*παρὰ τὴν ἀδελφείαν*
²Thucyd. I. 24—25.

Position
of the
Athenians—
a qualified
alliance
with the
people of
Korkyra.
The
Athenian
alliance
was to
Korkyra.

even by that great orator (was the reply of others). The preceding account of war was at work, and it will inevitably come whatever you may determine respecting Korymba: avoid yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantages." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly predominant in the assembly;¹ but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformable to the steady conviction of Perikles. It was however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korymba, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korymbians, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required, which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korymba and her possessions in case they were attacked; nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lamachus, son of Kleon. The weakness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korymba from ruin and would, in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lamachus and his two colleagues were express not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korymba or some Korymbian possession with a view to attack; but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of 180 sail now took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbor on the coast of Epizeuri at the Cape called Chamaireon, nearly opposite to the northern extremity of Korymba. They there embarked a naval

¹ Thucyd. i. 40. *Ἰσχυρὰ δὲ λέγουσιν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἀποφασίζοντες, ὅτι καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιτελέσῃ, οὐδὲν πλεονέκτημα ἔσται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλὰ ὅτι καὶ ἐὰν οὐκ ἐπιτελέσῃ, οὐδὲν πλεονέκτημα ἔσται τοῖς Κορίνθιοις.*

See, likewise, the language of Demosthenes usually like the positive denial of war.

² Thucyd. i. 40. *Πολεμὸν ἐπὶ τῇ.*

a. 18) satisfies the condition of the agreement, stipulated under Lamachus, for a petty state of Korymba against that committing no act, as to the real political advantage of Athens. From whatever side might the advanced, the active engaged seems quite necessary to speak.

station and camp, returning to their old & considerable force from the friendly Epicrate tribes in the neighbourhood. The Eorkyrean fleet of 512 sail, under Makhidas and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sphero, while the land force and 1800 Eorkyrean hoplites were posted on the Eorkyrean Cape Leukimont. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Chios, and encountered in the morning the Eorkyrean fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the chosen vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their opposite fleet; next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and manoeuvring were not conformable to the custom. The ships were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Eorkyrean side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward, so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, until they were on land—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian warfare, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman were of much greater importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength and swiftness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by force calculated to destroy, the Athenian captain sought to drive the enemy back of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy—side, rear, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed men on deck begin their operations.²

² *Diogenes* has only to turn the shipward—was a possible allegation made before him as that he had no employment in Athenian tactics, as we

Lacedæmonians with his ten Athenian ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, but as much able as he could by taking position at the extremity of the line and by making motions as if about to attack; while his women had full leisure to contemplate what they would suppose as nobody's handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The ships on both sides became entangled, the row broken and unmanageable,—where would soldiers be found any longer,—and the individual valour of the hoplites and bowmen on deck became the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Eorkyræans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the ^{the Eorky-}Ambrakian fleet of Corinth, and not only pursued ^{ships up} them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their valour in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved miserably unskilful, the number of their total number was inferior; for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the row obliged to retreat as they could—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have prevented, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonian. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were proving their victory—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Eorkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and water-logged ships, of their own and their enemies, as well as with swarms, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless about the vessels or keeping shore water as well as they could—among the number, many of their own.

see remarked also in Thucyd. iv. 10—
Thucyd. iv. 10, 11.

The Corinthians and Eorkyræan ships
whenever came to anchor, the
Athenians immediately by counteracting

their power with increased activity and
strength, and having the Athenians
used to a direct attack which the
other party was unable to bear
(Thucyd. iv. 10, 11).

children and allies, especially on their defeated right wing. Through these dashed vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of their prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. Some arms of their own allies were thus done, not being easily distinguishable. The Corinthians having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epeiros; after which they again reinforced their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Epeirians on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small vessels which had remained in harbour, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast; and the Achaean ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to co-operate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon; but the Corinthian fleet, though their ports had already been ordered for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epeiric coast. The Epeirians did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching under Glaukon and Antisthenes, which the Corinthians had been the first to detect, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukhorea, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies.¹ At first the Epeirians even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Epeiros, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the forerunners of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Epeirians had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—as that the superiority of

¹ Thucyd. i. 11. In the original and complete Greek text there is no repetition.

number was still on the side of the latter, who were however outnumbered with the men of 1000 prisoners (800 of them slaves) captured, not very eager to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Issa apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to launch a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Kerkyrans. And when their enemies called upon to offer them battle on the Egean coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance. The men carried no hostile staff (we should say, no flag of war), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. "Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Kerkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, who first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies?" It was not the fault of the Kerkyreans that this last idea was not seriously reflected; for each of them as was now enough to hear instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from heeding to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: "We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians; we have come simply to aid these Kerkyreans our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition; but if ye are about to sail against Kerkyra or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you." Both the answer and the treatment of the men in the boat satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying however to erect a trophy at Sydon on the Egean

Arrival of a reinforcement from Athens—
the Corinthians not willing, carrying off supplies, Kerkyreans prisoners.

Navigation not yet previously begun, but now Athens and Corinth.

agent, in consequence of their advantage on the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised Anaktoria at the mouth of the Anaktoria Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Eorians, placing in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was dismantled, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 600 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 200 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families in Eorion, and the Corinthians designed to give them over, as it is to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The colonisation incidents arising from their subsequent return will appear in another chapter.

Ships
seized
by the
Corinthians
towards
Athens.

Refused now from all danger, the Eorians picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient treasure to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success in the last wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected meeting of the last Athenian ships; but the last result was as triumphant to them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and forced all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and unquenchable, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her aims in sparing the Corinthians from off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

They begin
to stir up
warfare
among the
Athenians
and
Eorians, a
policy of
division,
begun at
Athens.

On the isthmus of Corinthus peninsulas called Pelion (which forms the westernmost of the three groups of the greater Thessalian peninsulas called Chalkidiki, between the Thessalian and the Boeotian Gulfs) was situated the Dorian town of Pelion, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally connected from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan alliance towards the latter; inasmuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the

tile of Ephyrae¹. On various points of the neighbouring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Botionians, enrolled in this manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighbouring island territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidike,² was held by the Macedonian king Perdikas, son of that Alexander who had taken just fifty years before the capital of Lykia. These two persons appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thracia by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdikas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Dardas, holding independent preeminence in the upper country³ (apparently on the higher course of the Axius near the Paeonian tribes), with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands.⁴ For the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land neighbour, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the wisdom of the sea; and we still find Athens herself valuing suddenly the favour of Strabon and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominions near the seaports.⁵ Perdikas began

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Chalkidians
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territory of
Cassius.

¹ See the geographical Description of Thessaly upon Greece, published at Paris, Frankfurt, and Thessalonica, vol. II. ch. 10.

² The words of the Geography of the same place, however, in the same passage, the words in Chalkidike, mean all the islands or in the cities of Thracia, within three years of Thracia land.

³ Thesaur. I. 17. 18. 19.

⁴ See the geographical passage in the same place, Thesaur. I. 17. 18. 19.

⁵ Thesaur. I. 17. 18. 19. Infinitely less a remarkable passage in this respect

in the beginning of the year Philip, year 111. After pointing out the importance of securing a victory on the coast of the territory of a powerful potentate, and the important advantages that would result from having a victory near the coast, he says, 'as far as the power of the Athenians would be important rather than necessary to Athens, because it would enable her to extend upon Thracia, through the power of securing her colonies, and to also find that important battle upon Thracia the Thracian king in consequence of her victory in the Chalkidians—victory

diately began to invite and aid the Chalkidians and Boeotians to revolt from Athens; and the violent anxiety against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Chalkidians by the recent events at Euboea, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidea. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidea, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian League to a general declaration of war against Athens.¹ And he further prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small towns on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perikles further assigned some territory near lake Beldis to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth. Immediately after the Euboean sea-fight they went to take precautions against the revolt of Potidea; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallis, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland—requiring them further both to deliver hostages and to furnish the annual magistratus who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 5000 hoplites, under Anisotrates and ten others, despatched to act against Perikles in the Thracian Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidea, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighbouring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potideaans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time, and to Sparta, in conjunction with Olynthus, in order to determine a Lacedaemonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidea being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty

Perikles, the able defence given with superior ability of which his role in this campaign did not furnish the opportunity presented.
Amplifying accounts also see Thucyd. I. 10, 21.

years' time still subsisting. At Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (scarcely about Malakothra, 433 B.C.), at the same time that the movement under Archestratus failed. The Chalkidians and Bottiaeans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.¹ Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perikles in Macedonia, not having resources enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therna, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philip and the brothers of Berenæ, after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therna, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired for the occasion—under Ariston son of Adimantos, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put to a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament however was speedily sent forth—sixty triremes and 2000 Athenian hoplites under Kallos son of Kallipides,² with four other commanders—who, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perikles, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Ariston and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf—next attacking, though without effect, the town of Berenæ—and then ascending by land along the eastern coast of the Gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.

² Kallos was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid his large

sum of 100 talents to Dem of Elm, the Peloponnesian, for the trial, imprisonment, and perpetual banishment (Plato, *Akribastês*, l. c. 35, p. 124).

them in the year when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to plan to reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a shock against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeia. In the battle which ensued, Aristeia and the chosen band of Chalkidians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance. But the remaining Paitheans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeia found the victorious Athenians between him and Paitheia, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two evils, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, making into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Paithean wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus, with a mole running out at each end into the water. He effected this during enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Paitheans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective movement; nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Paitheans and Chalkidians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only 500 men, while the Athenians lost 150, together with the general Kallias.*

The victory was however quite complete, and the Athenians, after having secured their trophy and given up the ^{Paitheia} ^{found in} ^{Paitheia} ^{by the} ^{Athenians.} enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Paitheia from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallantia; but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose,

* Thucyd. i. 97, 98.

until after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1000 Greek hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aspleyria in the peninsula of Pallinê, marched slowly up to Perithoe, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallinê, so that the town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the fleet refused to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalcidic and Boeotian towns. The capture of Perithoe being now only a question of more or less time, Arctonoe, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbour, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 400 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not deter the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sailed forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warfare operations among the Chalcidians, and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Scyrus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had however been so well provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Scyryra, with ductility and severity at Perithoe, spring those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

¹ Thopl. l. 22.







**BATTLE
OF
SALAMIS
B.C. 480.**

General's Orders, Vol. IV, No. 1.



BATTLE
FLATRA

U.S. 470
 1944-1945
 1946-1947
 1948-1949
 1950-1951

I. First Position occupied by the opposing nation.
 II. Second Position.
 III. Third Position.

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